Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate Studies

5-1964

The Role of the Federal Government in the Industrial Expansion of
Utah During World War Two
Anthony Thomas Cluff
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Cluff, Anthony Thomas, "The Role of the Federal Government in the Industrial Expansion of Utah During
World War Two" (1964). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 2795.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/2795

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu.

THF ROLF OF THE FEDERAL GOVFRNMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL
EXPANSION OF UTAH DURING WORLD

AR

'1'110

by

Anthony Thomas Cluff

A thesis sutmitted in partial fulfi llment
of the requirements for the degree
of

!\'ASTER OF SCIENCE
in
Economics

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Log-an, Utah

1964

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The period in Utah's
one of limited economic

hi~tory

progres~ .

fr om 1900 t o

194 ~ wa~

Workers emigrated t o

more lucrative areas of the nation, the rate of growth
in manufacturing declined , and there was a general fall
in per capita personal and fa r m income.

As a result of

this de cline, Utah suffered relatively more than most
in the nati on during the 1930 ' s .

Jtate

World War II cau ed the induJtrial and technological
development of Utah to mushroom .

1930

1 .,

failed t o bring in

What the New Deal of the

pr c ~perity

to the nati on, \•as

mure than made up fer by the vadt amount of government
Jpendi ng during Wo rld War II.

Such government spe nding

'1a.3 particularly important t o the Utah economy ,

Long after

the v1 ar, the effects of wart ime g overnment .!pending were
.3till being felt in the state' s economy .

Today, remainder

of wartime government investments , ouch as the Geneva Steel
'ltlorks and the Utah Oil Refinery, employ
pay incomes to

tho~e

thou~and.>

of Ut ahns ,

thousands , and purchase great amounts

of Utah 1 s naturo.l re s ources each year ,
The objectives of thiJ 3tudy have been the following :
A brief study of the national expansion of indus try

1,

during
?.

'11

orld Wa r II,
A stati stical and instituti onal description of the

iii

various government wartime def ense plants built in the
state .

J,

A comparison of national and Mountain States

with Utah industry before and after the war ,
4.

A study of the effects of both the government

activities and the war on the state

3

industry.

The most important sources of information for thi"
~ tudy

included the Salt Lake Tribune, The New York Times

and various periodical publications, all of

~ich

f ound at thelibrary at Utah Scat .. ·university.

were

In addi-

tion, various governmental publicat i ons, especially from
the U. S. Department of Interior, U. S, Department of
Commerce, U. S. Civilian Production Administration, and
/

the Utah Industrial Commi cision, were invaluable.

The

archives at the Utah State Historical Society held a
treasure of valuable letters and telegrams written during
the war by individuals in key
and national government 3.
o

pos iti on~

in both the scate

Use was also made of the files

the Department of Employment Sec urity and the University

of Utah' s Department of Economics and Business, both of
Nhich are located in Salt Lake City .
The author would like to thank and acknowledge certain institution<> and individuals who made thi
poss ible .

study

Appreciation i s extended to the librarians and
I

wo rk Jr

at the library at Utah State University

hose time

and effort spent searching shelves and indexes for

iv
information iJ greatly appreciated .

Thanks also goes to

the librarians at the Utah State Historical So ciety,
ho~

intere s t in my subject and patience with my ques-

tiond wad remarkable .
Several individuals have been instrumental in the
completion of this work .
profess or~
a~

Appreciation i s extended to

E. B. Murray and V. L. Israel en both of which,

cconomi~ts,

have been an

in~piration

study of economics at Utah State .

to my continued

Professor S . G.

Ellsworth, in his capacity as a historian, has provided
st imulus for attempts at accuracy of dates and authenticity
of events .
Arr ington

Special thanks 1:3 in order to pro f ei.lsor L. J.
~o·se

inspiration a>J an instr·uctor and patience

Dr . Arrington's

over comma

plices has been exceptional.

Juggestion

concerning this work have been highly valued

and enthusiast ically incorporated.
Finally, thanks go to my parents and my wife's parent s ,
1. ho e financial and moral support have been great ly appreciated .

Grateful appreciation goes also to my wife , who ,

though surprised and pl eased at the completion of this
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de spair.
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CHAPTER

I

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL EXPAN ION, 1939-1945
From

Depres~ion

to Boom

For ten years the American economy had been depressed .
Unemployment haunted economi c planner . . , lo .. producti on
plagued manufacturers, l ow incomes impoverished wage earners,
and everyone hoped for the dawn of new prosperity .

It <.as

a.s if recovery had waited for an untrodden decade to arrive
before heralding the ne w day.

The New Deal brought

Security for old age, in surance for bank depos it s ,

ocial
n e~

guar antee . . for labor , arrl a score of public v.ork projects ,
but it did not bring economic recovery.
The year 1937 had
but ''bu!.line

~

een some resemblance of an up.:ndng,

cros:sed the street from 1938 to 1939, .slipped

on a banana peel on the opposite curb, and nearly landed on
it ... ear . ,, l

Though the New Deal had promi ::~ed both recovery

and reform, it accompli shed the reformati on but failed to
enliven economic .stimulation .
ment

"~<la s

As late a.s 1939, unemploy-

::l till a serious problem .

Estimates of the number

of unempl oyed totaled approximately 10,000,000 at the close
of 1939.

1

Industrial production and real income, both on a

''A. D. 1939, " Fortune , January, 1940 , p . 98.

per capita basis, were still considerably below 1929
there had been an increase of nearly 10,000 , 000
per sons to the population during the decade . 2
~in c e

Recovery came

\~ith

. ar in Europe .

Though most

Americans desired to remain aloof from the European
problem, ec onomically they were drawn into the conflict .
With the choosing of sides, America committed itself to
the aid of England and France , and when Neville Chamberlain
.. at dmm at a microphone in London in 1939 and said , "!
have t o tell you nml that this country is at war with
Germany, ,. J
pr oduction .

America's idle capacity was tapped for wart ime
The American busines man understood that

as the U, 9, grew richer from the war, as men
went back to ~tork , as payrolls rose, as good:;
moved from railheads and docks , the c ountry in
spite of itself acquired a vested interest in
the cataatrophe abroad . 4
Even though busineos was in a moderately rising phase
before the . ar in Europe

tarted , whe n the European conflict

became a reality at the beginning of Sept ember its repercus s ions on domestic business were anything but depressive .
2 u. 3 , Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business ,
February, 1940, p. 26 ,

3

nA, D. 1939, 11 Fortune, p , 98 .

4Ibid ,

J

It changed the moderate recovery into a sharp
and vigorous expansion that in its early stages
had the characteristics of a speculative boom.
A fon1ard buying movement developed immediately
and was followed by a rise in purchasing of produce:.:- 'a goods that pushed production forward at
a spectacular rate. By December, industrial
production on an adjusted basis was the highest
on record.5
As the increased production put idle machinery, men
and plants back to \. Ork, attention .. as drawn to depreciated
facili ties.

It appeared that so long as income

remained

lm< and capacities ample to meet current needs, there was
little incentive to increase equipment installations, but
"When increased needs were anticipated andbrought prospects
of rising prices , there was a rush to carry out plans for
improving productive facilities. " 6
The aircraft manufacturing industry had expanded to
a record level by reason of large government and foreign
orders for military planes .

The shipbuilding industry was

bolstered by the acceleration ofprograms by the
mi ~ aion ,

V~ritime

and at the year end, total tonnage under construc-

tion in American shipyards was the highest since 1920,7
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as with Lincoln
changing generals, experienced trouble in finding a board

5survey of Current
6
Ibid., p . 10.

7

Com-

Ibid .

Busines~, February, 1940, p. J.

4

or commis s ion to coordinate industrial mobilization.

May of 1940 1 the

Pre~ident,

In

in an address to the American

people concerning his program for national defen e, Jtated :
Yes, we are calling upon the resources , the
efficiency and the ingenuity of American
manufacturers of war material of all kinds
of airplanes and tanks and guns and ships
and all the hundreds of products ti'.at go
into this material. The government of the
United States itself manufactures fe'll of the
implements of \1ar, Private indu:~try will continue to be the source of most of this
material ; and private industry ~ ill have to be
speeded up to produce it at the rate and
efficiency called for by the needs of th e times . 8
Inspired by th

success of Bernard Baruch during World

War I, the President attempted no fewer t.han four major
agencies before finally settling on one .
Board waJ

~et

The war Resources

up in August of 1939, but failed to live to

see the new year in.

The National Defense Advi ory Commis-

oion to the Council of National Defense wa

organized in the

middle of 1940 and managed to exist until January of the
fo llmrlng year.

Coordination in 1941 was under the direction

o.f both the Office of Production l-1anagement 1

..

hich

was

organized January 1941 , and the Supply Priorities and
Allocations Board , which wa :> organized in Auguat of 1941 .
Both exi ted until January of 1942 , when thePresident organized

g

New York TimeJ, May 27, 1940, p. 12 .

5
the War Production Board,

It waa under the National

Defense Advisory Commiasi on and the Office of Produc tion Management that new plant construction had its
beginning , but mo st af theexpansion came under the
auspice s of the War Production Board,

The organization

of the re mainder of the chapte r fo llows somewhat the
pattern found in Industrial Mobilization for War , which
is the offi cial hi~tory of the War Production Board.9
The National Defense Advisory Commiss ion
(1940- 1941)
The

~uba idizing

of individuals carried on by the

federal government duri ng the 1930 ' s was continued into the
1940'e, only it wa1:1 done for the 31ike of

~1 ar .

In 1940 ,

Fortune magazine stated that:
What the American people might be unwilling to
pay out for leaf raking , d~ and new country
road they a r e willing and will have t o be willing to pay f o1· battleshipu. What has happened
to the budget might be compared to ~h at happened
to the lady of light r eputation who get s married ,
Her habits do not change . The ring on her
finger makes all the difference , lO

9
.
U. s. Civilian Production Adminititratkon, Bureau of
Demobilization, Industrial Mobilization f or War: Histo
of the lar Production Boar and Predecessor Agencies , 9 7,
pp. xiii- xiv.
10
nu. S. Defense : The Dollars , •· Fortune, November ,
1940 , p . 79 .

6
The lack of facilities
Although some expansion had taken place in 1939,
ma j or expan ion of plant capacity began in 1940.
both the French and English forces to

With

upply , in addi-

t i on to equipping America's own expandi ng armed forces,
idle capacity soon disappeared and an effort

wa~

increase plant capacity for future production ,

made to
In 1940,

President Roosevelt spoke of producing no le s than 50,000
plane s per year, and newly expanded
mated t o be inadequate in meeting

facilitie~

were esti-

uch high goals .

Fortune magazine noted that:
It takes six to ten month3 to construct a powder
plant ~1 hich means we have been none too early in
commi~ ioning the du Ponte to build ono for us in
Indiana as thoy are building one f or Great Britain
in Tennessee . Nor • • • have •e been any too
vigorous in establishing the means to make torpedoes .
Up to a year ago our torpedo- manufacturing capacity
was around one a day , ll
There was at the time •·no company in the U. S, • • •
ready- -short of month s of herculean and costly preparation
--to go into production on s. major order of artillery , n12
It

\:as

noted also that:

Within industry many corporations, remembering
the searing aftermath of the last ; ar--horkers
di smissed by the thou11and~:~, plants shut do .. n ,
11 •·u. s. Defense:
ember , 1940 , p. 135 .

The Armed Forces, " Fortune, Nov-

12 "The Best Bargain \ve Can Jolly Well Make , '' Fort une ,
Apr il, 1940, p. 68.

7
expensive equipment standing idle, and realizing
much smaller profits will be made from this one-are saying, and have so informed the Defense Commission, that they wouldrather not take defense
orders, so long as other upplie r , deaperate for
business, are available.l3
Manufacturers were further reluctant to undertake
defense contracts in lignt ofthe Vinson- Trammel Act, which
had been passed in April of 1939.

The Act placed a ceiling

on military and naval contracts and subcontracts to limit
profits in the aircraft ind~try . l4
In the President's address made in May of 1940, the
part that the government \Ia:> to play in the development
~1as

clearly stated.

The President said:

I know that private businesJ cannot be expected
to make all of the capital investment required
for expansion~ of plants and factories and per3onnel which this program calls for at once, It
would be unfair to expect industrial corporations
or their investors to do this, when there is a
chance that a change in international a f fairs may
stop or curtail orders a year or t\"0 hence.
Therefore, the Government of the United States
stands ready to advance the necessary money to
help provide for the enlargement of :actories,
the establishment of new plant , the employment
of thousands of necessary ~orke rs , the development of ne~1 sources of supply for hundreds of
ra~1 materials requi-red , the development of quick
mass transportation of supplies . And the details
of this are now being \,orked out in Wa hington,
day and night , l5

lJ,,u, s . Defense; The Sinews , '' Fortune , October, 1940 ,
p. 164.
14Industrial Mobilization for War , p. 25 ,
1 5New York Times, May 27, 1940, p . 12 .

The Commission's r esponsibility
Although the Advisory Commis sion had no responsibility
for f inancing def ense facilities, it recei ved authority to
determine what facilities to build .

The Advisory Commis-

aion recommended that therebe a disti nction between
f acilities tha t

~ ould

be worthless after the conflict and

thoso which would have some peacetime value .

For the plants

which would have s ome peacetime value , the Advisory Commis ion .orked out a series of devices to bring private
capital into the defenae program.

For the "worthless"

facilities, the Emergency Plant Faci l ities Contract was
created .

Under this contract, themanuf acturer would attempt

to raise the money for the ne\1 plant and equipment with the
guarantee that the government wo uld reimburse him over a
fi ve year period . l6
The Def ense Plant Corporation
The Reconatruct i on Finance Corporation nas experimenting with what \{as to bec ome the Defense- Plant- Corporation
method of governmontanancing .

Defense Plant Corporati on

No uld shoulder the cost of erecting pl ants for manuf acturi ng .

Typically , the War Depa r tment or Navy \VOuld pay the

Defense Plant Corporation a port i on of the cost out of current

16
Induotrial f·1obilization fo r War , p. 25 ; 11 The War
Goes to Mr . Jesse Jone:>," Fortune , December, 1940 , p . 188 .

9

appropriations promising to reimburse the Corpor ation
out of future appropriations for any final debt.

At

that point the government would own the plant unless
the manufacturer exercised an option to purchase the
new faci litie~ . l7
The Defense Plant Corporation
Augu~t

~1as

organized on

22 1 1940, under authority of section 5(d) of the

Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act as amended .

Act -

ing as a subsidiary of the Recondtruction Finance
Corporation , the Defense Plant Corporation

ad created to

aid in the national defense program by financing and
supervising the con3truction and equipping of industrial
fac ilities ,

Under the provisions of its charter the

Defense Plant Corporation could undertake to construct
and equip facilities on it3 o>m authority .

Mo t construe-

tion , however , came only upon recommendation and sponsorship of another agency concerned ·with defense production .
Although the Defen e Plant Corporation did not finance
the construction of all government built plants , it did
contribute approximately $9 , 000 , 000 , 000 for the conatruc tion of 2 1 265 plants in almost every type of manufacturing
industry in the nation . l8

17Ibid .
l 3 u. s. Secretary of the Treasury , Final Re§ort of t he
Reconstruction Fi nance Corporation, 1959, pp . 13 -132.

10
Accomplishments of the
Commission

Advi~ory

Whatever its Jhortcomings as an organization,
the Advisory Commi ssi on . • • did succeed,
perhap5 beyond any reasonable expectation,
in what ~as from the long-range point of vie w
the most important of it s tasks . With only
the conviction>~, the personal prestige, and
the industrial contacts of its members for
authority, the Commission played the major
role in launching a $9 billion facilities expanaion , l9
Authorizations .

During the Commi ss ion' B existence,

a total of $1,600,000,000 .,ab authorized for direct mili tary construction, 20 ;.hile $.3,700,000 , 000 was earmarked
for expansion of indut:ltt·y and industrial service ,

More

than 60 per cent of the induutrial expan:;ion authorized
in the last half of 1940 was to be financed privately ,21
The largest authorization wa
craft facilities, for
Of

thi~

for expans ion of air-

which $516,000,000 was set auide.

total, $50,000,0 0 wa

to be

fina~c ~

privately.

Next to aircraft the greatest expansion was for explosives
19

Industrial Mobilization for liar , pp. 77-78 .

20
The term "auth orization" represents commitments to
both cons truct and equip facilities and the allocation of
funds for that purpose .
21

Industrial Mobilization for Vlar, pp . 77- 78.

11

and ammunition loading, which totaled $485,000,000,
v1hile guns and ammunition amounted to $274,000,000 .
A relatively :$mall but important item wa:; the inve->tment of $J4,000,000 for expansion in building machine
tools and other metal -. orking equipment . 22
Construction .

By the end of 1940 about $810 , 000,000

of new industrial plants had been constructed,23

~dth

public construction accounting for $159,000 , 000, or
about 20 per cent of the total for the years 1939 and
1940, .hile private construction amounted to $651,000,000
during the 1939-40 period.24
Facilities for aircraft production greVI subntantially
under the Advisory Commi sion .

In January, 1940, the

major airframe companies occupied 7,335 , 000

quare feet

of floor space and employed 45,000 workers.

In December,

the floor space occupied

1~as

just under 11, 000,000 square

feet, and the number of workerJ had increased t o 95,831.25

22

~·,

pp . 79-SO.

2)

The term ''construction" represent s only the cost
of the erection of new plants and not the equipping of
facilities .
2
4u. s. War Production Board, Wartime Production
Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook, October 9, 1945,
p . 33.
25

Industrial Mobilization for War , pp. 79-80.

12
Production.

Total industrial producti on in 1940

1<1a s larger than in any previous year of U. S. history.
The Federal Reserve Index of

indu~trial

production

(using 1935-39 as 100 ) , averaged 122 for the year,26
Th13 was S per cent higher than the 1937 average and
11 per cent above that for 1929 , · hich wa3 regarded up
to that time as the high-water mark of business activity
in the United States .

Largest increases were in aircraft,

tin , zinc, steel, and pulp and paper, all of • hich
strongly influenced by .ar developments .
wa s greatly accelerated during the period.

~; ere

Shipbuilding
During 1940,

53 merchant ocean- going veosels of mot·e than 2,000 groos
t ons each, representing a total of 444,700 gross tons,
were completed 1n United States shipyards,

Thi

com-

pares with 28 vessels and 241,0 0 gross tons in 1939 , 27
Even

~•ith

this substantial beginning of indtmtrial

facilities expansion, it was noted that:
Further expansion of indu trial production i s
likely to proceed at a slower pace in the
months ahead because the output of many firms
is already pressing upon capacity . The situation is well illustrated by the present statis tical position of the steel i ndustry . Steel
production over the past months has been above

26

The period 1935- 39 is used a
indexes in this chapter .
27

a base for all

Survey of Current Business, February, 1941 , pp . S- 11 .

13
96 percent of capacity--a record level in
termo of tons produced . Ne~; Orders have
been ~.e ll in exceus of shipments , and backlogs of unfilled orders are high and rising
atead1ly .28
The Office of Production Management (1941-1942)
Expansion for 1941 was under the audpices of the Office
of Production Management-- the third workhorse of Roosevelt's
wartime machinery.
of Production

The construction program of the Office

~~nagement

was largely a continuation and

extension of the program started under the National Defense
Advisory Commission, though the empha is shifted from
private to public fi nancing.
~~nagement

Under the Office of Production

the Defense Plant Corporati on began to play a

dominant r ole in the expansion.

Out of th

$4,700,000,000

budget for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1941,

$2, 500 ,000,000 ,,a., allocated to the Defens e Plant Corporation,29
Accomplishments of the Office of
Production ~nagement
Authorization~ .

Altogether, a facilities expanoion

program totaling more than $16 ,000,000,000 ;;as authorized
in 1941, with direct military conatruction accounting for
28~., December, 1940, p . 6 ,
29

Industrial Mobilization for ~lar , p . 160; '' The War
Goes to Mr. Jesse Jonea, ., Fort une , p . 204 .

14
$2,700,000,000, indu.>trial services for $2,600,000,000,
housing for $J, 60o ,ooo,ooo, and manufacturing, including
petroleum extraction and mining, f or more than
$7 , 500 ,000,000,

The largest single item in the expan-

.>ion program waJ for explosives and ammuniti on loading
co5ting $965,000,000 ,
$925 , 000 ,000.

~ ith

iron and steel next at

Plants for producing gun

and ammunition

totaled $825,000,000; ships , $817,000,000 ; petroleum eXtraction an:i mining , $795,000,000; other chemicals exclusi ve of petroleum an:i synthet ic rubber, $588 , 000,000;
and aircraft, $544,000,000,30
Construction.

By the end cf 1941, $2 , 800,000,000

01orth of new industrial facilities had been corultructed ,
with $2,000,000,000 of the additions coming in 1941 alone.
Of this total , public fi nancing amounted to $1,500,000,000 ,
or about 53 percent of the total, \.hile private fund
t otaled $1, 300,000,000.31
Producti on .

Output of planes averaged more than

1, 500 per month compared
in the preceding year.

~lith

the 500 unit

per month

The Federal Reserve Index of

shipbuilding production advanced t o 736 in December 1941,

30
3

Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 161,

~artime Production Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook, p, 33.
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from 236 a year earlier .

Creation of new indus trial

facilities required unpr ecedented amountJ of machinery
and related equipment, total expenditur· es for wh ich were
estimated to have been close to half again as large as
the 191,0 total .

Activ i ty in the vari ou..; industrie s

comprising th e machine17 group showed a sharp increase ,
the index averaging 209 in 1941, a 55 percent advance
over 1940's 135 . 32
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 caused
an upward revision of all schedules in preparation for a
maximum military effort.

At the year end, the President

stated that the country must be prepared to devote 50
percent of it s income to the prosecution of war, and the
budget submitted to CongreJ s called for an arms expenditure
of over $56,000,000,000 in the fiscal year 1943 .

The peak

of plant expansion .• as yet to come in the year 1942 under
the direction of the final war bureau--the War Production
Board , 33
The War Production Board (1942- 1945 )
Responsibility of the War Product i on
Board
~~obilization

IJas organized for efficiency under the

war Production Board .
32

As for industri al expansion , the

Survey of Current Busine.::ss, February , 1942 , pp , 19- 20 .

))Ibid., p. 4.

16
Board
ra,

·.;a::~

to direct the provision of facilities for

material~,

equipment, t ools and

f acilities required, curtail use of

servi c e::~,

resources

~carce

and eliminate nonesJential construction .

expand

The Board

wa s also given the responsibility for distribution of
material::~ and equipment,34

On the industrial front, the Board broke through
of the intricate technical and administrative barriers

mo~ t

preventing mobilization of indutitrial resources .
Jtantial amount of facilitie

A sub-

had been constructed but

the peak of production ltas still a year a1,.ra y and industrial facilities were still not adequate.

The Production

Division of the War Production Board was as s igned the task
of authorizing the construction of military and industrial
facilities.

To convert

exit~ting

plants for war purpo..Je s

the Division of Industry Operations was created , J5
An all-out effort for new construction often ran up
against barriers

a::~

were enc ountered in the

teel industry .

~pan

ion of steel capacity met considerable opposition

::~ince

construction of these facilities consumed large

quantities of steel needed in munitions production ,
addition, there \las a shortage of pig iron for steel
34

35

Indu::~trial Mobilization for War , p. )98 .
Ibid., pp. 204- 2 5, 240- 241 .

In

17
fabr ication .

At the end of 1942, plant s f or iron and

stee l products cons titut ed over one- half of all deferred pro jec t s . J 6
The War Production Board attempted to eliminate
nonessential condtruction by the i ssuance of Limitation
Order· L- 41.

This order, a s amended later in 1942, pro -

hibi t ed the beginning of any constructi on co ting more
than $200 for residential buildings, $1 , 000 for f arm con.Jtructi on, and $5 , 000 for indus trial construction l<ithout
s ec ifi c approval from the Board.37

The Smaller War Plant s Corporation
By 1942,

maller war plants were making sub.Jtantial

contributiono t o the war effort .3 8
.,maller

plant .:~

Three- fifths of all

in 1942 '• ere producing at l east ... orne har

goods , and 4

percent of their combined o ut put could be

c la s~ i fi e d a ~

war production .

Though the smaller plants

were making some contribution, they 1.rere faced v.ith
s erious pr blemti .

Their total physical out put wa s s till

at the 1941 level , and plants of the smallest size (0- 7

36

Ibid., p. 406 .

37

artime Producti on Achievement.J and the Reconvers i on Outlook , pp . 32- 33 .

38
A smaller war plant i s defined by the Surve y of
Current Busineds a:> one which hired lest~ than 125 wage
earners .

'•. age earners) , taken together, had 3uffered an actual
decline in output during the first of the v•ar years . 39
~ ith

reJpect t o the trend of productio n , it was found

that the physical output of all the smaller

firm~

had re -

mained about constant during the period fr t-·m January 1941
t o January 1943 , whereas industry as a
a marked expansion .
~;a.::;

With

re~pect

to

~hole

~;ar

had experienced

production, it

found that 58 percent of the firms were producing at

least

ome ·1ar goods, that war product3 comprised about

40 percent of the combined cutput of all .::>maller plants,
and that the extent of participation in \.ar production
wa~ greater among larger firmu than among the smaller . 40

The Smaller War Plant
1942 'Nith
purpo:.~e

Corpo r ation

~-;as

created in

-.sage of the Small Buai ness Act of 1942.

wa.:1 to

assi:.~t

Its

in mobilizing the production

facili tied of small business for war production .
empowered to make loans, to

purcha~e

It was

and lease production

facilitie· to 3mall concerns and to contract

~th

the

g overnment to furniah war materials and equipment . 41
Under· the same Act , the Smaller War Plant3 Division
of the

ar Production Board was created .

At the end of

39H . R. Bowen , "Impact of the ~lar Upon 3maller
Manufacturing Plants," Survey of Current Busines , July,
1945, p . 19 .
40

~ ••

p . 24 .

4 1 Fina1 Report of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora~ . p . 167 .
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1942, it wa!l reported that the Divi s i on had been responsible for the direct placement of prime contracts t otaling $102 ,100 , 000

~.ith

3 1 274 firms,

Altogether, the

Divisi on claimed credit for $1 , 000 1 000,000 'wi'Orth of contrac t s to small business during the war . 42
Accompli hments of the Board' s first year
Authorizations.

The composition of the facilities

reflect ed the emphas i o on meeting the huge demands for
munition

and military equi pment .

The planto built in

1942 provided the unprecedented production of munitions
and military equipment in later 1·1a r years .
third

Nearly two-

of all indus trial facilities authorized in 1942

\,ere for munitionLl production , including aircraft and
ships . 43
Construction .

In 1942 , a total of $3 , 800 , 000 , 000

•10rth of new industrial facilities was constructed .
equipping of these f acilities 1
put in pla ce in 1942 ;,a

If

added, the t otal value

$8 , 400 , 000 , 00 , •.ith federal

f unds accounting for $6 , 400 , 000 , 000 of this figure .

At

the end of 1942 , total industrial cons t r uction s ince 1939
amounted to $6 , 600,000 , 000 , \·, ith the government paying
for about 75 percent of the total . 44

42

Industrial Mobilization f or War, p. 530 .

43
Ibid .' p . 1,08.
44- ~ artime Production Achievements and the Reco nversion
Out l ook , p . 33 .
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It ia estimated, however, that by November 30,
1942, only every fourth plant on 1hich a war
contract had been l et since the middle of 1940
had been completed, Although ~ome of the unf inished plant~ started partial operation ,
mo~t of the new construction and equipment went
int o plants which were not yet producing munitions
by the end of the year . Completion of facilities
for Har production averaged t wo to three months
behind schedule , ,,hila the backlog of unfilled
orders f or machine toold , baaed on the annual
rate in the fourth quarter, 1>a!! equivalent to
almost eight nonths production . 45
Produ(.tion .

Industrial production , measured by the

Federal Reserve Index , was 180 in 1942 as compared vdth
156 in 1941.

The amount of industrial production devoted

to the :ar effort also changed over the same period .

In

1941, approximately 1$ per cent of the total production
;;as for the \iBr, but by 1942 approximately 55 percent of
the total was

l1ar

production . 46

Among the durable- goods manufacturing industries, the
tran~portation - equipment

group , including tbe vital ship-

building and aircraft industries , recorded gains amounting
to nearly 80 percent over 1941 .

Total 1942 aircraft pro -

duction was over 48 , 000 plants of all types , 47

45rndustri al Mobilization for War, pp , 407- 408 .
46 urvey of Current Business , January , 1943, p . 10 .
47

Ibid ., p. 9 .
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Employment .

The unemployment and employment figures

for 1942 are of some

~ ignificance .

The total number of

civilians employed in 1942 was e timated to be 51 , 900 , 000 ,
while unemployment reached the low of 2,600,000--a smaller
number of unemployed than the 2 , 900 , 000 registered in
1929, although the total labor force had grown by approxi mately 9,000,000 persons . 48
Accomplishments of the Board in 1943
Construction .

In 1943, the nation put the finishing

touches on the most ambitious program of new construction
ever undertaken in building a war machine .

Most of the

groundwork had been completed in 1942, and had been dono
with such rapidity that by the end of the third quarter
of 1942 men and materials were being shifted from the
preparation directly into the implementation of

\lar

materials.49
Indu~trial

construction in 1943 totaled $2,200 , 000 , 000 .

By the end of 1943 , $8,800 , 000 , 000 of new industrial
facilities had been bui lt , with public funds amounting to
$7,000,000 , 000 1 or 80 percent of t he total. 50

48 rbid . , April , 1943 , p. 10 .
49

Ibid . I April, 1943 , p . 10 .

5(\ artime Production Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook, p . 33.

2?

While the decline in indu<Jtrial construction
over the year was perhaps the outstanding
development in thiJ field of activity , it
muut not be f orgotten that the additiona t o
the industrial facilitie in 1943 were still
of con3iderable magnitude. Even if allo,.ance
is made for the higher condtruction costd in
1943, it is evident that the physical facilitiet: of industry wore substantially enlarged
during the year , 51
Defen!:ie Plant Corporation ownership.

It

~1a.:;

estimated

in 1943 that the Defense Plant Corporation owned one - third
t o one- half of the national metal- manufacturing capacity .
In addition, it \lau further estimated that it 01med huge
chunks of nm·; raw material industries , a significant frac tion of the steel industry , pipelines, bargelines and
nearly all of the new facilities that had been built for
the \;ar up t o that time .

By the first quarter of 1943,

1, 022 of the plant projects financed by the Defense Plant
Co poration had c cme into actual operation .

Total COl:!t

t o the government of con tructing and equipping these
1, 022 plantd 1~as $4, )00, 000,000 . 52

The plants and facilities built
•·l ar and Navy Department

exclu~ively

by the

were purely mili tary producers

and therefore not considered to be potential competition

5l urvey of Current Business, January , 1944 , p . 4 .
52, New Deal Plans Industry Control , '' Business Week,
1·1arch 2C, 194.J, pp . 15- 16 ; •·seventy Per Cent of DPC Pl ant
Proj ect..l Already in Operation , ,. Steel, March 29, 1943 , p. 46 .
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for private indu try.

The plants built by the Defeni:le

Plant Corporation, ho\tever ,

~1 ere

a source of 'lmrry to

industry because upon the solution of the problem of
postwar

di-.~poo ition

of these wide-range facilities re-

volved the ''principle of private enterprise

a<~

again t

government control c,r socialh;m. ,53
Production.

The Federal Reserve Index of industrial

production in December of 1943 was 248.

The average for

the year •. as 239, representing a gainof 20 percent over
the previous year and 48 percent over 1941.

The bulk of

the gain in total production in 1943 occurred in the
durable go ods indu tries, which included the major war
industria .54
Aircraft production reached the unprecedented level
of approximately 86,000 planes , compared with the 48,000
in 1942.

Ship conjtruction

from S, OOO,OO

ead

~Ieight

howed phenomenal gains also,
t om; in 1942 to approximately

19,000 , 000 dead weight tons in 1943.

Increase

were also

:JhoHn in the ma chinery and nonferrous groups , but only
modest advances were recorded in iron and stee l,

It was

53•vast Investment in Plant Gives Government Great
PoHer, 11 Iron Age , July 29, 1943, pp. 79- 80.
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e~timated

that of the total

indu~trial

producti on in

1943 , about 66 pe cent \1ao for the uar . 55
Accomplidhments of the period 1944- 45 .
The fac ilitie s program was nearly c ompleted by 1944.
At the year 1 s end a deci :.Jion \.as made to add further t o
the already expanded tire capacity .
It \taJ an unfortuna te time to undertake any
ort of construction activity . Lumber \;as
becoming increa ingly Jcarce, co natr uction
l abor had gone int o lines of wc-rk more dir&ctly
related to the productive war effort , machine
tools \~ere nearly all in place and operat i ng
else~ihere , and certain types of steel Here them;,elves becoming critical. In fact, the steel
load waa ri::ling $0 rapidly that there 1vas d oubt
that requirements for it could be met without
the addition of 25 or 30 th ou~and men to the
labor fo rce . 56
The basic aircraft and Jhipb uilding fac ilities programs
\tere compl eted and the 10 - octane gasoline facil i t i e:J and
the synthetic rubber factories \:ere bro ught int o operation .
New and expanded facilities for heavy bomb rs , jet propelled planes , h eavy artillor·y and dhells , mortars
and improved types of combat vehicles and land i ng craft,

55

Ibid ., pp . 4- 6 .

56rndustrial Hobilization for

ar, p .

777 .

Pre requi r ed t o mPet military

need~

but

were a

r·elati vely ::>mall part of the 1944 expenditure:> , 57
An important feature of thP 1945 expan ..>i on v.aJ
the :>hift in importa nce bet<een publicly and privat ely
financed activity .

Publicly-f inanced cLn:>tructi on had

d• minated con.,tructi on activity in th e pre ceding years .
In f act , 80 percent of th

t otal nel. ccondtruction in

1942 and 1943 .. as financed publicly .

ThL; trend ,·;a:;

r ever:>ed in July of 1945, and by December the valu

of

pr ivate con ... tructi on .. a:~ more than triple that of public
c .n.:;truct i on . 58
Some expan.;ion o f government - ... ponb ored indu.:;trial
c on.;truction occurred in 1945 pri or t u VE- day,
but by the end of the year thiJ source of con.;truc tion activity d1. indled to a .:lhado .• of it;;
f ormer size . Public industrial con.>truction ,
whi ch averaged about 65 million dollaro a month
in the peri od Augu.:lt through December 1944 , had
been ~tepped up t o an average of 75 million
dollarJ in a month in th e first quart er of 1945
in re.;ponse to the military demands for additi onal
capac ity of .,elected item., , Expenditures on thi:>
clas~ of construction reached a peak of 80- 85
milli on d:)llars in April and )~.'Jay. 59
VE- day was
st op- I•Ork

order:~

re~p o nbib1e

f or the is s uing of immediate

on new con.,;truction .

By Augw t, the value

of public indu:;trial con:;tructi on had declined to

57

Su1vey of Current Bu ine

~.

February, 1945, p . 14 .

58Ib id . , Februa r y , 1946, p . 17 .
59~ .

21:>

$49 ,00G,OOO,
~ulted

Ceu.;ati on of hostilities with Japan re-

in additional cut.; in the program,

JO

that

$20 , 00 , 000 11a:> "pent f or plantu in Oct0ber an
~iderably les in lee ember . 6
Summary of Indudtrial

con-

Expan~ i on

The r ole that American indu.;try played in

~> inning

the

.a r i.; .;urnmarized .;ome>lhat in the f ollm;ing .;tatement fr om
Fortune magaz ine :
Thi.; ian ' t the 11ar of the Spitfires and the
l>!e ... er.;chmitt J , Thi:; war i.; being fought by
the Bullards that turn th cylinder barrels;
by the heavy t oggl e presse"' that hunch do >.n
to ..;hape the partu for a bomber ~>i ng . Thiu
i...; the 1.ar of the machineu, of manpo11 er, of the
managers ; it ia f r ught in a multiplicity of
tolerances as fine a.; 1/1 ,000 of an inch and
fini.;he measured in milliontho of an inch .
Theue , f inally, are the animate and inanimate
resource of a great indu trial po .. er . 61
The increase in th
in manufacturing

nation'.; output, and especially

ent erpriJe>~ ,

reflected the

J u cce:.~.;

the nation in providing adequate plant capac ity.
~ion

of

&xpan-

of pl ant capacity wa'-> achieved by conutruction c f

nell plant..; or expan.;ion o f existing one3 ,

Bet ~. een

1939

and 1945 , the nation ' s over- all pr ductive capacity · a.;

oO
61
p . 79 .

Ibid .
'' Air Power and the l!ach ine , '' Fortune , March , 1941,
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increased about 50 percent ,

Total expansi on amounted

t o $25 , 000,000 , 000 , with construct i on of plants totaling
$10,000 , 000 , 000 and equipping of these plants totaling
$15 , 000,000,000 ,

Two - th i rds of this t otal Has financed

by the federal government . 62
The greatest growth in facil ities came early in t he
war years ,

More thar. one-half of the t otal

addition~

dur -

ing the five ye ,rs had been complet ed by 1942, and more
than three- fourths by 1943 .

Tabl& 1 sh0ws yearly totals

spent for industrial construction during the war .

Table l,

Public and private industrial constructi on in
milli ons of dollars , 1939-1945

Total
Public
Private
Source :

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

241
14

569
145
424

2028
1350
678

3806
3485
321

2198
1973
225

982
748
234

1280
640
640

227

see footn ute 62 ,

Actual industrial constru cti on in the five years
accounted f or only one- fourth of the t otal constru ction
during those same f i ve years ,

Indeed , had it not been

f or direct military building , "total new con structi on in
62
rndustrial Mobilizat i on for War, p , 964 ; Wartime
Production Achi evements and t he Rec onv e rsion Outlook , p , 6 .

the defen,e and war peri od 1wuld have averaged leJ, than
in the 20 years precedi ng t he invasion of Poland . • LJ
The proporti on of

governme~t - financed

conJtruction

wa.; heavieJt in those area;.; where the re ''as the lea st
a ... »urance of po.;tVJar ab aorb ti on of the ne
the civilian economy.

faci litie s by

Of th e more than $3,000, 0

, 000

invested in the aircraft indu stry during the war , cf
11hich 89 percent Ha s federal f und s , a large part ,.as in
plant_, 1.hich were likely to be unubable in the
period .

p o ;;~twar

Private financing •,;as heaviest in aviation gaso-

line, chemicaL;, coa l, petroleum products, food proce ssing ,
machinex·y and electri •: al equipment, and mi<l cellaneous
manufacturers with peacetime outl ets . 64
The Defense Plant Corporati on
The Defen:>e Plant Corporati on wa s diasolved in July,
1945 .

At the time of it.; diJsolution , th e Corporation

held plant s , fa cilities and other assets which had cost
nearly $7 , 000,000 , 000 .

Defense Plant Corporati on had apent

nearly $9 , 000 , 000 , 000 in constructing 2, 492 manuf a cturing
and non-manufacturing f a cilities .

63

I bid ., p . 7.

G4Ibid .

I

p . 35.

Nearly $8 , 500 , 000 , 000

29
of this total

~ ent

into manufacturing .

of expansion ·.va.; in th

The biggest area

con,truction of aircraft .facili-

ties , ,,hich oo t over $) ,200,000 , 000 ,

Since government

conutruction amounted t o about t ••o - thirds o.f the t otal ,
or ab out $16 ,000,00 ,00 , Defense Plant

C orporati ~ n

contributed over one-half of the federa l funds .

had

The rest

waJ financed directly by o>uch agencies a.; the larit im
CommisJion , the

~. ar

Dopartment , the Navy, and the Recon-

Jtruction Finance Corporation .

Table 2 o;ho\;

the di:.;tri-

bution of the Defense Plant Corporation's fUnds to var iouJ
industries, 65
A!'ter the 1rar the nation

i• a<~

equipped with the newest

and finest fac ilitie s in the world.
that, once these facilitic

To the nation it meant

had been converted from war

producti on to producing f er the cons umer, America ' s productive capac ity would be more than adequate to meeting
the future demand f or con umer goods in the podt nar period
of prosperity .

A will be seen , Utah played a substantial

part in the nati onal expansion of the productive facilities ,
and received its share of wart ime factories .

65
Final Report of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora ~ . p . 13 5.

30
Table 2.

Number of manufactur.bg plants and amount
authorized for various industr i es by the
Defense Plant Corporation , August 1940August 1946a

Industry

Number of
Plant ·

Amount authorized

Aircraft

623

$3 , 207 , 328 , 0 0

luminum and magnesium

152

1,291,884,000

Aviation gasoline

45

324 , 142,000

Chemicals

199

214,038 , 000

Machine

166

90,939 , 000

lJ!inerals

79

178,8G9 , 00

Ordnance

120

495,778,000

Radio and Communi cations

167

119,599, 00

Shipbuilding

100

200 , 827,000

Steel and iron

225

1 , 147, 788,000

Synthetic rubber

159

1 , 055 , 936 , 000

Other

230

143 , 694 , 000

2, 265

8 , 470 , 822 , 000

tool<:~

Total

a!ncludes amounts authorized by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation's Office of Defent~c Plant after the
dissolution of the Defen~e Plant Corporati on in 1945 .
Source :

see footnote 65 , above ,
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CHAPTER II
V.ARTD1E INDUSTRIAL lXPANSION Ill UTAH
Comparison of Utah and the Nation
The federa l gover nment , in allocating ne> fa cilitieJ
thro

hout the country , l'las continually plagued 1 i th the

problem of urgency in building ne1t plants
.:>ame time attempti

~1hile

at th e

to evenly di3seminate them .

No

matter ho11 ideali ::~ tic the planners might have been in the
diJpersi on of facilities , in reality the natural thing t o
do 1aJ to expand plants already existing in heavily indu~tr ialized

areas.

The se areas offered large numb ers of

unempl oyed fac t ory workers , developed transportation JyJtemu ,
and plant

;:hi ch could be expanded roore hastily than com-

pletely ne"1 f acilities could be built .
a reas liere

compo::~ed

of rur al

t

rkers

The nonindustrialized

~•h o

had little knovl-

l edr,e of 1·rorking in a factory , and had few exi t ing
whi ch cvuld be expanded .

plant<~

Since the se areaJ lacked any

exi sting industrial f a ct orie , they failed to receive large
amount~

of the ne w i ndustrial facilit i es .

In a hear ing before the

Hou ~ e

Committee on

Affai rs in 1941, the following colloquy ,

~ hi c h

~alitary

t ook place

between Representative Kilday of Texas , and '" illiam
Knudson, then director of Ue Offi ce vf Production

32
r~na~ement ,

exemplifies some of the problem3 faced

by government official 3 :
ll'r . Kilday . Mr . Knudsen, in the early day.J
I believe that the National Defense AdviJory

Commissi on i3sued a policy 1ith reference to
the locati on of ne 11ly - e.:.~tablished defen t~c i ndustries , and thE:lre 1~ ere a number of com;ideratiomJ in the policy 11ith reference to the
availability of labor , and s o on , and a;) t o
the locality, to the effect that they hould
be placed strategically , from a defense standpoint .
Mr . KnudJen .

YeJ .

Mr. Kilday . And that included the territory
between the Alleghenies and the Rockies , and
far enough from the border;) and the coaJt?
l-h- . Knudsen .

Mr . Kilday.
to that?

200 miles .

!lave you pretty generally adhered

Mr . Knudsen . Yes , ir. Of course , you mu3t
understand that he have expanded .;orne plant ,
but they 1. ere out ide the line because we
could not move them a•:ay from there . 1
According to Mr . Knud en 1 .J te timony , both the
llati onal Defense Advi ory

C o mmi.:.~sion

and the Office of

Production f-Yanagement had attempted to disperse

ne\~

ex-

panJion, \lhile at the same time placing facilitie.:;
strategically , both f or defe nse purposes and f or a means

1

U. 3. Congrea , House, Committee on Military Affairs ,
Hearing.; , Inquiry as to National- Defen..;e Construction , 77th
Gong ., l Jt ess ., 1941 , p . 227 .
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of rapid producti on.

1-!r . Knud.-en added that:

Thi~ matter of plant locationa, of course , ia
quite a ticklish aubjcct 1·1henever we have them
to place . But we have no brief f or any particular place in the United State~ . We began in
the O.P .ll!. to try to do it a fa irly as we kne\'1
he<~ .
We have not any particular pet locati on
in the United State~ .2

After the •.rar, however, the \1ar Producti c n Board
admitted that the geographical pattern of industry waa
no t g reatly different from • hat it was before the \lar .
I t further stated that

indu:.~trially ,

rthe top nine

otates of 1939 are the t op nine today . ,.3
The largest part of the
~st~North

Central

state~ .

of the nation 1 ci facil iti e

increa~e

Thi

had gone t o the

region had 31 . 5 percent

in 1939, and received 26 . 9

p rcent of the new facilities during the 1.ra.r ,
l~iddle

Atlanti c states ,

The

hich had 29 . 8 percent of the

1939 facilit i es, received 15 . 7 percent of the expanded
total .

The smallest amount went to the

which rccei ved only 3. 26 percent . 4

l~ountain

.Jtates ,

Although the

3u. S. .ar Production Board , Wartime Producti on
Achievements and the Reconveroi on Outlook , October 9 ,
1945 , p . 33 .
4Ibid . This reference stateb that the percentage
receivecrTn the iountain ~tate was 5 . 26 percent , 11hich
a p pears to be an error , since the region received
$818 , 000 , 000 out of the $25 , 000 , 000 , 000 spent.

34
Mo untain

~cates

received the

fa c ilitie~.

The Mo untain

~tatea

of their productive fac ilitie
the valu

amount of expan-

f indu.;trial

Table 3.

~e

in

increa.;;ed the value

by 188 percent , l'h ile

in the Ea.;t - North C ntral

by 54 percent . 5
c

~malledt

thi.; area had a great percentage incre

~i o n,

:>tate~

.1a.;;

increa~ed

Tab l e 3 ~how~ the national di.;;tribution

fac ilitie~

in 1939 and during the \.ar .

Regional ccmpari.;on of United '}tate.; indu~trial
facilitie.; in 1939 and indu~trial facilities
built during the peri od 1940- 45 (in millions of
dollars )

Region

1939
valu

Ne .. England
·liddle Atlantic
Eaut-Nor th Central
w. e:.t - North Central
3outh Atlantic
laJt - outh Central
e~t - outh Central
Mountain
Pacific

3, 877
11,788
12 , 461
2,170
3 , 600
1,345
1,)05
435
2, 571

Undit~tributed

Total
ource :

1939
p rcent

1940-45
addition

9.8
?9 . 8
Jl. 5
5.5
9.1
3.4
3. 3
1.1
6.5

1,101
3,941
6 , 773
1,688
1,551
1,248
2 , 544
818
1 , 938
3, 556
25 ,158

39,558 100 . 0
see fo otnote 4, above .

5Ibid ., p . 36.

Percentag
of
addition
4 .)8
15 . 66
26 . 92
6 . 71
6 .16
4.96
10 . 11
) . 26
7.70
14 . 14
100 . 00

35
Utah received

authorization~

for a total of over

$3 11 , 000 ,000 of new facilities during the war , or about
38 percent of the total amount authorized for the
l ountain :;tates .

Of thLl amount , about $27,000 , 000 was

financed privately , ,,hile over $284 , 000 , 00

was financed

publicly . 6

Table 7 ( Jee Appen dix A, p. 186) , list the

indu .:~tria l

facilities authorized f ur the state of Utah

during the war .
On a per capita basis , if the $25 , 0 O, OuO,OOO spent
fe r new facilities during the peri od 1940- 45
buted over the average populati on of 133 , 000 ,

i~ di~tri 

0 for

thode same years , ? th ,re .. as approximately $188 :lpent
per p
person

r.:~on
d aJ

nati onally .
much higher .

In Utah, the amount tspent per
Utah's average population for

the years 1940- 45 was 583 , 000 . 8

By di.:~tributing the

$311 , 000 , 000 authorized for Utah , ther e
$534 per person in the state .

6u . S. Civi lian Production

aJ a total of

Furthermore, there waJ a

dmini::~trati on , \'lar In-

du~trial Faciliti es Authorized , July 1940 to A€*~45 ,

page s not numbered. The H .:~tJ.ng orp! a nts In t i.:l document omi tJ plant s with expansi ons fa l l i ng bet wee n
$25 , 000 and $50 , 000 , Public authori zations omi tted r epre.:~ent a negligible fracti on of 1 percent of total public
expenditure~ , and pri vate authorization~ omi tted came to
l ess than 3 perc ent of the total .
7u . S. Department of Commerce , Stati t i cal Abstract
of the United States , 1946 , p . 9 .

8
Utah Foundation ,
in Utah, 1963 , p . 2 ,

~ tat i .:~tical

Abstract of Gov ernment

)6
total of $428 in public fund
hile only $120 in public fund

spent per person in Utah ,
was spent per person

nationally.
Early Expansion in Utah
Probably the first event to create interest in Utah ,
especially among West Coasters , was the moving of the
rmy's bombing baee in September of 1940 from . an
FrancL;co t o Salt Lake City.

The objective

~;as

to place

it where the possibility of enemy attack would be
minimized and yet keep it within easy flying di tance of
the area it wa

to protect . 9

It . as noted that the Beehive state's leaders
traditionally had "fro;.ned on encouraging new industries
and branch plants

becau~e

of their doubts about the type

of population that might be attracted . nlO

But it was

pointed out that the newly-elected Democratic Governor ,
Herbert B. Maw , ;-1as pu hing .;trongly for indu trial
development , as exemplified in his move for the est abli hment of the state ' s first Department of Publicity and
Industrial Development .

Commenting on Utah ' s promotional

move, Business Week stated :

9

Busine
k Ma rc h 15 , 1941 , p . 25 •
nutah Steps Out, " ~~~~~
e~
e~,

10

Ibid.
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A strong bid for chemical and electro- chemical
indu tries is a part of the governor ' s program
and the state ' s supplieu of such material as
sulphur , gypsum, helium, and carbon dioxide ,
radium, uranium, vanadium, phosphate rock,
alunite, and , of course , potash will be fea tured.
To emphasize Utah 1 s strategic location for d a fen e indu :~tr ie , promotion <l ill point out that
the ~ar Department, in addition t o moving the
former San Franci3co bombing base to Salt Lake
City, has located the principal v1estern Air
Corps repair depot at Hill Field between Salt
Lake City and Ogden, and a major Quarterma ter
upply Depot together with a new Ordnance Depot
near Ogden . ll
The Ogden Arsenal
Shortly after World War I, the United States Army
constructed an arsenal nea r Ogden .
vide storage f or surplu
lation centers .

The plant wa

to pro-

equipment a way fr om large popu-

The plant remained small and unimportant

until 1936 \,hen it was enlarged to include a bomb -loading
plant .

In 1940 , another program of expan ion was started

by enlarging st orage facilities and adding

everal manu-

f acturing units to assemble 20 and 37-millimeter shella , l2
This installati on was of significance to Utah during the

11

Ibid . , pp . 25 - 26 •

•wr, since it was the first manufa cturing concern to be
uilt in the s tate durinr; the

eriod 1940- 45.

Tile first expaneion during the war was for a 37~ illi meter

1940.

shell loading plant during the last half of

The plant was to cost

~ 2 , 6oO , OOO ,

and was located

on 973 acres of land north of the existing ordnance depot
area.

It was believed at the time that approxi ately

2,000 pers ons, mo tly women, would be required at the
ne\'1 plant •13
In June of 1941 , a contract for additional construction of shell loading facilities amounting to $3 , 500,000
wa ~

announ ced by the Army.

It was reported that the

additional 9hell loading line would
ing~

and

nwerou ~

con ~ i ~ t

7~

utilities as compared with 10 5

in the already existing shell loadin1 plant.
t ional con ntruction
.:6,100 ,000.

of

rought the

buildbuilding~

This addi-

otal authorivation to

Production s tarted at the plant in

of 1941 with 100 men end 40 \10r.len .

ovember

Not only did the

initiation of production require the u3ual increase in
e ployment of women for clerical help , but the females
were used in the a s semt ly line al no. 14
lJ
qalt Lake Tribune, December ?0 , 1940 , p. 12; April
20, l '.IU , p . l i.,A .
l i.Hid . , June 15 , 1')41, p . 13A; Noven:ber 11, 1941 ,
p. 11 .
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The Ogden Arsenal provided Utah workers with their
first acquaintance of liartime production .

Employment

at the end of 1941 v1as about 1, 00v, but inc eased to
beyond 6,000 by November of 1942 .

There

~a~

a reduc-

tion to approximately one- half that number at the end
of 1943.

Employment increased to nearly 4,500 in April

1945, and was slightly above 3,000 in December 1945.15
The Arsenal

~a

typical of the type of facilities

built in Utah early in the war .

Financed by the War

Department, it vas placed in Utah for defense purpoJes
rather than for the extraction of some mineral re ource .
It was a facility built specifically for use during the
war and could not be expected to continue production in
the postwar period.
Ut hns, kno11ing that Utah's atorehou e of natural
resource

held the key to indudtrial developmPnt,

~ ere

not content with one plant that utilized only labor .
Governor

Il.a1~

thought Utah could help the nation by

offering up its treaaure
cat_,.~

and the nation could recipro-

by building the extractive and-•productive facilities

which would allo\t Utah to develop ita industrial potent:l.al.
Convinced that it might as well be Utah receiving the
government construction funds, the Governor went to

15

J. R. Mahoney , "Economic Changes in Utah During
\'/orld War II, " Utah Economic and Business Review, June
1946, p . 11.
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Washington, D.C. early in 1941.
The Small Arms Ammunition Plant
The Governor in Washington
In Apr il of 1941, Governor Maw conferred with
several government officials in an attempt to persuade
some further development to be authorized for utah .
Salt Lake Tribune

~tated

The

that:

Every loyal citizen of the state, regardless
of political affiliations or alignment of
preparednes.::~ , l'l ill \,ish the governor succeao
on his mission to decure some of the benefits
incident to undeaireable conditions in •.hich
.
the world is being placed by aggressive p01'1 ers,l6
In the company of the four Congressmen from the state ,
Gover nor Maw 1tent to the office of Robert P. Patterson ,
Adsi<Jtant Secretary of rlar .

The discussion indicated

that there was strong sentiment , on the government ' s part,
f or a pO\'Ider plant or a small arms ammunition plant , or
both , to be built in Utah.

After the conference,

Governor Maw felt encouraged at the possibility of gett ing
a small arms plant for the state, even though a powder
plant wad eliminated because of the lack of a swift ,
::~izeable and dependable fla.l ing stream,l?

16

Salt Lake Tribune, April 11, 1941, p. 20,

l?Ibid ,, April 9, 1941, p . 7; April 10, 1941 1 p, ?.
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Shortly thereafter , the Govern or and Congressmen
met with Donald l-i. Nelson and Edward R . Stettiniu

of

the Office of Production Jvl.anagement .
Nelson aJsured his callers that he, for one ,
is opposed to establishing any more new industries in established and industrialized
areas; that he wants t o get out into new
torritory away from congested centers and
that, in this respoct, the Utah appeai interested him.l8
Though Nelson sounded

reas~uring

on the point of a

mall

arms plant , he reminded his audience that he had to wait
for recommendation from the War Department . l9
Later, the Governor and Democratic Senator Abe
Murdock met with Bri gadier General C. T. Harri ll of the
Army Ordnance Corps .

Harris voiced concern over the

inadequacy of the Utah labor supply, but the Governor
Jtated that within a 40-mile radius of Salt Lake City
there were 23,000 "employables. r

He stated fur ther that

he had a list of the names of 1,200 persons who had left
Utah but would return if employment were available .

The

Governor went a step further by declaring that the s t at e
of Utah ;;o uld build any roads necessary to give access
to the small arms ammunition plant and would guarant ee
18

~.,

19

Ibid.

April 11, 1941 , p . 1 .
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that they \'/Ould be completed ani ready before the plant
Hent int

prcducti on ,20

Shortly thereafter , the Governor and Senator Murdock
met v1ith President Roosevelt, ani f or the first ti me heard
about plans to give Utah a pig iron plant as part of the
national steel expansion program.

The Pres ident had the

proposed Utah expansion brought to hiD attention only th e
day before meeting with the Governor and Senator .
the que ti on of steel expansion
~e veral

~as

Although

not sett led until

months later, it immediately brightened Utah's

industrial outlook,

So pl eased v1ere the Governor and

Sena tor t hat they are reported to have told the President
that if Utah could get tho pig iron plant and the

mall

arms ammunition fact ory , the state ' s unemployment prob lem
would be solved and there \IOUld be ''no more unemployed in
the state , ~ 21
The Remington Arms Plant
Partly as the result of this urging, federal officials ,
in June 1941 , authorized the erection of a $)0 , 000,000
small arms ammuniti on factory in Salt Lake City ,
Salt Lake Tribune reported :

20
21

Ibid . , April 12, 1941 , p . 1.
I bi d . , April 13, 1941 , pp . l - 2 .

The
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The small armn ammunition plant represents
the largest si ngle defense outlay yet
authorized in Utah, and 1dll almo.;t immediately
call for employment of thousands of workers
during the construction period. After completion it will afford steady employment for
other thousands, a large percentage of them
11omen .22
Governor Maw, in a letter t < Sena tor Murdock v:ritten
on the day of the announcement,
on your good

~~r k

plant for Utah,

in th

~~ rote:

"Congrat uations

matter of getting a

mall arms
Ever·yone out here is rejoicing. •· 23 Later

in the week , he wrote again to Senator Murdock:
I could not possibly tell you what the umall
arms ammunition plant has already meant to
the people of the State , ~veryone is enthu iaatic, Hundreds of people are singing your
praises as well as those of your associate
11ho v1orked with you. The plant is certainly
the biggest thing that has ever come to Utah
and we are very happy and proud . 2~
The War Department ultimately

spen~

a total of

)6,000,000 for the construction and equipping of the
factory.

In August, the Remington Arms Company , of

Bridgeport, Connecticut, was designated as prime contractor for the plant and was awarded a War Department
contract for $86,000,000 for operating the ne ,
22Ibid., June 11, 1941, p. 1.
23
Letter f1·om Governor Herbert B, Maw to Senator
Abe Murdock , June 11, 1941, Utah State Hi3torical Society
Archive •
24Letter from Govenor Herbert B. Maw to Senator Abe
Murdock, June 16 , 1941, Utah State Hidtorical Society
Archives,
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plant , 25
ll.anufacturing activities \tere :Jtarted in December

By July 1942 ,

19~1 .

employm~~t

approached 10,000 per-

sons and held steadily clo e to that f i gure until
November 1943, when manuf acturing activities ceased.
The plant wa

made part of the Ogden Arsenal in 1944

and furnished employment t c appr oximately 1,500
employees until the end of 1945 . 26
Si gnificance of the Ogden and Salt Lake
Plants
The Ogden Araenal and th

Remington plant had parti-

cular influence on the Utah employment picture,

Between

the months of Oct obe r 1941 and November 1942 there wa s a

12 ,393 increase in the number of employee

wor king in

manufacturi ng concerns who e employment and payrolls were
sub ject to unemployment insurance.

The Remington plant

increased its number of employees during th e
by a total of 10 1 57S . 27

am

period

In other words, the Remington

plant accounted for 85 percent of the increase of the
number of employees in "manuf acturing " concerns between
25

ar Industrial Facilities Authorized , pages not
numbered ; Salt Lake Tribune, August 15 , 1941 1 p, 1.
2CJr.!ahoney, lac . cit . , p . 11 .
27utah Indu trial Commis ion, Department of Employment
Security , Ten Years of Insured Employment in Utah , 19311946 , pages not numbered,

I
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October 1941 to November 1942.
During the fourth quarter of 1941, the Remington
plant had a payroll of $191 ,000 , while in the la t
quarter of 1942 thi

figure had ri:.en to $5 ,700, 000 ,

out of a total of $17,000,000 paid in all manufacturing concerns in the state ,

The annual payroll of the

plant reached $22 ,000,000 in 1943, out of a total manufacturing payroll of over $67,000,000 for Utah , 28
The Ogden Arsenal and

mall arms ammunition plant

employed about 10 percent of all the persons engaged in
non-agricultural employment in the 3tate duri ng 1942,
while offering reliof to Utah ' o unemployed,

Utah ' n

in:mred average 'r/eekly unemployment figtn·e in 1938 stood
at 5,943, for an insured unomploym nt rate of 9.76 percent .

By 1940, this figure v;a

at J,922, while during

1942 the average \·1as reduced to 1, 769 , for an in ured
unemployment rate of 1.51 percent.
vidual~

The number of indi-

receiving unemployment insurance benefit checks

in January of 1942 was 4,98e , but by November of that
same year (at which time the employment at both plants
had increased to 16,000), the number stood at 314 . 29
28
29

Ibid.

statistical Abstract of Government in Utah, p . 14A;
Utah Industrial Commis ion, Department of Employment
Security , Utah Annual Report Supplement, 1961, p . 4A ;
Annual Report for the Year 1942, p . 33.
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While it cannot be stated for certain that these
two plants accounted for all of the reducti on , or even
that the e

fi gure~

can account for a l l of

Utah'~

labor

for ce at that time , the effect of the two factories is
obviou •

Nevertheless , neither plant watl built to

utilize any Utah resource other than labor .

Both were

built by the War Department and were strictly l>artime
fac ilitie

which did not

repre~ent

any significant post -

war productive source once the war was over .

The

~

Lake Tribune quite pretentiously stated that the Remington
plant meant ''a permanent indUJtrial estab li hment , as
long

all unconquered countries may remain on the de30
fensive for centuries to come . "
!lad the \lar ended in
a~

January of 1942 , ho 1over ,

Utah • ~

wartime

indu~trial

develoymcnt would not have amounted to very much.

30

alt Lake Tribune , June 12 , 1941, p. 10.
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CHAPTER III

UTAH'S ALUNITE INDUSTRY DURING WORLD IAR II
Utah ' s Mineral Resources
By virtue of their state ' s natural resources, Utahns
held the conviction that the national ·v.ar effort could be
aided by utilizing the mineral
great deal of Utah

1 .:J

trea~ures

of the state ,

A

induJtry prior to the war had been

directly related to the mineral resources found in the
urrounding mountains .
The Bureau of

~~nes

1

Mineral Yearbook for 1942 listed

over 37 minerals produced in Utah during the period 194041, of which such minerals as coal, copper, fluor par , gold ,
iron , l ead , lime , s ilver , tungsten ore , vanadium, and zinc
;;ere named .

During 1940, the mining industry in Utah con-

s i ted of 302 firms , and had an annual payroll exceeding
$17 ,000,000 ,

Firms i n the chemical , petroleum and coal ,

clay and

~tone,

glas~

products , and primary metals in-

dustries in Utah numbered 113, and had an annual payroll
of $9 , 500 , 000 during t hat same year .

Among manufact uring

concerns , the pri mary metal s industry , which had an annual
payroll in 1940 of $6 , 600 , 000 and hired approximately
4 , 000

1

orkers , was

~econd

only to the food and kindred

products industry , ;. hich hired about 7 , 000 workers and
pai d $8 , 200 , 0GO in payrollu .

The mi ning and the above

48
manufacturing industries together accounted f or over
one-quarter of the total annual payrolls paid in all
industries during 1940, and hired 18 , 000 out of the
81 ,000 workers engaged in all indu;;trieti in the atate . 1
Utah'o Alunite Resources
In 1933, Senator Abe 1\lurdock, then a United States
Representative from Utah , attempted to bring attention
to the alunite and pota h deposits found near Marysvale
in Piute County .

The Bureau of Mines in a survey made

in 1932 estimated that the total reserves at Marysvale
contained only 300, 000 tons of potash or approximately
a one year supply .

On the other hand, the Bureau

estimated that "the J,OOO,OOO tons of alunite reserves
contained 1,000,000 tons of alumina or approximately a
20- year supply . r2
The Bureau of Mines reported in 1941 that the
alunite depoJit;; in Utah

ere by far ''the mo.:lt exten-

sive of any known in the United States . .. 3

The Bureau

estimated in that year ti1at of the 47 , 000 , 000 tons of
1 u. s. Department of the Interior , Bureau of Mines,
Minez·als Yearbook, 1942, pp. 73-74; Utah Indu trial Com- mi~Jion, Department of 3mployment Security, Ten Years of
Insured Employment, 1937- 1946, rage, net numbered .
Fieures exclude firme not s ubject to unemployment insurance .
2 u. S . Department of the Interior , Bureau of Mines
Alunite Resources of the United Stated, prepared by J .
Thoenen, Report no . 3561, p, 4.

R.

Jibid ., p. 20.
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alunitized r ock in the United States there were over
35,000,00

tons in Piute County alone .

It also esti-

mated that Beaver County had about 2 , 000 , 000 ton , 4
With increaaed production of airplanes , which
acc ompanied the war in Europe, there 11as cnncern over
having a reliable source of the ore bauxite , from
aluminum 'fias produced .

1~h ich

Most high-grade bauxite wa

imported from Briti h Guiana, Brazil , Surinam, and
Canada.
~ource

The Bureau of Mines, reporting on the domestic
of bauxite, stated that only limited quantities

of commercial- grade bauxite existed in the United States ,
Larger depo3its of low- grade bauxite existed, but these
could not be economically utilized as long as high - grade
fo reign ore Has available.5
Foreign sow· ces could n ....t all-1ays be relied upon,
especially in the event that thePanama Canal fell into
enemy hands.

\"lith concern increasing over sources of

bauxite ore, government officials began devel oping
domestic

ources, especially in Arkan:;as, •lhich became

the largest bauxite -producing state in the later

~1ar

years ,

Utah alunite was one of the .>ources tried during

the

years in attempting t o relieve aluminum producers

1~ar

4

Ibid., p . 38.

5Ibid., p. 3.
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from being dependent upon one domestic

~ource

of

alumina .
A Senate subcommittee on Public Lands concluded
in 1941 :
Although moat of the n w plants producing
aluminum v.ill u.:>e alumina made fro m bauxite ,
yet an important part of the producti on will
come from plant3 in the West, thereby involvi
a l ong freight haul for the alumina . Therefore,
the production of alumina in the West from
native raiT material!l uch a ... alunite and highgrade clayJ iu a lon time development 1hich
seem.s inevitable, but ~1hi ch hould be hastened
by the removal of reatraint.:> on producti on
that has prevailed for fifty years in th~ pa3t . 6
Although the \lartime attempt to build an alunite
indu~try

in Utah was unJucceJsful, the alunite plants

built in the .:>tate during the war are significant for
.;everal rea.;ons ,

First, the Kalunite plant built in

Salt Lake City •·a

the firdt mineral- utilizing plant

authorized to be built by the government in the atate
during the period 1940- 45 . 7

3econdly , this plant is

typical of a number of induJtrial facilitie
Utah during the war in that it

wa::~

built in

built to :oatiofy a

6

U. s. Congress, Senate , Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Landd an:i Survey , Mine r al Resourcea
of thP Public Lan
of the ~n ited States and their DeveloPment, 77th Gong., 1st Ses3 ., 3. Report No . SJS, p . 11 .
?Authorizations for expansion of pig iron facilities
in Utah 1ere made as early as July 1941, but all authori zations were cancelled or revised until the Geneva s t eel
plant was authorized in November 1941 .

51
demand created on the \lest Coa t .

Thirdly, the

attempts by Senator Abe Murdock and other Utah Congressmen to obtain an alunite plant

ere typical of those

made to gain the indastrial fac ilities built in the
state during the period 1940-45 .
Development of Utah's Alunite (1910- 1939)
For many years pro .. pectors had kno·,,n of the vein of
·pink spar• that OC" curred in the high mountainJ near
~~ry~vale .

but it
a3

n a~

Many sample s of theore were as sayed for gold ,
not until 1910 that t he mineral was identified

vein alunit e.

Tho ve i na were immediately recognized as

potential uources of pot. a sh , and the increased demand for
domestic

ources of this material brought on by

~orld

War

I resulted in the di covary of additional vein and replacement depo s i t •

Before many of the replacement depo its were

explored to any extent the war

timulus 1-ms removed and ,

except for occasional s ub aequont shipments for experimental
purposes , production and exploration ceased . a
Various mining operations
The vein de posits were mined during World War I by
both t he .ineral Product
g

Company, a subsidiary of the

Ma) E. Willard and Paul D. Proct or , "fuite Horue
Alunite Deposit , Mary vale, Utah , " Economic Geology ,
Oct oter , 1946, p. 620 ,
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Armour Fertilizer \'l'orka , Atlanta, Georgia, and the
Florence Mining and Milling Company, of Philadelphia,
Penn..;ylvania .

The Mineral Products Company i;; reported

to have produced 250,000 tons during ita exi tence.

In

1940 .:lOme of the plant remained, but many of the "tructures
had either fallen or burned and much of the original
equipment had been ;;old o
;.a .. about five
Mine

mileoo~

removed.

The treatment plant

;;outh of Marysvale .

The Bureau of

in 1941 stated that 'the entire plant probably has

little salvage value at present in comparison

its

>~ith

ori ginal cost. "9
The Florence Mining and Milling Company i

r ported

to have pr duced 12,000 tons during \ilorld War I.

The

alunite from thia mine wa.:l haul d to a treatment plant just
outaide the city of Mary.:lvale.

The plant was

till stand-

ing in 1941 and •as 01-ned and operated by Aluminum,
Incoporated, of Cleveland, Ohi o .
had patented the Moffat proce s

Aluminum, Incorporated,
whic~

was de;;igned to

utilize alunite as a raw material for the production of
pure alumina, potassium ..;ulfate and other products .
ori ginal patentee, R.

Tho

vi . P.1offat, is r eported to have said

that the process had been tested in the laboratory and had

9

Alunite Resource
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successfully produced high- grade alumina which had in
turn been made into aluminum . lO
In June 1939 , Aluminum, Inc orporated, mortgaged its
property and obtained a loan of $50 , 000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

The company agreed to re-

pay this loan at the rate of $5 , 000 per year, but no
principal payment was ever made on thi
mall payment of interest, the
the company.

loan, and only one

um of $380. 82, was paid by

The company al o failed to pay the taxc3 on

the property for the years 1941 to 1943 . 11
The Kalunite Proces
Kalunite, Incorporated, under the direction of Dr.
Arthur Fleischer had been c onducting extensive re earch
during the 1930's into th

chemiotry invvlved in

everal

proce ses for the reduction of alunite to potassium
fate , alumina , and metallic aluminum .
Cor,poratiun,

ul-

In 1934, the Olin

hich became intere ted in the wor k, bought

about 90 percent of the Kalunite Company , and the next year
built a pilot plant in Salt Lake City.

The plant under

direction of Dr . Fleischer extracted fifty
factory alumina from alunite in 1939 .

ton~

of satis-

The project was

10
Ibid.
11

Aluminum, Inc . v . the Reconstructi on Finance Corporation , Federal Reporter , Vol . 151 , No . 3148, p . 653.
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later moved to the Battelle Memorial Institute in
Columbus , Ohio, and there produced several ton3 of
metallic alum1num,l2
The Aluminum Company of America, which made an investigation of the Kalunite

proces ~

in 1934, maintained

that alumina from alunite ccntained enough pota h to
damago the reduction equipment and that its grain aize
,,a

so fine that huge du t lo::..>e

re earchers , ho .. ever,
equally

~1ork

would occur .

ere confident that the

Kalunite 'a
~oc

ss would

ell with lOI•- grade bauxites or liith clays , of

which domestic deposit

were incalculable . l3

Aluminum Expanaion During World iar II
In the year immediately preceding the beginning of
World

ar II , the American aluminum industry 'as centered

around the Aluminum Company of America, the only primary
producer and the major fabricator .

Four reduction planta

approximating over 300, 000,000 pounds capacity were in
operation ,
pounds ,

Secondary capacity ,,a:; less than 100,000,000

~1hile

total fabricating facilities were barely

adequate to proces s the available metal,l4
12 Alunite Re~ources of the United State s , p. 22·
Have or Have Hot?• Fortune, December, 1943 ,

~Aluminum:
p. 262 .

13 Ib1d .
14u . s. Department of Commerce, Business and Defen e
Services Administration , Materials Survey: Aluminum,
November , 1956, p . II - 9 .
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During the war, the industry was expanded to meet
vital strategic requirements.

·~en

been completed, a second integrated

the expansion had
roducer had entered

the industry, the country's ingot capacity had been increased to 2,300,000 ,000 pounds, secondary recovery had
been multiplied by five, and the fab ·icating system had a
machine capacity of approld.mately 2 , 600,000,000 pounds .
"The United States had become the world's foremost aluminum
producer and fabricator, with 42 percent of the world's primary capacity and a fabricating system exceeded by none."l5
Congressional interest was focused on the supply
situation in May 1941 when the Senate ' s special committee
investigating the defense program heard testimony from
r epresentatives ot the aluminum industry, and the government.

The hearings pointed out the need for increasing production and hastened decisions for the expanded program . 16

By November 1, 1941, the entire expansion had been
planned and the construction proceeded under the supervision
of the Aluminum Company of America 1 s engineering staff.

15

Ibid.

16
I id., p. II-10; see also, U. s. Congress, Senate ,
Special-committee Investigating National Defense Program,
Hearings , Investigation ot the National Defense Program,
77th Cong., 1st Seas ., 1941, pt. ).
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Ch oice of operating companie

for the plants wa

narrowed to the Alumi num Company of Ameri ca , Bohn ,
Uni on Carbide , and Olin ,

Bohn and Union Carbide with-

hile Olin contracted

dre ~. ,

~11th

the Defenae Plant

Corporation t o operate a plant at Tacoma , washine;ton,
The other plants were assigned t o the Aluminum Company
of America ,l7
- ith the tremendoUJ aluminum- production program
rlanned, kno n domestic res rves of high- grade bauxite
l'lere estimated to be exhausted within a few years if
dependence l>er e,

plac~d- e~tir

,ituation , Congres

ly on them .

In vie. of thio

appropriated funds in the fall o f

1941 for a more comprehensive investigation by both the
Bur eau of Hines and th

U. S, Geological Survey to f ind

the occurrence , extent , and quality of dome tic bauxite,
alunite and high- alumina clay . 18
The Kalunite Plant During World ' far II
World

ar II gave Utahns rea on to believe that the

alunite deposits in the vicinity of Marysvale would at
last be developed .

17

Pro~pects

Materialo Survey :

18
Vdneral

looked attractive with the

Aluminum, p. II- 10.

Yearbook , 1941, p. 659 .
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national aluminum expan ion Gaining momentum and the
government offering to build plants and factories for
t he war effort .
In July of 1940, 3enator Murdock and S, P, Dobbs ,
Democ ratic national committeeman for Utah , met with
George L , Batt , then an assistant in the Defense Council ,
to urge federal funds in expanding the pl ant o1.ned by
Aluminum, Incorporated, at

1~rysvale .

that Mr . Batt at first

not interested in plans for

building
alumina .

ne~

a

It

as reported

plant , but 1anted an immediate supply of

The Senator pointed out to the official that

the Marysvale plant was already in operation ,

~~o ugh

the

plant >.a..; in a somewhat r·etarded condition . 19
/

•

Not long after the conference the Reynolds Metal
Company of Raleigh , North Carolina off'ered to take the
entire output of' Aluminum, Incorporated , if the alumina
from Utah alunite could be produced commercially and at
a favorable price .

In addition , the Reynolds Company

offered to advance $200 , 000 to bring the daily output up
to 50 tona , 20

19
20

Salt Lake Tribune, July 30 , 1940, p. 15 .

ill;!. , Augu t 7, 1940 , p , 8 .
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3even
l~urdock

month~

later , in

?~rch

1941 , Senator

called on

Pre~ident

R.:>o..;evel t in an attempt to

interest him in a plan calling for expan i on of the
Marysvale plant .

The Senator reported that the Presi-

dent aeemed intere..;ted in the project .

In June , the

Senator moved to broa en an investigation of methods of
producing aluminum from lo,. grade baw:ite to include
alunite by introduci
pp r• priati on~

Bill .

an amendnent to the Interi or
The Dill called for $85 , 00 for

the investigation, part of which the
be u..;ed t

~enator

hoped would

investigate both the Hoffat prr ce:;s, of Aluminum,

Inc orporated and the Kalunite process of Kalunite ,
Incopo! 'ated . 21
The Senator •·a:J apparently !luccessful becau.Je the
Inte:·i t,r Department· Jtppropriation Act f or 1942, approved
by

Congres~

June 28 , 1941, allocated a total of $85,000

for the :
Production of alumina from lo - erade bauxite ,
aluminum clayd and alunite : For all expens ..;
necessary to the conduct of investigation· and
research on processes for prod ucti on of
alumina from si l aceou bauxites , aluminum clays
and alunite . 22
The amendment propo..;ed by Senator Murdock
the Bureau of I:ines t o u e half of the $85,00

in~tructed

f or !ltudy

21Ibid . , March 14, 1941, p . 4 ; June 4 , 1941 , p. 20 .
2?u

S Congred&

IntetiQt Department Appropriations

~A~cut._.,---o!1._.9~4u;.2 , Public La1.'136;'17tfi Gong ., 1st SesJ ., Sen . Doc .

114 , 1942, p. 163.
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of the alunite pruceases , although the law itself did
not

~pecify

any particular amount to go t o either

bauxite, aluminum clays , or alunite investigation3 .
In addition, the Senate Committee on

Appropriation~

recommended that the appropriation for investigation of
bauxitic ores , under the Second Supplemental National
Defense Appropriation Act, be made available also for
investigation of alunite ores and aluminum clays.

The

Act passed in October 1941 provided a total of $415 , 000
for the :
Investigation of bauxite and alunite ores and
aluminum clay deposits: for all necessary expenses for investigation, including laboratory
research and procurement of materials therefor , concerning the extent, occurrence, and quality
bauxite and alunite ores and aluminum clay
in order to determine domestic ources of upply.2J
In ,Tune of 1941, Secretary Ickes of the Department of
l

»

'

the Interior testified before the Senate committ ee investigating the nati onal defen e program that aluminum could
be produced fro m Utah alunite by a tested and approved
process at a coat cheaper than that of using bauxite .
Secretary also told the committee that a plan for

The
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utilizing Utah alunite and converting it into aluminum
had been proposed to the Office of Production f·ianagement by th

Interior Department in April , but by June

nothi ng had been done about the plant ,24
One month later,

ecretary Ickes informed Utah
~

Congre ssmen that the aluminum expansion program then
under :ay contemplated the production of aluminum

olely

from bauxite, and did not contemplate theuse of alunite
in any plant , although the Secretary had protested to
the President over the apparent discrimination against
alunite by the Offi. e of Production Management .

The

President evidently mediated the controversy between the
Office of Production Management and Secretary Icke s becaus

within a ,,eek Arthur Bunk r, chief of the aluminum

di vi ion of the Office of Producti on Management 1

~~a

uoted a s saying that Utah alunite would •·definit ely have
a place in the expanded aluminum production program . " 2 5
Mr . Bunker stated further that it '' a s the intention

of the Office of Production Management to have the Olin
Corporati on operat e an aluminum plant at Tacoma, Washington
that

~10 uld

use alumina made from Utah alunite.

Frank

24

Hearin~ , Investigation of the National Defense
77- 894 .

Program , pp .

25salt Lake Tribune, July 17 , 1941 , p. J; July 21,
1941, p .
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~iche lberger ,

rcpresentati v

of the Olin Corporati on

in Wash ingt on , •·hen t old of the latest proposal

~. as

quoted as tia ying:
It' s all new to me . We have never been told we
were t o u3e a lumina derived from alunit e ; ~e do
not even have definite a ssurance that we are to
operate an alumi num plant at Tacoma, and we have
not expressed delight over any decision by OPM ,
for a far as we kno't.i there has been no deci s i on.'! 6
In July 1941 , the Nati onal Academy of Science approved

a u feasib l e and practic a l the Kalunite proceas of producing
alumina .

The .\cademy had been investigating the process

for over one month .

In the fo llo1dng month , W. L. Batt,

then deputy director of production in the Office of Product.i on Management-;- te::rtifying 'bofore a subconnnittee of the
~

Senat e Committee on Public Lands- and Surveys , 3tated that
hie office proposed to 1'recornmand to the Army and to the
R.F.C. the approval of a program of sub stantial produc ti on
27
of alumina from alunite ."
Just >1hen it look d as if Utah \.a uld obtain the
alumina plant, Artbur Bunker, head o f th e aluminum di vis i on of t he Offi ce of Producti on r.mnagement , expressed

26

Ibid .

27 Ibid., July 25 , 1941, p. 61 U. S. Congre s , Senate ,
Sub committee of the Committee on YUblic Land and Surveys ,
Hearings , Development of Minerals Resources of the Public
Lands of the Unit ed States , 77th Gong . , 1st Sesd ., 1941,
p.

394 .
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concern over the que tion of l>'h ether or not there 1as
tiUfficient alunite in the utate t o j ustify the government in financ ing a plant .

The con cern 1·1as based on the

r eport of the technical committee of the National
Academy of Sc ience which had met in New York during
Auguot.

Such concern

as voiced in apparent di agree-

ment \vi th the Bureau of Mines • report made in February
uf 1941, :hich stated that Utah po ;;Jessed 74 percent of
the 47,000,000 tons of alunitized rock in the nation .

On

the day follo,ling, the Bureau of Mineu reaffirmed itJ
February findingti,

It a1oo claimed that there had been

no recommendat i on by the Office of Production
to Rec ·nstruction Finance Corporation or the

~~nagement

\/ar

Department

that the alunite plant be built . 28
Harry S. Truman , who at the time was U,
fr om P~ssouri , headed the

enator

enate committee investigating

the defense program , and ·as reported as saying that he
doubted that the Office of Production Management was
interested in obtaining alumina fr om Utah ' s alunite
bccauae the Aluminum Company of America had

11

the OPM by

the throat , ~ 29

28 salt Lake Tribune , August 7 , 1941 , p . 2 ; Auguat 8 ,
1941, p . 17.
2
9Ibid ., August 15 , 1941 , p . 17.

6)
A report by that committee in 1941 stated:
The Office of Production Management has not
only not encouraged but actually has discouraged
research and experimentation in the use of alternate processes for the production of aluminum
from low grade bauxite or other sources such as
alunite . On the o ther hand, the Department of
Interior, through the Bureau of Mines, has encouraged the development of processes Which involve the use of basic materials other than
high- grade bauxite. The Bureau of Mines i now
conducting such experiments with the cooperation
of the inventors of the proce ses . A report
recommending alunite as a oource f r m which to
produce aluminum wa prepared by the Bureau of
Mines and sent t o the Office of Production Management more than 6 weeks ago, but the Office of
Production Management has n~ yet acted on it ,JO
In discussing the monopoly position enjoyed by the
'I

Aluminum Company of

America~

thecommittee concluded that

the reluctance exhibited by the Office of Production
Management in developing any other source of alumina might
be explained by the fact that , au f ar as aluminum wa s conccrned :

l

..

Alcoa had convinced the Office of Production
Management of the adequacy of the supply in
order to avoid the possibility that any one
else would go into a field \ihich they had for
so many years successfully monopolized,Jl

)0
U. s. Congress, Senate, Special Committee t o Investigate the National Defense Program, Investigation of the
National Defense Program, 77th Cong ., 1s t Seas .,
Report

1.so,

1941, p . 6.
Jl I b id., p . J.
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Indeed , it could be said that Alcoa had good r eadon for
attempting t 0 di scourage competit or s in the field of
alumina producti on, since 96 percent of the production
of alumina wa

centered in four plants owned or operated

by that rirm .32
3enator ?.{urdock conferred a week later
Batt , of the Office of Producti on

1~ith

~~nagement,

\ • L.

in an

attempt to f ind out what was delaying the alunite development .

~~ .

Batt is reported t o have t old the Senator that

the delay was not the f ault of the Office of Production
Management, but that hi:> office wa
investigation~

a~laiting

supplemental

that were to be made by the Bureau of Mines .

Only a '' eek before , Mr . Batt had announced that a man
f rom his office had been sent out to Utah to check on the
alunite deposits .

NoH he claimed that the man had not

been sent out by the Offic e o

Production Management, but

that he 11a:> a metallurgist from the Bureau of Mines s ent
to check on the alunite process .))
Secretary Ickes ,

~<hen

confronted with the report of

the new survey , said that no new investigations of the

3 2 nAluminum, Have or Have tlot ?•· Fortune, p . 1)8.
)) Salt Lake Tribune, August 15, 1941, p . 27.

proce ... se .. or depo:>it:. 11ere being made by either the
U. 3 .

Geol ogical ->Urvey of the Bureau o:: t-lineJ .

Jtated that t he ir

inv e:;t i gati o n ::~

He

•1cre c omplete, that

they were satisfied as t o the quality and the extent of
the alunit e , and Here convince
supply to j u ti fy the
Two

that there \Ia:> ample

stabliJhroent of an alumina plant , 34

days later, th e Office of Producti on Management,

the Bureau of

an

iin c .:~,

the U,

Geological Survey ten-

tat ively agreed that th e government

::~h ould

advance the

f unds to the Kalunit e Company of Salt Lake City t o build
a one-unit plant at

Y~ry

vale .

The agreement contained

the c•. ndition that if the one- unit plant established the
c<mrnercial feasibility of the p1 ocess other unit s
be

aut; horized.

~1ould

u:; t 18t>h, Senat or Mur ock 1.a .. in-

On A

/

rormed by · , L, Batt that the Of fi c e of Producti on ManaGement had pr po:>ed to th e 'ar Department and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation a plan for producing alumina f r om
Utah alunite by providing f or $5 ,000 , 000 for a proce sing
plant at Marysvale or

alt Lake City . 35

The plan called f or th

Utah plant to handl e 100 tons

of alunite daily, f r c·m l>hich the alumina produced 1.ould be

34rbid .
35

I bid . ,

Augu.:~t

17, 1941, p . lB ; Augu:>t 19, 1941, p, 9 .
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Jent to Tacoma , rla Jhingt on t o be proceo ed into aluminum
by the Olin Corporation, mother company of Kalunite,
Incorporated.

Frank

ichelberger is r eported to have

Jaid that a plant handling only 100 tons of ore a day
via

••not a commercial plant , but i 3 , at best, a gl orified

pilot plant. r 36

Mr . Olin , of the Olin Company, indicated

that a plan under which they might market 100 tonJ o
alumina per day would be acce ptaoe, but there was a va t
difference bet ,een 100 tonJ of alumina and 100 ton3 of
alunite .

A plant producing 100 t ons of alumina per day ,

he believed , \!O uld Ju tain the needs of the Tacoma plant .37
At the end of

Augu~t ,

th

Offi ce of Produ ction

ment requested that the Kalunite Company

~~nage 

ubmit 1. hat it

c n3idered the smalle t fea ible commercial unit f or a
plant

t~

..

produce alumina from alunite .

Company, voici nb concern over the

The Kalunite

ize of the plant , claimed

that a "ea;:;ible operation 1muld be the plant producing 100
tond of alumina per day, which would cal l for 350 t o 500
to n :~

of alunite ore .

In other 1'/0rds , a plant f our to fi ve

times as large a" the one ori ginally suggested by the Office
of Production ~anag ement.38
J cl bid .

---,

August 22, 1941, p . 15.

J?Ibid . , August 2), 1941, p . 1).
38
I bid ., August 30, 1941, p. 17 ; September J , 1941 , p . 11 .
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The plant which Kalunite proposed to the Office
of Production Management 1.a.. designed t o turn out 100 tons
of alumina a day, and would

co~t

$2 ,300,000 ,

At the same

tim , a technical committee of the National Academy of
cience ouggested a plant be built with a daily capacity
oJ 35 ton

of alumina, at a

co~t

of $1,100,000.

The

committee recommended that the process be proved commercially- faa ible before expanding t o 100 tons per day,39
During September, the Defen e Plant Corporation
reached an oral agreement with the Olin Corporation under
whi ch the company would operate a gov emment- o1·med aluminum
plant in Tacoma .

Tilis plant wa

to be capable of producing

30,000,0 0 pounds of aluminum annually .

The agreement,

hOI'Iever , did not involve conJtruction o:f a plant in Utah
to produce alumina . 40
Short ly after the agreement wad reached with the Olin
Company concerning the Tacoma plant, Kalunite propos ed
another plan.

Thi

plan called for consideration of both

the Tac oma plant and the Utah alumina plant a

one

operation , since they 11ere t o be dependent upon each other .
The plan also called fo r a three-unit plant to be built at
Lehi at a cost of $2 ,300 , 000 ,

Thi

three- unit plant

39 Ibid ,, September 13, 1941, p , 17 .
40

Ibid ,, Septmber 16, 1941, p . 9 .

wa~
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t o be in addition to requesting funds to be

u~ed

for

mining of alunite at fo!arysvale . 41
Several reasono were
vale to Lchi.

gi~en

for the switch from

~4ry

-

It wa3 .:;tated that Lehi "1as near an enormous

a mount of aluminou..J clay, which cou ld be dra1.n upon after
the Marysvale deposits had been exhausted .

Furthermore ,

Lehi was closer to housing facilit i es and a larger labor
supply . 42
At the en

of

eptembcr, it was announced that the

Jefen..Je Plant Corporation and the Olin Corporation had
reached an agreement in

1-;hi

ch the government would ad-

vance funds for building a one -unit plant at Lehi, 1dth
tho agreement that if th
pr oduce alumina two mor

plant should c mmercial1y
units 11ould be added .

One month

later , Kalunite 1•as authorize1 by the Defen e Plant Cororation to build

a;; al~na

plant in Lehi , for which

the go vernment \tOuld advance $1 ,500,000 .

An additional

$500 ,000 1'/a..; authorized for the purpose of beginning
mining operations at Marysvale . 43
In January

or

1942, consideration was given to build-

ing the plant in Provo rather than in Lehi, since the plant

4libid . , September 17, 1941, p . 17 .
42

Ibid . , September 21, 1941, p . 18 .

43Ibid . ' September 26 , 1941, p . 1 ; October 25, 1941 ,
p . 15 . - -
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11a.., t o use natural e;a.o and ga.o rate& at Provo >-iere
che per .

In February , however , it

plant

to be built in .salt Lake City , and that the

taJ

wa~

decided that the

company would receive an additional $1,000, 000 , thus
brine;ing the total to be spent for the plant to
$3 , 000 ,000.

The capacity of the plant 11a-. to be 167

t onu of alunite per day , with the agreement that if the
plant proved to be commercially uuccessful the c pacity
wo uld be increased to 500 ton

per day . 44

In April , the Kalunite Company requested funds to
treble the capacity of tho plant to increase production
of alumina to 105 tons per d y .

Kalunite estimated that

the increaoe could be met 1ith an additiond
$875 , 000 from the go·vernment.
granted to the company .
capa city of the plant

~um

of

The request l>a3 not then

In October of 1942 , the annual
tood at 30, 000 tons which was

ultimately increased 4to 36 , 000 tons annually , or approximately a 100- ton daily capacity . 45

44

I bid ., January 22 , 1942, p. 13 ; February 3, 1942,

p. 1.

45

Ibid ., April 17, 1942, p . 17; October 16 , 1942 ,
p. 17 ; U. . ' ar Assets Admin1.3tration , Plant Finder :
Li .3ting of Government Owned Industrial Plants , September ,
194 ' p. 186 .
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Development of Aluminum , Incorpor ated, at
Z.tarysvale
In June of 1942 , Aluminum , Incorporated made appli cation to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation fur a
loan of $SO , 000 , in addition to the $50 , 000 it had
borro\ed in 1939, for th

purpoue of erecting a plant

capable of producing 70 ton.s of alumina per day.
application \;a
$775 ,000 .
~ire

sub sequently revi ed and changed t o

In the revision the company stated it

to erect a plant

~nich

~1as

de-

'NOUld produce 40 tons of

alumina per day which would cost $480 , 000 ,
application

Thi

The revised

accompanied by a letter from tm Dorr

Engineeri ng Company of New York, stating that the plant
could be built for the $480 , 00

'

.struct it .

Also attached

aa

and that they \iould con-

r copy of a contract

ith

Jl(etals Reserve Company, a 3Ub;;idiary of the Recon truction
Finance Corpor ation, to

ell 50 , 000 tons of alumina at

$40 a ton,46
On l.fuy 4 , 1943 , a conference waa held by repre5entatives of Dorr , The Bureau of

~lines ,

and the Reconstruction

Finance Corporation fo r the purpo3e of considering the
feasibi lity of the project ,
tat ive

The Bureau of Mines represen-

tated that he thought the plant could be

46
Aluminum , Inc. v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation ,
Federal Reporter , p . 654 .
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~onntructed for the estimated $48

,ooo . 47

On flay 13, the Recon.Jtruction Finance Corporation
announced a loan of $775,000 to Aluminum, Incorporated,
The initial installation of the plant was to have a
capacity of 30 to 40 tons of alumina per day, which
t o be produced by the f.loff'at proces::l .

\iSS

In June, the Dorr

Company completed an investigation of the proposed plant
and made a report to the Aluminum company in \ihi ch it
Jtated that the estimated cot of a 20-ton plant , afte<
using existing building and equipment, and by purchasing
uaed equipment where possibl , was $894 , 000, and that th
estimated operating cost would

b~

approximately $176 per

ton . 48
In July, the Dorr Company asked to be relieved of the
conatruction job becau e the Dcf n e Plant Corporation
3tipulated that second-hand e uipment and materials were
to be used almo t exclu ively on th

job .

month , the H. K, Fergu on Company was

Later in the

ub.,tituted in the

place of the Dorr Company with the consent and approval of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation .

In the contra ct

47Ibid.
48Salt Lake Tribune, ?-1ay 14, 1943 , p . 17; Aluminum,
Inc . , v. the Reconstruction Finance Corporation , Federal
Reporter, pp . 654- 655 .
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<~ith

Aluminum, Incorporated, th

Ferguson Company

s tated that the estimated cost of the

crk, exclusive of

engineering fees , wa s $371,000 . 49
In July 1943, a further nati onal expansion of alumina
capacity h'as proposed, totaling )00,000
this

propo~al

was quickly

ingly apparent that alumina

ton<:~ .

Ho\~ever,

helved as it became increasst o ck~

w re gro ing too

rapidly and that consumption at reduction

plant~ wa~

to

be cut .50
In October, the lar Production Board revoked itu
order allocating $4,000,000 to build an experimental plant
in the Pacific Northwest to
alumina from clay.
lack o r lab or .

;1or~

on methods of extracting

The reason given for the cutback was

One week later the

Recon~truction

Finance

Corporation placed a stop- order on the prc; ect of
Aluminum, Incorporated, and advised the company to make
no further expenditures under their allotment of $775 ,000,
but to hold the pro j ect in suspe11·s pending decision a
f uture policy . 51
Senator f·lurdock tried to draw a distinction between
the

~~rysvale

alumina plant and the pro jects for extracting

49 salt Lake Tribune, July 14, 1943, p . 21 ; Aluminum,
Inc., v. the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal
Reporter, p . 655 .

50~finerals Yearb ook, 1943, p . 695.
51 salt Lake Tribune, October 5, 1943, p . 4 ; October 14,
1943, p • . •
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aluminum f r om clay in an at tempt to persuade the Reconstruction Finance Corporation t o r ecall its stop order ,

The

onator pointed out that the funds had already been
allocated, and that 60 percent of the plant
in existence .

'~at~

already

By the end of October, the st op order had

been recalled by both the War Production Board and the
Reconstruction Finance Gorporat1on , 52
In November, the Fergu on Company submitted plan

and

pecifications fo r a 40-ton plant at an estimated cost of
$3,300,000,

It als o declared thatif the proce s worked

at all the capacity of the plant would have to be increased
t o 100 tons per day in order t o make it pay,
a

The plans,

prepared, were re j ected jointly by the Bureau of Mines

and Aluminum, Inc orporated,53
Later in the month, the Ferguson Company returned to
the government a new plan which called for constructi on
o! a pilot plant to cost $721,909
capital ,

plus $300,000 in working

The plan also called for con truction of a 100-

ton plant at an additional cost of $7,200 , 000 if the
pilot plant proved satisfact o::-y .

52
15.

FolloNing thi

proposal

Ibid. , October 16, 1943, p . 16; October 30, 1943, p ,

53Aluminum, Inc., v . the Reconstructi on Finance
Federal Reporter, p, 655 ; Salt Lake Tribune,
November 3, 1943, p, 13.
C ~ rpo ration,
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there was a complete report of the entire situation made
by the ReconJtruction Finance Corporation .

The report

wa J 3ent to the War Production Board, and the Board recommended that nothing further be done \lith the company's
pr oject . 54
At the end of 1943, the s tocks of aluminum v1ere
acc umulating so rapidly that outback
30 percent of

in~talled capa ~ ity

De cembe r 1943 and July 1944.

in producti on totaling

were made between

The cutbacks discontinued any

expansion of the facilities of Aluminum, Inc orporated, at
r.'.ar ysvale . 55
In January 1944, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation cancelled all c ontracts with the company.

It was the

conclusion of the government that the company \ aa in complete default of performance on its commitment
l oan contract .

under the

In that same month, the government

in tituted an action in the United

tates Distri c t Court

f or t he district of Utah against Aluminum, Incorporated,
t o re cover j udgment on

t ~o

promissory notes and to for eclose

a mortgage given as security.

The firs t no te ;,as for

54

Aluminum, Inc . , v . Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Reporter, p. &55 .
55

Minerals Yearbook , 1943, p . (g3 ,
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$50,000 and the other fo r $775,000.

On the latter note,

the gove rnment asked j udgment for only $10,108,
ha s the amount advanced to the company .

The

~·hich

an~ ~r

of

the company was that the ~econ truction Finan e ~ Corporation 1.as not entitled to any judgment since the company
had suffered damages a s a r esult of an alleged breach of
contract by the Rec onstructi on Finance Corpor ati on, in the
um of $1 ,142,56 •

The los

j udgment in its counter claim

for
wa~

hich the company sought
a supposed pro f it

~hich

it claimed it \\ Ould have r alized under the contract with
the

l~etals

Reserve Company.

The trial court di missed

the counter claims and entered j udgment in favor of tho
government in the amount asked fo r, and for the foreclosure
of the mortgage.56
In February of 1945, the company appealed the case .

Judge Huxman in deciding the caoe in November of 1945, in
the Circuit Court of

Appeal~,

upheld the decision of the

trial cour t and stated that the Reconstructi on Finance
Corporati on was ''not a charitable in titution or an experimental lab oratory . ••57

5G

Aluminum, Inc ., v. the Re oo n truction Finance
Corporation , Federal Report er, p. 65) .
57

~ •• p .

656 .

7
Plan

for an Aluminum Plant

In addition to proposals for alumina plants in the state,
i n 1942, there was some consideration given to the building
of an aluminum plant in Utah.

Senator McNary of Oregon

had protested in early 1942 against plans that the new
defende industries authorized for the Pacific Coast
States be placed at less vulnerable inland siteJ,
con~ideration

wad a plan to build aluminum plant

Under
scheduled

f or Troutdale, Oregon, and Los Apgeles, California in
either BoiJe , Seattle, or Salt Lake City.58
In an editorial, the Salt Lake Tribune stated :
Under the circumstances, viewing the urgent ne ds
of the Nation in the light of rs~ent developments,
it is difficult to understand the Oregon Senator ' s
protests . To favor one ' home enterpri e i laudable, but not when uch cause is advocated at th
expense of the people and the government as a whole .
The enator de ire to .please hi constituents, of
course, but in tim of naticnal j.:uril his duty as
a member of the highest la~;mak.ing body on the continent extends beyond the boundaries of any state
or section . 59
Utah, of course , lad strictly concerned with national
interest rather than the development of its own industry .
This false pride of ownership wa

in vain, however, f or with-

in a very few days Senator Murdock, in a telegram to
58
59

Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1942, p. 7.
rbid ., January 4, 1943, p . 14A.

77

Governor f.'law , said:
Concerning aluminum r olling mills, Under
Secretary Patt rs on cf ar Department advises
m that plants originally scheduled for
Troutdate and Los Angelea are t o be c ~ nsoli 
dated int one plant l oc ated at Spokane . This
plant ~1 111 require 55 , 000,000 kilowatt hours
of electricity \,hich i not available in Utah. 6 0
A boost
the
a

f~r

~uminum

eek lat er.

explained t u

Salt Lake City

plant acheduled for

a~

the site fer part of
pokane was given about

J . L. Haugh of the Union Pa cific Railroad,
en tur Plurdoc k that the fabricati

plant

.. vuld require 65,000 kilo .. at t:J , or J USt about the quantity
of pr wer used by the Utah Copper Company.

The company was

hen building itu o;m po11er plant and when it began
it.:~

own p011er, it would releas

entir

75 ,000 kilowatts.

u.;~:l.ng

The

plan was halted later in January of 1943 by govern-

ment officials. 61
Postwar Status

f

the Kalunite Plant

Although the Kalunite plant

~ a.;~

completed in 1943 ,

the Bureau of Vanes reported that the plant had been

60

Tele J am from Senat cr Abe Murdock to Gov~rn o r H. B.
Ma , Januar. t , 1942, Utah State Historical Soci ty Archives.
t.l

Salt Lake Tribune, January 10, 1942 , p . 17.
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disapp inting in results, and the prcduction had been
lesJ than five percent of

c apa ~ ity.

As late as June

1944 there v1as no predic ion a.> to when the plant w uld
te in commercial operation.

In 'uly of 1945, th

Dt< f ns e Plant Corporation rea ched the conclusion that
there nad no ob j ect in continuing the uperation of the
plant .

The government reached the decision claiming

that the plant had n ver

~u cc

eded in getting int o

commercial operation . 62
In Aug st, the RecunJtruction Finance Corpora t i Jn
notified the company that they would be g iven 9G days
t:.o proc eed with the determination of the te chni cal and
commercial p1a cticability of the prvcess u::; d b; Kalunite.
The extensi on wa.:;

ue to the S nat"

mall

Busi~ .:1::.

Com-

mit t ee , which had rec, mmended to the Defense Plant C01 ·pora t ion that the company be given $00,000 a month for
months to prove the feaJibilit y of the plant .
the thre

If after

months the plant was not a tiUccess, th n the

plant could be declared surplu
of Mines

th~ee

wa~

property, unles

intere ted in the plant .

the Bureau

As the Salt Lake

Tribune pointed out, "it is a 100 to 1 bet that the Bureau
of Mines doesn't want it. •·6 3 In December 1945 , the Defense
62
.
1-Unerals Yearbook, 1943 1 p. 69oi· 1944, p .
Salt Lake Tribune, July 28, 1945, pp. 3 and 20 .

80;

6 3rbid ., August 6 , 1945 , p . 6 ; October 7, 1945, p . 18 .
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Plant Corpor ation advided the

urplu

Pro perty Admini -

tration that the Kalunite Plant should be cl o Jed don~ . 64
In 1946, the plant ~~ a d declared surplus property
and put up fo r sale .

In March 1947 , th ree c ompanies

bid on the

hi gheat bid being Gubmitt ed by

lant, t h

the &nerald Mining Company , of Elko, Nevada .
t. ther bidders ;-. ere
Ne

The

t~

o

terlin1 Chemical.;, I nc rporated , of

York City, and the J . R. Simplot Compar.y, of Idaho .

In P.ay of 1 94 7 , the high bid

a~

approved by th

lar

AJsets Administrati on, only to have the company withdt·aw its bid later in t he month . G5
In August 194 7, the War AsuEJtu Adn1inistratic n re coi ved ne1. off rs for th
hi g hest, at $510,000 .

pl ant w1 th J . R. 3implot bidding

I n September, the adminiJtration

re : ected the bid as being too lo .
bid

In November, new

wpre received, and the American Potash and Chemical

Corporation , of New York, offered $752 , 000 for the plant ,
l<ith the 8.3surance that it 1<8.:o prepared to ::.pend an
additiona l $750, 00 in reconverting th e plant f or the
production of pho phate fe rtili:Ger.

However, the plant

,·/8.3 uold in Decemb e r to J . R. Simpl ot , of Boise , Idaho ,

64
65

Ibid., December 20, 1945 , p. 15 .
Ibid . , March 21 , 1946, p . 13 ; May ?7 , 1943, p . 9 .

8
fvr $752 ,000, with the

under~tanding

t o be reconverted

a pho3phate f ertilizer plant.

int ~

that the plant was

The Salt Lake Tribune stated :
Acquisiti on of the Kalunite plant here in Salt
Lake City by an Idaho man who plans t o convert
it into a phosphate fertilizer factor y 1~as the
be t news of the week for intermountai n bu3iness ~ijd provided a plendid yule gift for this
city . oo
AccomplishmentJ of the Kalunite Plant
During the War
The plant at Mary vale cannot be considered to be
either a success or
during the

l<ai',

failur~

in the production of alumina

aince it wa1..1 not developed t o any extent .

However , s ome c0n lusion can be reached concering the
$5 ,454,000 plant in Salt Lake City .

The Bureau of Mine

reported that during 1943 the plant received 12,000 t on&
or ore f r om the mines in

Mary~vale .

In 1944, R. L.

Sebast ian and C. C. Heikes, both of the Magne ium and
Aluminum Division of tho War Production Board,

te~tified

before a Hou e Subc ommittee on Irrigati on and Reclamation
that the plant in 1944 was produc ing onl y about five tons
p r day . 7
(.(

Ibid . , Augu t 26 1947 p. 13 ; eptember 2o, 1947,
p. 11 ; November 18 , 1947, p . 24; December 24, 1947, p . 1 ;
December 27, 1948, p . 8 .
67\var Industrial Fa cilities Authorized ; U. S. Depart ment of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Exploration of
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In 1950, Dr. Arthur Fleischer, in a report pre~ented

before the American Institute of Mining and

Met allurgic 1 Engineers on the production of aluminum
f r m Kalunite alumina, stated that Kalunite alumina had
produced commercially ac ceptable metal.
plant dur ing the war,

ho1~ever,

The Tacoma

reduced only 1, 20

tons

of Kalunite alumina t o produce mor e than 6oO t on.; of
metalic aluminum .

In addition to not producing t o

capacity , ho1. ever, Kalunite alumina produced
less pure aluminum

~etal

lightly

per pound of alumina, required

more the refining element cryoli te, more electri c current,
and more

kimming than alumina made from bauxite • 68"

The aluminum plant at Tacoma had not been co mpletely
succe :::ful eithe r.

The Attorney General of the United

States, in a report made in 1945 on the aluminum industry , stated that altho

h this plant had the benefit

l, f a t idewater location and an economical source of
power, had been one of the hiehe$t cos t producer
aluminum in the coun try .

The cvst

of

reported in 1943 were

all about three cents per pound higher than most producers

Alunite Depos it s f~r) ~alel Piute County , Utah, by John
H. Aild, Report No . 972, 946, p . 3; U. s. Congress ,
House, Subcommittee of the Committee on I rrigation and
Re clamation, Hearings, Columbia River and I ts Tributariea ,
77th Gong ., 1st Sess . , 1945, p . 1511 .
MSalt Lake Tribune, lolarch 19, 1950, p . l OC.
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on the coa t.

The extra c? St3 were due to lab or costs ,

and the use of certain materials,
aluminum f luoride.
t he Ka l unit

uch a3 cr yolite and

Since the use of more cryolite for

alumina •ao pointed out a s one of the de-

fe cts of Utah alunite, the hi t h co:ots might erroneously
be blamed on the use of che Utah product .

Ho ever , Mr .

Heikes of the 'ar Producti on Board stated that most of
the alumina for the Ta co ma plant came fro m Hurricane
Creek , Arkan a , and that only two percent of alumina
shipped to the plant was f r om th
1~e

Kalunite plant in Utah. 69

Attorney General, in hi s report, concluded that

unle1.1::1 cost could be pared

do~m,

t he Tacoma plant would

be •·one of the least lik l y to b

able to prcduce at a

profit. " 70

concerned, he s tated

As f ar as alunite wa

that :
A \ride variety of minerals cont ain relatively
large amounts of aluminum, including bauxit e ,
alunite , lucite, feldspar, and very common
clay . Thus far, ho\!"!Ver, bauxite has proved
to be the onl y commercial ore of aluminum. 71

Most of Utah' s industrial development during the war
wa s not as unsucce sful as was th

alunite eAperi nee. The

69

U, S . Attorney General, Lett er from the Attorney
General, The Aluminum Indu try , 79th Gong., 1st Sews ,,
. Rept. 94, 1945, p . 66 ; U. S, Congre ss, House , Columbia
Riv er and Its Tributaries , p . 1513.
70

u.

71Ibid.

Attorney General, The Aluminum Indust ry , p . 66 ,

c3
~i

nifican e

r l

the plant certainly does

t i v n ; ith lat... r.

nr>arl) lG
J(

c~

~ cnbcr

&nploymen

The averag

it~

come in

at tl">e pla nt reached

b v December 1942, and

1943.

n~t

H&ti

increased to ?50 by

employment of lG5 \ta.., main-

. ained thruugh 1945 . 72
'l'he value added by the manufacturer did not amount
t

Vf'r'/

uctiv

nt!c h, an

it did not re..,ult in any p ;:;t\;ar pro-

facilit:, at least for

a.., intend d .

It '<las simply an attempt

Utahn_,, th UJ h unsucessful to
a~ ··

j

he purpose for hich it

·n the part

e ;:;ure, to build indu try

und t.he mineral resource..; of the at ate .

ndu.Jtry

·f

It h'a ... an

hict ,;as brought rJn by tl.e war stimuluJ, and

without v1hi ch ;.ould probably n ver have been .. eri _.,L.. ly
attempte •
Yet, Utah alunite had been ... uccesaful \'lithin its

.m l'ie;ht .

Out of fully 232 proce;:;s

•· r k d ont f r

eri vin

J

which had been

alumina from common clay., and

other native ores besides bauxite, and out of th
accepted, only the Ka lunit

four

process resulted i n a

_(.. minrJrcially desirned plant built during the period
1940- 45 to produce alumin

from alunite , 7J

'/?- J. R. l·'ahone'r, .. Economic Changes in Utah During
.orla .ar II, •· Utah bCCnomic and Bu.Jiness Review, June ,
194t , p , 11 .

7Ju . ~ . Congres:J, llou.:J , Columbia River and Ita
Tributari :.; , ? · 1507 .
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CHAPTER
UTAH

1

IV

STEEL INDU TRY DU!UNG TiiE

AR

Introduction
As one of the most basic

prvdu~ts

of the

econ~my,

... teel was one of the first productu affected by the \'tar
in Europe .
Ameri c

Indeed , the adequacy of

in meeting increa ed demand

early as June of 1940 .

t el facilitie

in

wad queutioned a

There never

ati complete

ree-

ment on exactl y how much titeel capacity the United States
hould ha ve , but when th"! war·time

e~-pan.s i

on wa.J c 1mpl ted

there had been $2 , 500 , 000 , 000 sp nt on new Jteel- producing
f cilitiea.

American

teel capacity was expanded from

82, 00,000 t c 96 , 00 , 00

tons por year .

Of the total ne

investment , t~ ~ v rnment contri uted ab out $1,21
and private industry pajd the Lalance .

,v 0

ome 29 new plant

w re con:Jtructed, at a cout to tht• government; o1 at leallt

$5 , 0 0,000 each, w1 han

a~mregat

cost amountin • to

$770 ,ooo,ouo . l
OnE' of the most famou::. and i mportant pl ants built by
the government du: ing t tx1

ar was the Geneva Steel Plant

1
u. S . Congre ::l 1 3enate , ::lube mmittee on Surplus
Property of the Committ ee on lilitary Affairs and t .c
Industrial ReJ _~ anization Subcommittee of the Special
Committee on Post\iar Economic Policy and Pl anning, Hearinss , lar Plant~ Disposal--Iron and Steel Plants , 7gcnCong . , lst Se s . , 1945 , pp . 3- 5 .
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con~t ructed
~ive
1~aJ

in central Utah .

It wa

the most expen-

pr ject of the Defen·e Plant Cor porati on , and
tho most impor t ant

of Utah .

1~artime

Approximatel

and pi g iron facilitie

development for the state

$215 , 000 , 00
in

tr~

wa~

spent for Jteel

tate during the war, of

which Geneva received $190,0 0,000 . 2
The Nat ional Steel Expan2ion Program
Adequate steel capacity for the nation waJ one of the
most controversial industrie s on the list of indu tries
scheduled for expansion .

The huge armament program con-

templated by the President in 1940 created skepti ci m on
the part of certai n government, officials as t o the adequacy of existinr fac ilit ies in meeting ne w military and
foreign demands .

In 1939, a total of $121, 0 ,0 0 had been

spent for new equipment in the
the

indu~try

However,

contemplated

teel industry , and in 1940

p nding more than $146,0 0 , 000 .

keptics pointed out that the 1940 program con-

Jisted mostly of the purchase of new and up- t o- date
equipment to suppl ant ol der in tallatians .

The annual

capacity of the basic steel industry at the beginning of
1940

1~a s

2

about 81,000,000 net t ons .

Since fini ahed steel

u. S. Civilian Production Administrati on , War
I nduJtrial Facili ties Authorized, July 1940 to August
1945, pages not numbered .
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product i on then r an about 75 percent Lf ingot output,
w a~

there

a

~o , ooo,ou

- ton capacity vf hot - rolled

~teel product~ .3
In tho middle of 1940 the controversy over uteel
capacity f lared up .

\'ihile certain governmental official::;

were s keptical, the steel
capabl

of meeting any

indu~try

increa~od

believed that it

wa~

Irving Olda ,

demand .

chai r man of tho board of the United States Steel Copora tion , said in September of 1940 that t he

ela~ticity

within

the indUDtry \/Ould permit an ample s teel supply, although
some u)'Stem of pri orities might have to be

10 .

ked out .

In Dec emb r , Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the National
Steel Corpor ation, restated the belief that the industry
wa.; adequate to meeting any demand .

The New York Times

e3timat ed tha t production capa city at the ber inning of
1941 \IO Uld be 83,000 , 000 net tons, of which <iar requirements Hould take 21 percent oftJmt total, leaving
65 ,509,000 for civilian usc .

Since civilian consumption

in 19 40 amounted t o v nly 56 , 400,00u tons of ingot

~tee l,

it was estimated that there was ample capacity existing,
in the indus try . 4

3tlew York Times, February 16, 1940 1 p . 29 ; September
22, 19W;"seic71n-;-P . 3 .
4
Ibid . , Sept ember 19,~, 194 i p . 33i· December 21, 1940 ,
p. S ; Decembe r 22 , 19 4C, ~ ec . I I, p . .
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In January 1941, a serious study of American
Jteel production capabilities was initiated by Gano Dunn,
Chief engineer and member of th
CommitiJion.

National De fense Advisory

The purpose of the study wa s to determine if

expantiion .should be speeded up or cont inue as then planned,
and just how much more capacity
February,

~rould

be required.

In

pokesmen for the industry conferred with W. S,

Knu Jen of the Office of Production
t o enlarge exi ting facilitie •

~~nagement

and agreed

The program contemplated

expandi ng the industry b ' more than 2, 500 , 000 ton , and
wculd be a gradual
The repre

in c rea::~e

rather than a rapid expansion.

ntatives also agreed at that time that th

re-

port being prepared by Dunn would be us d as the basis for
increased expansion in the future . 5
In February, the Dunn report was made public .

It

estimated that if certain measures were taken there would
be an excess of ingot - producing capacity in both 1941 and
1942, as uming the expansion planned by the industry
proceeded a ccording to schedule .

The estimate for 1941 ,

which Has based on a national income of $80 , 000 , 000 , 000 ,
stated that the total defense, foreign, and civilian requirem!Jnts for that year would total over 75,000, 00 tons .

5Ibid . , January 12, 1941, Sec . III , p . 1 ; February 1,
1941, p-:-75.
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Thi

w. uld leave a surplus of about 10,000,000 ton

capacity.

in

Assuming a national inc ome in 1942 of

$90,000 , 000,000 the report concluded t ha t there would
be a surplus capacity of 2,000,000 tons . 6
BetHeen February and May of 1941, several national
and internativnal events llllde the Dunn estimates
inaccurate for forec a sting national steel r equirements .
Governm n· economists during that period forecast a
national income of $100 , 000,000 , 000 for 1942, and even
suggested that military, foreig n, and civilian needs for
steel would run between 110,00 , 000 and 120,000,000 tons .
In l-1arch 1941 , the Lend-Lea e Act

~1as

passed, and com-

mitted $7,0 0 , 000 , 000 to for ign nations at war .
addition, between

tho~e

In

two months there was an accelera-

ti on of the national defense pro ram, and an increase in
private consumer demand due to increased incomes.

Irving

Olds declared in May that aomc enlargement of the exist ine steel capacity mi ght be n cessary , though he called
for ''state sman-like" caution in formulating any expansion
program .

In the light of these events, a second inv esti-

gation was made by Gano Dunn on the nati on' s steel
capacity . 7

~ . ,March

1, 1941, p. 6 .

?Ibid., May 8 , 1941 , p. 15; May 23 , 1941, p . 15.

The

econd report, made public on

~~y

28th, stated

that in both 1941 and 191,2 there would be a deficit in
the s upply of steel if existinG f acilities were not
expanded more than scheduled .

The combined milit ary ,

fo reign, and civilian demands f or steel, the report concluded, would exceed capacity by 1,400,000 ton
and 6 ,400,000 ton

in 1942 .

in 1941

The report estimated that

maximum reliable capacity of the steel industry as of
Decemb er 1941 would be 91 , 000,000 tons annually, therefore it wao necessary t o expand

teel capacity by 10,000,000

tons . a
The New York Times, commenting on the second report,
..;tated that:
Here is the nub of the matter. No one who
f ollows the swift and tragic course of \lorld
ev nts can fail1D understand that time is
verything. I f Mr . Dunn 1 calculationa are
correct .• , the propositi on that we build
even 10,000,000 tond of additional capacity
means stealing time from ou= currant vital
effort in order to provide t\W years hence
an additional capacity \~hich it may then be too
late to use . It means filching 4,160,000 t ons
of steel , plus men and manufacturing capacit i es
sorel y needed for def ense at this mcment, t o
increas capacity two years hence . 9

8~·, lo':ay 29. 1941, p . 13 .
9Ibid., June 4, 1941, p , 22 .
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On June 4, 1941, the Office of Production Management asked the steel industry t v make plans for expanding productive capacity by the nece oary 10,000,000 tons.
Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce and head of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, said that the
ment would make funds availabl
the cost of construction .

to finance a larg

gove~n

part of

In the middle of June, Gano

Dunn 1 ft his position in the government to return to
private industry allegedly due to poor health, although
he had been under severe criticism by some for hiJ fore cast of a ~teel deficit.lO
The authorization for the expansion of 10 , 000,0 0
tons cf capacity came in September when the Supply
Priori ties and Allocation:! Board announced that it

as

their policy to
encourage the provision of 10 million ton of
additional steel- making capacity, including J
million tons already approved, to encourage
the provision of integrated facilities necessary for this expansion, and to encourage the
provision of additional pig iron needed to
offset the shortage of scrap . The Office of
Production fl.anagement is directed to t ake appropriate action to effectuate this policy .ll

10

Ibid., June 5, 1941, p . 13; June 14, 1941 , p , 9.

11 u. s. Civilian Producti on Administration Bureau
of Demobilization, ~Qnutes of the Suppl y Prioritie and
Allocati cns Board, 1946, p. 12 .
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In

Augu~t ,

steel was placed under 100 percent

priority control to
wou ld be met .
~

~ic

in:~ure

that d fense requirements
1~ar ,

\:hen the United States en ter ed th

steel capaci ty in the United States had been

increas d by approximately 5 ,000,000 tons a year, and
of thf' 10 , 000,00{, te-n increa ... e which had been ordered
it

~~ ~

highly rrobabl

that at lea,t 7 , 000,00

~ uld be c mpleted in tim

ton ....

for usc in the 1943

:·ogram.l2

The e pan:>ion o• a basi c industry of t.he war

wa.:~

finally authorized by the government only th ee month
be"rr

the attack on Pearl Harbor .

This deci sion Na.:;

tc, affect Utah '::; wartime indu:Jtl'Y more than an}' othersinr,le decioJion other than the later decision to build
the Geneva Steel Plant .
Utah '"

teel Expansion During the
.ar

An early Utah industr ·

Iron manufacturing wa

not a

ne,~

induatry to Utah .

The manufacturing of iron in the State began a few years
after the Mormon pioneer::! arri vod in the Salt Lake Valley .
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In 1851 , a ''pioneer iron mi:>sion •· wa:> founded by the
Mormun Church at Cedar City with the enlisting of
t.hirt ,l'- f iv e men who were skilled in mining and manu~'aG turing.

Af ter almost ten years of lab or, the proj ect

resulted in nothing more than a

f e~1

andirons, kitchen

utensils, f lat irons, wagon wheels, molasses r vlls, and
machine castings .
du.Jtry 1:a s

•·Small, volunteer , c:-operative in-

imply unable to cope

~lith

the pr oblem

ad:;oc iated with developing a ma jcr resource . "l3
The Columbia Steel Corporat ion in 1922 purchased
ore properties in Utah and began mining ir on ore.
er~cto d

a battery of 33 byproduct cok

It

ovens and a

45U- to ns blast furnace at Provo , which went int o cperation in 1924 .

The United

tate

Steel Corporati on be-

came a producer of steel in the west in 1930 l. ith the
purchase of the

propertie~

of Columbia Steel .

The United

State:.! Steel Company th n became the o nly integrated
steel manufacturer west of the Rocky Mountains.

At the

t ime of the l'lar, Columbia '1 teel Company, then a subJidiary
of the United States Steel Corporation, operated a pi g
iron plant at Ironton in central Utah . l4
13Leonard J . Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom : An
Economic Hist ory of the Latter-day Saints, 183 -190
(Cambridge Mass . , Harvard University Press, 1958 J.
pp . 122- 12 17.
l4u . S. Steel, The Ne~1 Industrial vest , pp . 2-3.
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The wartime authcrization
The first seriOU,) mention of increasing Utah 1 :>
pig iron capacity for the war came during the meeting
of Utah ' s Governor H. B. Maw and Senator Abe

~urdo ck

with President Franklin Roosevelt in April of

19~1 .

The

President noted that there wal> an apparent shortage o"
st el on the Pacific Coast and that Utah was being cons idered for a $8,0 0 , 000 pig iron plant and a $3,000,000
~ teel

mill .

It was estimat d that the plant would h ve

a capa city of 1,00

tons per day.l5

Later in the month, Senator Murdock and Henry J.
Kaiser , a California industrial! t, met with President
Roo~evelt

to propode the e tablishment of an inte6rated

dteel indudtry on the west coast.

Kaiser'

$150 , 0 ,0 0

plan consisted of a pig iron plant to be l ocated at
Mount Pleasant, Utah ; a steel mill in the Bonneville

Dam area ; and
~<hich

nether steel mill in southern California,

would produce steel by a new production process .

Henry J . Kaiser entered the shipbuilding industry with
the war boom and formed the California

hipbuilding

Company, which operated one of the new gov ernment-o~tned

15

Salt Lake Tribune, April 13, 1941, pp . 1-2 .
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.shipyard

on the '.ie t Coa.Jt .

By May of 1941, he held

ctntracts f or building 54 shipa in Oakland, California ,
and >lad a s ociated ·.1ith firm.> having contra cts to build
159

.ship~

in vari ous Pacific Coast shipyards.

His inte-

grated steel industry wa.s to supply steel for hia
~hipbuildinB

activities .

DuriQB tho meetin 0

,

the Pre i -

dent brought up the question of an ado uate water .Jupply
in Utah t o handle a pig iron plant .

During the meeting

nrlier in April, President Roo evelt had expre sed concorn over Utah having adequate coking coa1.16
Follo;ling the meeting , Senat or Murdock was reported
to be oomewhat perplexed ,

It seemed to h:l.m that there

wa;J aomeone who was hostile to the idea of the Utah plant
whv aLw had ;:;ome inf luence \iith the President .
3enator therefore sent a
.,.hich he

t

legram to Governor

Th

~w

in

tated :

Just i'inished conference with President and
..._Henry J, Kaiser involving Utah pig iron plant
in vicinity of Mount Pleasant . Frt m sources
unknown to me President has been informed
that there i.sn 1 t sufficient ~tater available
fo r :;,uch a plant, we mu t overcome thi s

1(

Ibid . , April 2J, 1941, p . 1 ; New York Times, April
2J 1941, p , 16; 1'Kai er 1 ~teel? • Bu ·iness Week , May J,
1941, pp . 24-26 ; Salt Lake Tribune, Apr1l 23, 1941, p . 4 .
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barrier a~ once . Suggos~ Sta~e Engineer consider the ma~~er a~ once and advise me a~ the
earlie t possible date officially as to availability of \;ater , It i estimated plant will
requi.re approximately eight milli on gallons
per day, three milli on gallons (• f which will be
· dis~ipated, remaining five million recirculated,l7
~iv day~

later the Governor sent a telegram back t o

the ,enator in which he stated :
Sta~e ~ineer after careful analysis reporta
ample <:~urfa e ~;ater for pig iron and <:~teel
plants five mile
outhwest of Mt . Pleasant
on San Pitch River, also exce~sive amounts of
water thirty- eight mil a outhwest- of Mt.
Plea3ant on Sevier River. This does net take
into consideration underground water s uppli es
which natives say io of itself ample to supply
needo f or steel and pig iron plant . In additi<m there i.> mor than ufficient ater supply
f or plants located on Sevier River ab ove to\in
of Sevier and on Sevier river below the to .. n of
Mills and above Delta. There is also ufficient
.ater on Provo River and Utah Lake in Utah County
and Jordan River in Sa lt Lake County and Weber
River in Weber County . l8

' · A. Hauck, consultant on steel capacity and produc ti on in the Office of Producti on Management, in!Spected
coaJtal steel production in relati on to existing coa s t
defense projects , and in May 1941 stated that the normal
steel consumption of th e Coa t did not warrant Kaiser's
17 Ibid .; Telegram fr om Senator A. Murdock t o Governor
~~pril 22, 1941, Utah tate Historical Society
Archive ...

H. B.

18 Telegram fr om Governor H. B. Ma\ to Senat or A.
April 24, 1941, Utah State Historical Society
Archiv s,

~~u rdo ck,
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elab orate program; that such a pro ject
enough steel in

~o

days t o duppl y a

~o uld

year'~

pr'xiuce
emand ; and

that the flurry of shipbuilding might be over

~h u r t l y

after Kaiser's plants b gan t o oporate,l9
Although Hauck was not f or

Kaiser •~

plan, he did

estimate the adequacy of' wel:ltern :.;teel mills in supplying the \vest Coast.

He e tima t.ed that the Paci fie CoaJt

had an ingot capacity of l,066 ,28U

t on~,

and t hat prcgrams

under1:ay at that time f or expan .. i cm ··ould bring this t otal
t o l,2Ll,?OO

ton~

by the end of 1941.

He further

calculated t hat , even Hith the increase in facilities,
additi onal ingot requir ement
total 1,115, 200 .

It

'tl

for the Vlest Coa::st would

s r cc,mmflndod that these require-

ment.3 he mot by constructing t w., 100- ton blast furnaces,
t ~e lve
a~

100 ton open hearth furnaces, and structural

~houg ht

one of th
Lo

necessary .

It ft as f urthe r recommended that

blast furnaces be in talled at Provo, Utah;

Angele , California ; or Pueblo, Colorado.

. A.

Hauck concluded that :
In no event should any bla t furnace be
established on th West Coa st by any new
companie until there is po itive assurance that there ar adequat reserves of
suitable ircn ore and coking coal available

19

mill~

rKaiser 1 s St eel?" Business

eek, pp . 24- 2l .
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and acce ssible for their successful operat ions .20
On the 23rd of May, the Office of Production Management rejected th e plan of Henry J. Kaiser , s tating that it
fav:• red the expansicn of companie
duc ing stee l.

~> hich

were already pro-

Governor Ma\'1 , when t old that Utah wo uld not

receive the pig iron plant , declared that rthe fight ha
only begun . •·21
When the Office of Producti on Mangement, in J une of
asked f or propo3al 3 by th

1941

s teel industry f vr expan-

s i on, t he Col umbia Ste el Company proposed a $63,200 ,000
expan s i~n, o f which the company "~>. ould finance about ten

percent and the gover nm nt the balance.
Utah

~a d

~o

Of thi s total ,

r eceive additi onal coke vvens, a blast furnace,

an open hearth plant, bloom and slab mill , a sheet bar
mill, a jobbing and

heet mill, plate mills, and a oteel

fo undry costing $57,200 , 00 •
provide an increase in
t ons .

'fhe proposed expansion 11ould

teel ingot capacity of 930,000

Governor Maw, when tol d of thi::J news, de clared

'' That ' s r reat news, andwhat \, e have been working f"or. u22

2

Memo from W. A. Hauck to S. R. Fuller, May 15, 1941,
a forwarded in letter from G. Backman t o Govern or H. B.
Maw , July 1 - , 1941, Uta)'t tate HistorJ..ca.l Society Archives.
21 alt La ke Tribune , May 24, 1941, pp . 1- 3:
2 ? I bid . , June 20 , 1941 , pp. 1- 6 .
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One month later the Off ice , f Production
me nt annn mc ed that a plan .. a

~~nage 

under way t o inc rease the

fa cilities at the Columbia plant in Utah.

The plan con-

te:nplat ed th e allocation of $20,000,000 t

t he plant. in

· rder t o triple the pi g iron

facilitie~

and that further

all ocati c. ns -.ould be made at a later date bringing the
t.>tal amoun t auth oriz d fur th
whi ch ~D

Utah plant t o

57,000 , 000 ,

the amount sugg sted by the company in June ,23

r n Jt. l y 24 , 1941 the Office of Producti on Management
announced i t s approval vf

he investment of $20,0 0,000

'··r expan i on or· the pr oducti •Jn of pi g iron in the llt&te
f

Utah.

s truct!"d.

The plan call >d fo r a n w plant t o be conNo of ficial >m r d Ylab made c oncerninr: the locati on

of the plant, but rumor

~a"

that it would be a lakeside

l ocati vn in the vici-ldty o f Provo.

The plant waa t

have

a capacit y ,f 1,0 0,000 t ons of pig iron per year ; 4
The plan.> 1.ere bar ly completed when th
Producticn

~~na g ement

Columbia pl ant wa

ann o~ nced

Office of

a revised plan.

t o bA all ncated $30,000,000

The
or the

additi on of three blast furnaces desir.ned t o turn out
1 , 004,150 t ons of pi g iron annually.

Under the revised

plan t here •. a:; no menti on of the producti on

2

c:- f

steel

3~ . . July 20 , 1941, p . l.

24Ibid ' July 25, 1941, p . 1; July ~ a

1941, p.

a.
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The additi on meant a six- fold increase in pig iron production at the existing plant .

The ink had barely dried

c.n t he new propcsal .hen the government offered a ne v1e r
plan.

The Defense Plant Corporation reached an agreement

\;ith Columbia "teel under whi ch the government wo uld advance $35, 00 ,000 for buildin1 a t wo- f urnace pig iron
plant ,.i th a capacity of 750 , 00 tons annually, •i t h the
probabilit y that wi thin 10 days or t wo 1. eeks additi onal
f unds w uld be advanced for a third blast f urnace and a
mill to turn out semi f inished steel . 25
Fin&lly, in November' 1941, the government announced
the advancement of an

addi~i o nal

$91 , 000,000 f or the c on-

tructi on of a pl ant t u hou3e pi g iron f urnaces alon
.. ith one open hearth furnace t o produce steel ingot s and
a r olling mill to t urn out
tion of the $12o ,u0

,uou

teel plates .

The exact loca -

pla.nt was not announced, but it

was supposedly within a fe. mils of the plant at Ironton ,76
In February 194? , t he site of the new plant 1a

cho en,

west of Orem at the point v.hcre the Denver and Rio Grande
Western and Uni on Pacif ic railroad lines met .
e

The area

ended westward t o Utah Lake fro m the state highway and

enc c.mpassed the Geneva resort a

well as the home

2
5Ibid . , October 2 , 1941 . p. 1; October 2.
"'(,

' I bid , Novemb er ;;·, 1941, p, l.

of 37

1941, p . 1 .

lt-0
'am ilie~.

The plant became kno1. n immediately a

the

Geneva .c.rk.:; ,2 7
The Columbia

teel Company announced that the re -

muval >f a blast f urna ce frc..m Joliet, Illinois , to
Ir· nt <J n \,a;; t o be the extent uf it:; expansi on.
Jtruction
<~everal

f t he fur nac e

~tarted

n June 5

1 S 4~,

c ke vven" ' ere started June 2U, 1942.

~tructiJn

• the

facilitie~

at Iront on

Conand

Con-

.a~ c t mpl~ted

in April 1942.~8
.3tructural ::;teel mill f ;r· Ru .:.ia
In July 1942, planu

ore made for the c vnstructi on

c•f a .Jtructural mill at the Genevu plant in addition t u
th~

rlane mill

c n .. truct,i n v

previ o u~ly

J

In December 194J,

the .:;t ·uctural unit 1-1a.; halted by the

.. ar Pr• uucti n D-ru·
1'a

announce

Since the Utah Oil Refining Company

ct n<~tructin p- a high- 'Jctane ra,a· line refinery in

..,a1t Lake City duril'li.· a peri d , f a sh rtage uf c<.nJtruc tit n >.orkers in the state, the workers from Geneva l<ere
u ... ed in con.Jtructing the refin ry ; the aviati c. n ga:> uline
plant 1:as cun.>idered t u be mere critical than the
~tructural mill at Geneva.29

27

Ibi

:>Sibi .
2

, February

9

1942, p. 1.

l·farch 19 , 1~42, p. 1 2 ; 1-18-y 1 ~, 194J, p

~ Ibid. , July ~5

15.

194~, p . 15 ; December 21 , 194J, P

lJ.
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In January 1944, t here wa3 rumor that t he Ru sian
g vernment was interested in th

mill.

It

11£l.:l

reported

that President Roouevelt had prumi ed equipment and
fa cilit i es t c Rua:Jia in •1rder t o increase it
capaci y .

3teel

As of Jan uary there had been no return of

rt crkers to construct the structural unit at Geneva, althou h i t was thvught that the labor problem in t he
Jtate ha

been cvrrected

One mcnth later , f our Rus ian

engineers visited the plant, and their vi it revived the
rumor that the Rus&ians were t o receive the structur al
mill.
wa

Government of ficial

denied that the guvernment

contemplating the removal of the unit, but did admit

that t he matter had been

d i~c u s sed

and negotiation2 had

been dropp d. ) 0
By July , the structural .;teel mill \ a s
begin opera t i vns on an experimental ba.;i .

.:~c heduled

to

In September

;[ that year, three Russian engineers visited the plant,
but it

wa ~

made clear t hat the y

eie contemplating the

purchase of equipment similar t o that at Geneva. 31
Fact ors inf luencing the choice of
Utah f or a steel plant
There "ere basically ei ht fact ors influencing the
con tructi un c;,f the steel plant in Utah.

They ,,ere :

) Oibid. , January 23 , 1944, p . 18 ; February 22, 1944, p . 11.

31

I bid. , Jul y 1, 1944, p. 17 ;

eptember 7, 1944, p. 1).

lU.
ecent ralizati n, tran .. pvrtation, labt r, 1:ater, c al,
ir n

d~ l omit e, and markets.J2

re, lime t J ne an

The ch , icc u.f Utah a.., th

... ite f r decentra li zatiun

purpos e ., ,,aJ based .:m the t.heur y that an i nland l ocati<• n
1.a ... needed t o
bc. cbing
lo ... .;

f

J

~ restall

r invasi<.. n .
... te el

the 1-'- ""'ible loss

It wad al.:J'-' a precauti vn a ain.Jt

shipment d t <.. the Paci i c c _ast .,hould

Panama Canal be closed .
ad: acent t

the plant,

Grande .e:Jtern an
ing ~

" .;te 1 due t u

Tran3p- rtati un

a.;

he

c ~ nvctientl y

ith b th the Denver an

Ri

Uni un Pacific railr· ad lines c nverg-

the plant Jite.33
The Utah lab r f orce

wao.~

c< nuidered t u ue ' ne •.J f

the mo t pr ductive in t.hc nati on .
o.~tate

in the

tended t 0 be settled

'3ince the p<, pul ti un
abdenteeit.m \,ad

1011 .

In addition, Utah • vrkera poc::Je::;:,ed a hirher e uc ti on
than

ther worker

in t he nation, thu., making training

eat.y ,JL.
Viatcr, though
~o a:.l

abundant.

riginally C( n:Jidered t o be a liability,

1.ater wa.;

bt.aincd from the Deer Creek

ReJervcir, and fr <>m artesian \.ell..; and :>pring..; 1 cated on

32 c

H H .lmea, 'Fact or:J Affecting Development vf
Inuu:,tr. in Interrncun ain merica ,' Journal vf
Q_~~l!r· Tan rJ, 1959, pp. ?~-Jl.
t he

~t eel

33 Ibid., pp . 2( - 27
J4

Ibid. , p. ?7 .
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the plant prvperty ,

Approximately 22u,OOO,u00 eallons

of . a ter, mo t uf it reclaimable f or recirculati n, .as
pumped thr urh the plant daily.
~ umpti on

The average daily con-

has approximately 29,000 ,000

gall o n~,

f which

9, uOO, UQO gallond \;ere obtained fr om the Deer Creek
Reservoir and 20,000,000 gall' n

f rom 1. ells , spring ,

and drainage.35
Coal, a neceJsary mineral f or productitn of coke,
~a~

readily accessible in the surroun ing mounta ind,

Utah Valley had access to
re erves,

--

~o me

~2,0

of hhi ch here within 75 mi les of the plant,

Tnel;e reserve.. •<ere

Lituminoul; character

lar~,;cly

A

of a bituminous and semi-

new coal mine was opened at

Hwr se Canyvn, sume 1?0 miles
plant.

0, 0 ,000 t ons of coal

~ - utheast

of the Gen

a

Coal in the east central area of the atate

a

C' nuidered to be the most important item that led to the
e tabli hment of a larbe integrated plant in central
Utah. 3u
Iron ore was so abundant in the state that it was
estimated that there was at lea t a 'i5 year reserve .

The

iron ore mines of the Columbia Iron Mining Company at
35 , later Recovery and Ore Bedding are Highlights ,'
U. S . Steel New, Oct ber, 1943, pp. 1.:- 7 .
3tHolmes, loc . cit . pp. 2t- 3l · U. S . Steel, Gr owth
of the Iron and-sfeer-Induutry in Utah , p. t ; Utah State
Department of Publi city and Industrial Development, Wartime ·conomic Change and Postwar Industrial Read1ustm9nt
in Utah, b y J. R. ~~h o ney , June, 1943, p. 23.
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Iron Mountain, about 252 miles

outh·,. est of the plant ,

1ere expanded in order to aupply iron CJre f r the new
~teel

mill.

Limestone and dulomite came fr om pr <perties

o•,ned by Columbia Steel Company near Pay:.lOn, ab out 35
miles fr om the plant.37

Map 1 on the f ollowing page

sh v1s the locati " n of the Geneva plant and the l ocation
·f s jurce3 f r various raw materials .

Ao for markets , it
tln- mil es needed t

as estimated that the t otal

a:;semble ra• materials fu r one t on

of pig iron and ship one t m of steel from Geneva to
Juch centers of manufacturing activity as Los Angeles
and San Francisc o , Cali fornia; Portland, Oregcn; a nd
Seatt.le,

;ashington, was sh orter than from any uther

maJor steel manufact uring center in the nation.38
Constructi on of the plant
The Geneva works .1as designed by United State
Company engineers and wa

built by Columb i a Steel .

ar reement made by United

tates

Steel
The

teel v1as that they would

construct the plant 11ithout fee if they were alloh ed t o
operate the plant .

If the government employed s omeone

37

and

Holmes, l oc. cit . , pp . 29-30 ; Grm. th of the Iron
teel Industry in Utah , p . 6 .

38J . R. ~~oney , •The estern Steel Industry , ' Utah
Economic and Busines s Review , June, 1944, Pt. I, p . ~
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Mal? 1. · Location of raw materials used i n
product1on of steel at Geneva .

e l.:~e

to operate it, United 3tate.J Steel v·ould rt>ceive

a reasonable construction fet>.

Unitecl States '3teel 11ao

picked to operate the plant by the
arr<!n~eme nt

overnment and an

wa:; made uo that the company would receive

a profit equal in amount to 1 percent vf the value of
the material man •factured.

The percent age aeemed rea-

sonable enough, but 1hen applied to the vaat volume of
tho plant's capabilitie
a year.

the pr fit t utaled

1,00 , 00

The government per uaded United States

teel

t o run the plant for no profit. 39
Pri or to the completion of the plant, approximately
o,9LU ,OOO cubic
t onJ of

yard.:~

of earth were removed , 67 ,000 net

tructural steel erected, bbU,OvG cubic yard

concrete poured , 124,UOO ton

of

of equipment and machinery

in talled and 117 acres of corrugated siding and roofing
placed by approximately 100

ub - contractors . 40

Upon c ompletion in 1944, 252 by- product coke ovens ,
three 1,100 t on bla t furnace , nine 225 - ton open hearth
furnaces, a 45 -i nch
inch

labbing and blooming mill , a 132-

emicontinuoua plate mill, a

2~ - inch

.:~tructural

mill

39
Je se H. Jones , ~ifty Billion Dollars (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1951 , pp . J2l-322 .
4

r:yron 3. Strate, Conversion . ., f the Facilitico of
Geneva Steel Company t o Peacetime Operations , Paper pre sented before the Pacific Coast General 1-feeting of the
American Institute of Electrical Engineers , Portland ,
Oregon, August 20, 1951, p . 2 .
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and num rou s complementary f acilities had been ins talled.
The capacity of the plant at completion \· as 1,150, 00
net t ons of iron; 1,283,400 net tons of steel ingot;
700 , 000 tons of plates ; and 250,000 tons of structural
shapes. 1•1
In

Augu~t

of 1943, the United States Steel Corpora-

tion fi led articles of inc orporation fo r the Geneva Steel
Compar.y ,

it~

nel; subsidiary .

The new company '<las

capitalized for $5,000,000 by the issuing of 50,000
of stock.

\ alther Mathe ius, a German- born

hares

teelmaker

who had proposed as early as 1935 that Utah be chosen f or
a ateel plant,

as made President of the newly formed

company . 42
In December 1943, the first of four batteries of
coke oven , each containing 63 ovens, wad placed in
operat~on .

furnac<l

was

In January 1944, the first of three blast
" blo~m

in " approximately 20 months after

an army of cont ractors moved onto the site and began
rooting up orchards and garden.s .

One month later, th

first of nir.e oren hearth f urnaces \'lent int o operation .

41
42

Holmes, loc . cit ., p . 23.

l t 1ake Tribune, August 19, 1943, p . 13 ; August
2t. , 1943 , p. 13; Arthur W. Baumi "Utah's Big Baby, ''
Saturday Evening Po.st, V~y 15, 948 , p. 154 .
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t the end of February, the f ir at slabs of steel
rolled in the huge rolling mill at the plant .
the first

~1ere

By April,

teel plate from the plant was sent to the

West Coast shipbuilders.

The shipment consi ted of five

carloads totaling 600 tons of steel plate.43
Employment at Geneva
•pproAimately 10,000 men were employed to construct
the plant .

~~ ny

of t hea

were from s urrounding town ,

but others had to be broutht in from outside the state.
To house single men, ten 105-man single-room barracks
and two 295 -man double-room barrack
the plant site .

were constructed on

To acc onwodate families, the Federal

Public Hou ing Authority s upplied about SOO tra1lers.44
There was no resentment at first , except possibly
on the part of the Mormon Church, which did not
like the idea of a big industry intruding on the
peace of the valley. But resentment began when
,t nries of neighbors having to leave farm their
grandfathers had pioneered tarted to get around.
And when it became necessary to import men from
other counties and other states to fill out the
construction crews, th~ resentment grew stronger.45
As for the pecple of Provo :
43salt Lake Tribune, December 15, 1943, p . 17; January
4 , 1944 , p. l l i February 3, 1944, p . 13; February 25 , 1944,
p . 13 ; April 1~, 1944, p. 19.
44 U. S . Steel News, p. 5.
4 5t-1urray Moler and Andre Fontaine, "Utah' s Steel
Guinea Pig," Collier's, December 30, 1944, pp. 11-12.
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They didn't like the trailer camp that sprang
up near Geneva , and some of them were unhappy
about the tremendously increased bu~iness the
beer parlors in Provo were doing . They objected
to the sudden over cro~ing of everything from
stores to homes . They resented the sudden ,
mushroom gro~~h of near-by Amer6can Fork ,
Pleasant Grove, Lehi and Orem . 4
Operations at the plant began officially in November,
y February 1944 , employment stood at 1 , 500 and

1943 .

then advanced to 3 , 000 by .ay 1944 , and a maximum of
approxi~ately

4,200 was reached in January of

19 ~5 .

It

declined to 3 ,000 by VJ-day and to 1 , 000 in December 1945.
As for the type of employees, it was noted that
the 're farmers first and s teel men se cond. When
the fruit crops are ripe they go ~ack to their
farms for th~ harvest. Steel , they say, can wait;
fruit can't . 47
Production at Geneva f teel
During the period that Geneva Steel was operated by
the government , more than 850 ,000 tons of iron were produced .

46

Ibid .

47
J. R. Vahoney , "EconoMic Changes in Utah During
\'7orld War II, •· Utah Economic and Business Review , June,
1946 , p . 11; .urray !'oler and Andre Fontaine, • Utah ' s
." teal Guinea Pig , " Colliers , p . 28 .
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From February 1944 to November 1945 , the plant produced
L34,010 tons of plate, and 114,280 tons of structural
shapes .48
Po twar Status of Geneva Steel
With the surrender of Japan in Augu t of 1945 , the
cance llation of

~;artime

contract

for shipbuilding and

other war projects brought an end t o the emergency need
for Geneva .

The plant gradually slowed t o standby

operations while potwar dispo~al plan were negotiated . 49
In February 1945 , officials of the Uni ted States
Steel Corporati on advised the government that they were
interested in purchasing or lea ine the Geneva plant for
po~twar

operation.

Opposition to the sale of the plant

to United States Steel developed in some government circles
on the charge that the company was attempting to monopolize the market .

There was al o some doubt about the

successful operation of the mill in peacetime in view
of the size of the faci l it i e

Colorado Fuel & l.U.nes

al o bid on the pl ant . 50
48

Myron E. Strate, £E· ~ ., pp . J - 4.
49 Growth of the Iron and Steel Ind• wtry in Utah , p . 7.
50

Salt Lake Tribune, February 6, 1945 , p. 1 ; Gro1vth
of the Iron and Steel I ndust ry i n Utah, p . 7.
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In July 1945, the Board or' Directors of United States
~teel

decided to take no f urther action toward the

acquisition of the Utah plant .
Husbands , president of the
the Board

In a letter to

am H.

efen e Plant Corporation,

tated:

After ful l c0n ideration of the who le situation , including the various problems ~.h ich seem
to us to be involved in attempting to establish
the Geneva mill a.fter the Har as a soun and
succes ful commercial enterprise, the Director
of United States Steel Corporati on have decided
that no further action to ac uire the Geneva
plant be t~~en . 51
The que tion of post •ar
a problem to the government .

dit~posi tion

of Geneva ••as

In 1945, a special Senate

hearing .as held concerning the di poJal of wartime iron
and

teel plants, although

Geneva .

In

t~hearing ,

Colorado Fuel and Iro

he hearing revolved around

E. Perry Holder , president of

Corpor tion ,

aid :

I feel that Geneva is 20 year ahead of its
time through circum tances of war .
Under no circumcltances would Geneva have
ever been built , I be li eve , if it were not
for a war ; but it v.as built , it it~ there ,
and it is a problem to us . That is a steel
buuine ss of over 1,000,00 tons in a town
of 75 , 00 population . There isn' t another
single , individual steel operation like that ,

51

u. s.
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I believe in the country that is as far
from pop~tion, or has that scattered
population, in the United States .5 2
!·1ore on the

philo<~ophical

side, but a nonethloss

important statement, was made in that same hearinb by
Henry J . Kaiser , of the

Kais~r

Company, who said :

I think there beams to be two main schools
of thought regarding the dispo i tion of surplud ~overnment property .
One represents the point of view that all
Government-owned war plants should be clo;:~ed
o ~ to prove t their being used in competition with prewar enterprises.
A second school of thought proclaims that every
Government 1~ar plant and all Government- owned
supplies should be employ.ed a fully a::J .po:lSibl
The

di~posal

of the Governm nt-owned steel mill
harpened the contrast between
these two opinions, and therefore becomes an
i~su
of social as well as economic i mport . In
fact, we are in the presence of a conflict of
opinion aJ to the nature of ocial and economic
justice in which the ~nole world is inveloped.53
t Geneva, Utah ,

'l'ha ,overnment later allowed United States St eel to
bid on the plant , and in May, 1946, the War Assets Administration accepted its bid of $47,500,000 and a pledge to
52 U. 'J. Con&reds, Senate , Haari ,B, \Jar Plants Dispo al--I ron an&. Steel Plant , pp. 16- 17.
53 ~., p. 25 .
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Jpend $18, \ 00, 00 f or reconvertinb the plant to peace~ ime

production .

On June 17, 1946, Attorney General

T. C. Clark approved the sale to United States Steel .
Private operation of the plant began two days later .

In

the full of 1946 , all the Utah operations of United
States Steel .. ere consolidated under the management of
Geneva

teel Company ,,ith the e..<ception of the iron

mined which

~ere

operated by Columbia Iron 1-'.ining Com-

pany . 54
To many
aJ

it:~

urvival of the Utah steel industry, ju t

birth , depended upon the \>'artime economy.

ab ence of federal financi ng and accelerated tax

The
mortiza-

ti on •wuld mean the death of the huge Utah plant .
it

a~

Joon pointed out thatthis analysis wa

But

not correct .

Frc.m the view point o r raw material.;; cost , the i'urnaces
at Geneva were as efficient as th
cations

uch a s Chicago and

Pitt~;burgh.

major pig iron producing facilitie
Geneva ' ~

raw material

furnaces at older l oIn fact, of all

in the country ,

cot was the least . 55

54
salt Lake Tribune , June 18, 1946 , p . 1; Gro>~h
of the Iron and Steel Indu t ry in Utah , pp . 7- 8 .
55?•iarvin J . Barloon, "The Expansion of Blast Furnace
Capacity , 1938- 1952: A Study in Geographical Co t Differential ,•· Bu iness Hiatory Review, !J!arch , 1954 , p . 1.
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Importance of the Geneva Steel Plant
During the

ar

Geneva was the most important wartime development
in Utah.

Approximately $190,000,00U was spent for the

Genova plant out of $Jll,OO , 000 in

ne\~

indu trial

f acilities authorized during the var for the state .
About 70 percent of Utah'

wartime industry i

accounted

for by the Geneva plant and the Columbia plant at Iront on .
Utah' a industrial

evelopment during

or·ld War II would

havo amounted to only $9J,OOO,OOO of new

facilitia~

had

it not been for the expansion of steel and pig iron
faci lities in the state.
The Geneva plant

wa~

the 1irst plant utilizing a

natural resource that was authorized for Utah and had
any postwar significance .
ource in 1 tself Geneva

13

?-~ore

effect

than just a productive
~1a

multiplied through-

out th e Utah economy by utilizing the state'

natural

resour ces more than any other plant built during the
period 1940-1945.

The GeneYa plant proved that an

area did not necessarily- have to be heavily industrialized
in order t o succeed in producing

uccessfully .

Utah

proved up to t he challenge of such a basic indu try as
teel production .
A for the influe nce of Geneva on the changing indu trial West, of the 1,966 ,000 tons of finished steel
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products consumed in the seven

estern States during

the year 1930, 23 percent was produced in the West .
During 1940, 26 percent was pr oduced in the West.

In

195U , however, of the 5 , 000 , 000 tons consumed in the
West, 61 percent was produced in Western steel mills .
Geneva steel mill played no small part in this change . 56

56

Dr . Walther Mathesius, The Growth of estern Steel,
remarks before a joint meeting of the American Society
for Metals and the American In titute of Mining and
Metallurgical Enginerrs, September 24, 19 51, p. 24.
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CHAPTER V
VARI OUS STEEL- RELATED FACTORIES
ilar~; im e

Developm nt of Utah 1 s Vanadium

Introducti on
Another mineral re .. ource

c.f

Utah around 1.hich a

manufacturing industry wa., built during the war waa
vanadium .

A~

with alunite, the development of vanadium

probably would not hav

b en attpmpted on the scale it

ha.:i had it not been for the .ar ; the success of lJtah 1 s
vanadium inducltry ha.; depended upon ;.artime market s and
the postwar era of t he Cold liar .

The Bureau of Mines

estimated that the deposit s of vanadium in Utah ·ould
not have had any colll!llercial value had it not been for
:~pecial

arrangement.; made wit.h the government f or i ts

production . !
In relation to

mo s~;

of Utah's wartime industry, the

plantl> built to produce vanadium .. ere signif icantly different from other

plants constructed in Utah at that time.

As th e nati onal expansion of industri e s, most of Utah' s
factor ies were located in areas already industrialized and
/

more heavily populat d.

The vanadium plants built in Utah

1
u. s. Department of the Inter i or , Bureau of Mines,
ineral
Yearbook, 1941, p . J .
M
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were departures from the typical practice of locatin
f actories in the Jasatch Front.

By being built in the

aouthern part of the stat e near available reaources,
t he vanadium plants were unique

~1artime

factories.

Development of Vanadium in America
The principal use of vanadium is in the manufacturing of high - speed lm•-alloy t ool
c st iron and steel forgings .

teels and high-strength

Demand for vanadium during

the war was reflected in the increased use of vanadiumbearing steels, .bich had been substituted for steels containing nickel and tungsten .
were

respon<~ible

Foreign armament program

for increasing the demand for vanadium.

The mineral had been confined by government order to defense purposes early in the armament program, and in
December 1941 wad placed under the control of the Metals
Reserve Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.

All vanadium produced in the United

States fr om December 1941 to February 1944 was sold to
this government agency for war purposes.2
American vanadium companies .

The center of American

vanadium ore i..; in an area enc ompassing Colorado, Arizona ,
Ne ~ Mexic o , and Utah--what is commonly called the Colorado
2 Ibid., p. 639; U. S. Department of the Inter ior,
Bureau of Mines, Expl orati on of Vanadium Region of Western
Colorado and Eastern Utah, report no. 3930, by W. P.
Huleatt, S. W. Hazen, and W. M. Traver, eptember, 1946, p. 4 .
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Plateau.

The Col orado

oro .:~

were orit•inally mined about

1900 by Joe and Mike Flannery.

The brother s first 1.orked

the depoJitJ for radium, but later became interested in
vanadium--in Peru, rather than in Colorado .3
Until 1919, the Flannery fami l y controlled the rlOrld
production of vanadium.

It is significant also that more

than 9u percent o·" th e mrld produc tion of the ore

1929 ''ere under American indu;;trial control.
the Flannery 1 J

.:~old

in

In 1919,

their vanadium properties to C. M.

'ich,. ab and J . L. Replogle, steel

industriali.::~t.::S.

Sch~.ab

and Replogl e formed the Vanadium Corporation of America ,
which became the major developer of Peruvian <.ieposi t».
The vanadium in Peru
natural sulfide o

w a~

extracted from patronite, the

vanadium, and for a long time thia

ore contribut ed cG percent of theworld's vanadium recovered
from ore s.4
The f irst effective challeng e t o the Vanadium Corporati on of America came in 1 926 1. hen the Union Carbide c vmpany
acquired the United State · Vanadium Company, a f irm producing vanadium f r om ores in Colorado .
company

1 .a~

Corporation.

The name vf the

later changed to the United States Vanadium
ThiJ company operated plants at Uravan and

3• vandium 1 s Trail, • BuaineJs 'eek, January 3, 1942, p . 40.
4.!.£.!E..; Salt Lake Tribune, .July 11, 1942 , p. 23 .

.,

'
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Rifle, Colorado.5
The Colorado and Utah

deposit~.

The principal ore

of vanadium in the Colorado-Utah region is carnotite .
These deposits, representing a distinct t ype , are found
dissmeninated in

spot~,

bunches, and seams.

Deposits

are also fo und in northeastern Arizona and north estern
Ne~1

Mexico.

The area in .;hich they occur includes

approximately 10,0 0
Although it

wa~

quare miles . 6
not recognized as such, carnotite

was kno1•n to exist in the Gandston es of western Colorado
a~

early as 1880 .

About 1898, its commercial importance

as a dOurce of vanadium, uranium, and radium wa
The carnotite ore ,.a..J fo und in

established.

an Juan County, Utah in

1698 and the first shipm nt of the Utah ore t1as made to
Buffalo , New York in 1904 ,
large companies held

.

In 1910 and 1911, several

~roperties

in the

t~o - state

region

and began shipping carnotit e ore t c radium extraction plant
in Franc .

By 194(;. , the largest holdings in th e region

we re cont rolled by the United

tates Vanadium Corporation

and the Vanadi um Corporation of Amer ica.

The Vanadium

(.,

Minerals Yearbook , 1941 , p. 6J5 ; Exploratio n of
Vana ium Region of Western Colorado and ~stern Utah, p . l.

12(;
Corporation of America

c0ntroll~d

approAimat Ely 30

claim5 in San Mi guel and Montrose Counties,

Col orad ~ ,

anu 3an Juan County , Utah.7
The ui5c overy of richer and more cheaply mined
pitchblendJ ores in the Belgian Congo in the early 19?0 1 s
left the Colorado- Utah depo.:Jit::o \,i thout ec onomic importance
a .. a oource of radium and uranium, and in 19:;'3 the area
became inactive .

The ri.;ing dernanJ of the alloy- .>teel

indu try fvr vanadium renewed interest in the

epuoito ,

By 1938, vanadium productivn in the area haJ achieved
respect able pl'vp0rtions and ne11 impetus •. au given t o it
at the entry af the United State
rder to meet the requir m nt
built in Durang
addition to the

into WQrld \lar II.

In

of 1ar, n0w plants "ere

Col orad , and .vnticello, Utah , in
pening of ne• vanadium

mine~

and the

preparation of .. 1 er one., f or prvduction . il
Vanadium p1o ucti on in Ut8h
Prior t o entry of the United States int
had p1oduced some vanadium .
po unds o · vanadium were

the 1- ar, Utah

In 19J9, mor e than 11l9,0u

sh~pped

from Grand and San Juan

7Ibid., pp. 1- 2.i. Utah ~lining A.ssociation, Utah •
Hining"'Tridustl'v , 195':1, p. 75.
an

(! l!.-~pL rati ~ n : f Vanadi urn Regi on of \'/estern Col oradc
Ea»tern Utah, pp . 3- 4.

1:>1

(; untie .. , .ith the large::;t ;:,hipment coming fr om the
~hum.ay

p uperty neat Blanding . 9

In Augu.;t 1941, vanadium •. a
prhrity cont
Pric,rit ies
L

c

1.

placed under full

During a meeting of the Supply and

Allocati CJn>~

Board in November of 1941, \, .

Batt and P. u. Reed, both members of the

c mmented

n the aupply and demand
ince estimate

.ith vanadium.

defen~e re~uireme nt"

proble~

B ~ ar

,

in cunnecti n

that direct and in irect

in 194? 10ul

exceed supply, they

pc intetl out that close control l f the metal w ul

be

nece::;.:lary.lO
During 1941, the Vanadium Corpvration vf America
maintained an ore
purchaJed an

ampler at Mrmticello, v.here c,re 1 u-1

stockpiled.

In November, the g'vernment

apprvved $725 ,000 to th~ c mpany f or the con::;truction of
a mill in Monticello .
site and buildingd, and
ment.

Of thi

total,

193,00 tad f vr the

5J?,Uu0 for machinery an

equip-

The plant, owned by the government and Lperated

by the company, 11a.s to produce vanadium pentoxi e f er u e
in tool making.ll
9
f.1inerals Yearbook, 1940, p . 634.

10
Salt Lake Tribune, Augu.st 17, 1941, p. 4A; U. S .
Civilian Prod ucti ~ n Admini.;trati vn, Bureau c f ilemobiliza tion, Minutes . f the Supply Prioritie_, and llocati on.;
Board , 194L, p. 23.
11r.:ineral:i Yearb c~u k, 1941, p . 639 ; Salt Lake Tribun ,
N vembt>r 5, 1941, p. 24
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In December 1941, announcement wa:o made that the
plant ·.,ould

tart productivn about July 1, 1942.

co t of the plant

•~a.;

then reported to be

The

1,00 , 00 ,

while ultimately the co .. t reached $1 , 290,000.

It was

estimated at the time that 98 percent of the pure ore
prvduced at the mill

~a~

to be shipped to Bridgeville,

Pennbylvania for refining.
ploy about 7u

The plant 'as slated to em-

men and would require 6 ,000 gall ons of

oil daily to fire the roasting ovens and generate
electricity .

It would

al~o

require about 4,300 pound

of salt per day and five tons of sulfuric acid a month .12
The Blanding mill.

In June 1942, a fire destroyed

a vanadium mill which had been operated by the Blanding
Mines Company.

The fire in the mill caused mere than

$25,0UO worth of damage.
been reconstructed and had

In March 1943, the mill had
tarted operation

again.l3

The new mill processed oro from mines leased in the
Cottonwood district, 14 miles southwest of Blanding.
Concentrates from the mill

~rere

trucked to ?4ontro e,

Colorado f er ·hipment ea.;t by rail.

The new plant co t

$70 ,000 , all of which was financed pt!blicly, and had a
12

Ibid., December 19, 1941; p. 21 ; U. S. Civilian
ar In ustrial Facilities
Authorized, July 1940 to Augu t 1945, pages not numbered.
Productron-Admini~tration,

13salt Lake Tribune, June 2o, 1942, p. 8 ; March 14,
1943, p. 9B.
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daily capacity of 25 short tons.l4
Production at Monticello.
plant at Monticello wa

By November 1942, the

working around the clock.

townsites had been constructed for the plant .

One was

cc.mprised of 19 houses and a staff howe for the
force.

The other consisted of 32 houses .

con~tructed

Two

taff

Both had been

by the Defen e Plant Corporation.

Since th

construction of the plant, the population of San Juan
County had increased by more than 600 persons. 1 5
In December 1942 , the mill began operating at a
daily capacity of 100 t ons.
employed at the plant .

At that time 260 men

~ere

Much of the min:ing of the ore was

done in Navajo Indian co untry, wh re 9

percent of the

employees at the mines were N vajos .lb
During 1942 , 1,075,596 pounds ui vanadium •er& produced in Utah , and 833 , 680 pound

were produced in 1943.

In February 1944 , however, the Metals Reserve Company
t rminated its program of purcha::.ing vanadium.
6 , 1944 , the plant at Monticello Has closed .

On Febru ry
The govern-

14 Ibid. ; \'ar Industrial Facilities Authorized; ~1iner ls

Yearb oo~943, p . 665 .

1 5salt Lake Tribune, November 15, 1942 , p . l4B.
16

~. •

December 20, 1942, p. 14B.
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ment claimed that the 1,000,000 pounds of vanadium
pentoxide on hand was sufficient f e r the duration of
tho wa r ,

In spite of the cutback domestically,

Peruvian imports of the metal remained high thrvug hout the year .l7
In contrast t o the 216 operat or

who reported pro-

duction in 1943, only 82 were known to have shipped in
1944, and more than half of these shipped to the
Metals Re erve Company only during the first t wo months
of the year.

The responsibility f or maintaining a domestic

vanadium industry reverted to the United States Vanadium
Corporati on and the Vanadium Corporation of America. 18
In February 1945, the Monticello plant wa3 reopened
when the Vanadium Corporati on of America purchased the
Mc.nticello
ment.

tockpile and leased the plant frcm the govern-

The company then planned to rehire 60 men to

work the plant.

During 1946 , the Monticello plant com-

pleted refining of ores purchased from the Metals Reserve
Company and various other sources.

The plant wa

shut

down at the end of 1946.19

17
Minerals Yearb ook, 1944, p . 79; 1943, p . 664 ; 1944,
p . 642; Salt Lake Tribune, February 6 , 1944, p. lOB; December
24 , 1944, p , 'lB .
18Minerals Yearbook, 1944, p. 644 .
19 Ibid.; 194,
6 p. 1235; Salt Lake Tribune, February
27, 1945, p . 11.
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Po twar use of the Monticello plant
The vanadium plant at Monticello was advertised for
sale by the government in May 1947.

The Vanadium

Corporation of Amerl ca, wartime operator cf the plant,
bid $85,000 for the machinery, equipment and 17 buildings of the mill, but did not bid on either t ownsite ,
In August, the War Assets Administration turned down the
bid .

The company indicated a desire t o tear down the

plant and sell the materials .

The government, it seemed,

vtanted the plant kept intact.

One reason for thL!, of

course, wao tnst the government had become interested in
carnotite as a s ource of uranium.

In 1947, the Atomic

Energy Commission declared that it vas their policy t o :
purcha e ores for it pr ogram from private
sources and limit direct Government produc tion as far as po sible. It ia desirable,
however, f or the Commission itself to carry
on certain activities f or the purpose of determining the most efficient methods of ore extraction and beneficiation . 20
In December the Atomic Ener gy Commission bid $143, 324
for the plant which it said it wanted on
for the possible production of uranium .

tandby condition
Later in the

month, the War Assets Administration approved the bid, and
20

Ibid . , May 27 , 1947, p. 12; August 16 , 1947 , p. 17:
U. S, At omic Energy Commission, The Third Semiannual Report
of the United States At omic Energy Commissi on , Senate Doc,
No . il8, BOth Cvng., 2nd Sess. , 1948, p . 4 .

l2b
the plant 1as sold t o the Atomic Energy Commi3sion,
\•hich reconverted the plant t o the production of uranium
frmn carnotite .21
Si gnificance of vanadium production in Utah
Carnotite--the ore f ound in the Col or ado Plateau of
Utah, Colorado , Arizuna and New Mexico- -has been processed
f "r radium, vanadium, and uranium.
metal~

Each of th

three

has been produced at one time ur another in the

regi on, but each has held primary interest during distinct and separate in ervals of time.
existence of the ore

~ nly

During the known

one of the processed motal$ has

played a maj or role, while t he other two played minor
r ~ les.

one

f

There are basically three peri ods of time in which
the three

pr~ducts

interest to processers.

of carnotite ore held

pecial

They are : r adium, 1898 t o 1922 ;

vanadium, 1935 to 1947; uranium, 1947 t o present.
The principal u e uf radium

wa~

therapeutic, its

chief application being in the treatment of cancer and
skin disea es .

The carnotite ures of the Colorado Plateau

were mined primarily for radium until 1922, 1men a lull
wa

induced by competition from t he radium fo und in the

21

Salt Lake Tribune , December J, 1947 , p . 17 ; The
Third Semiannual Report o f the United States At omic Energy
Commi::; i on, P~4.
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Bel gian Congo .

Uranium and vanadium were p1 c duced,

but both were byproducts.22
From 1935 t o 1947, the
primari ly f or vanadium.

re~

were proc es ed

During 1935, the output

of carnotite ores from t he Colorado Plateau amounted
t

1,145 sh ort tons valu d at $56,/23, containing

3,329 milligrams of radium, 22,009 pounds of uranium,
and 50 ,776 pounds of vanadium.

In 193 , the United

States vanadium producerd proce sed 139,512 pound

v nadium ores and concentrat

of

By 1943, 5,586,492

pounds were shipped, all of l'thich came from the Colorado
Plateau .
th

In 1941, the United States displaced Peru as

leading producer and inc reased its lead in 1942 by

supplying over 50 percent of the t otal wurld output.
The deman

f or uranium at the beginning of the war so

small that only 13 , 000 ton

were classed a

uranium ore .23

It was not until the development of the atomic bomb
during World War II that t he ore became important as a
source vf uranium.

In 1947, the Atomic Energy Commissi on

reported that up until then uranium had c ome predominately
fr om certain f oreign

c ~ untries

whose uranium dep osita ware

richer than any found in the United States,
22

No production

Minerals Yearbo k, 1946, p . 1207 .

23 Ibid., 1943, p . 66 ; 1935, p. 501; 1942, p. 665 ;
19 46' p-:-I2'{i'7 .
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of uranium frcm the United States other than the
recovery of by- product uranium from t he vanadium industry
of the Col orado Plateau was fea sible during the war.
The Commi

i on believed that :

In the field of ra1~ materials , • . . the
Commi i on no., must plan for the indefinite
future in <:hich the requirements of nati nal
defense and of peacetime industrial applications of atomic ener y will bring unpredict able demands for uranium ores.24
By 1953, uranium product i on became the primary product of the carnotite ore in the Utah-Colorado regio n.
In that year, the vanadium indudtry was one of the small er
ferr ous metal industries, ranki
econd hi
metals.

last in producti un and

est in price among the eight ma jor alloyi
Nevertheless, vanadium production in Utah had

conti nued in the poJtwar period.

In 1947 , the produc -

tion of vanadium in the state hit a low of 48,949 pounds .
By 1954, l , CJ77,8vo pounds were prLduced , which

~·as

2, 000 pounds more than the producti on in the peak war
year of 1942.

But the producti on of vanadium in th e post-

war peri od was different than that carried on during th e
war.

24

The Third Semiannual Report of the United State
Atomic Bnergy Commission , p . 3.
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Since entry uf the Atomic Ener gy Commiasion
into the carnotite regi on f the Colorado
Plateau f or the purpooe of obtaining uranium
by far the greater part of the vanadium production in the Uni t ed Statea became a byproduc t or coproduct of uranium . Previously,
vanadium production in the United States result ed in byproduct uranium . 25
The vanadium indu try in Utah was launched during
the
Cold

ar, and
ar.

wa

ma.intai ned in the postwar peri

of th

The demand f or uranium in thP po twar p r i od,

however, o vershadowed the demand for vanadium .

The ex-

tracti on of vanadium from carnotite in Utah becB.Illtl of
oecondary importance t o a new Utah industry .
The Tungoten Re- treatment Plant
Introducti cn
In addition to prcducin

vanadium for America's

steel-t ool industry during the war, Utah produc d tungsten ,
which i

used also as a 1:1teel alloy .

As was true for

vanadium, the demand fo r tungoten was directly related to
the increased product'ion of ateel tool

during

c>rld Wa r

II.

The Salt Lake City tungsten plant was significant
becau e it

25

wa~

one of only two plant

in the country

Minerals Yeru·book, 1953 , p . 1245 ; 1947, p . 1218 ;
1954, p. 1298.

1)0

1·1hich u ed a chemical process rather than the cc.nvencional

c ~ ncentrati v n - flotation meth ~d

tungsten.

to produce

The other plant wa.; located in Nevada.

The

Utah plant provided a market for loh-grade tungsten
producers in Utah and .•as instrumental in the production
of over 5,U O,vOv pounds vf u able tungsten during the

iJevelorment of the tung.;ten res• urce
The chief use · f tungsten, a.; with vanadium, is in
the man ufacturing Lf cutting tools , t he majority of
hhich are made of high-Jpeed steel containi

ab out 18

percent tungsten, 4 percent chromium, and 1 percent
vanadium.

Tungtiten wau first used about 1758 by A.F.

Cron ~t e dt,

;.ho applied the term t

''heavy

<~tone•·)

ten (S11edish f t r

t o the mineral because of it.; high density.

The first important uae of tung t n commercially

~. a.J

in a

tungsten- maganese steel which hardened upon air cooling
fro m proper heat - treating temper atures .
achievement in the field

oJ

tung.;ten

The mo t notable

uteel~

was the

development of the c mpouition knvl• n as high- dpeed stee l.
This product ;.a.; received with great enthusiasm when it

2b •l1ore Tungsten,' Busine
eek, May 23, 1942, p . 84;
U. S. Department of Commerce, Business and Defense Service::!
Administrati - n, ~~ter ial~ Surve : Tungsten, 195( , p . I-l .
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wao first exhibited by the Bethlehem Steel Company
at the Paris Expositi on in 19v0. 27
During

~orld

War I, demand fo r American tung ten

increased in countries whose
Germany .

The production

upply was cut off frLm

1 ores, concentrates , arrlhigh-

speed steel all greatly increased in

tr~

during this peri od primarily because of
In preparation for

orld

United States
efense activity ,

ar II, the stockpiling of tu

by the gvvernment was initiated under t he Strategic

sten

~~terials

i gned by President Franklin Roo evelt on June 7, 1939,

Act

which auth orized t he expenditure of $lOO,vOO, OvO over a
4-year period for the purcha e of strategic materials.28
development in Utah

~rly

The first tungsten shipped frcm Utah wa

a by- product

fr om the Continental- Alta mine in Little Cottonw od Canyon
in 1905 .
d

In 1916, a mill at Eureka treated 1,726 tons

.re from t.he Deep Creak region .

Tung ten waJ al o

discovered in that same year near Linwo0d, in Uintah
County.

In 1918 , a

fe~1

t ons of tung ten were shipped

from near Lucin in Box Elder County , while in 1937, the
Star Dust mines shipped 22 t.ons of tung ten concentrate
27

Minerals Yearbovk, 1941, p . 651 ; Materials Survey :
Tungsten , p . I - 1.
28
~. , I 3-4.
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f r om the Gold Hill Dititrict in T ·( ele County .

Miners

had been walking over tungdten ores and throwing it on
t he dumps f or years and "had it fi()t been f or the threat
of war, plus new techniques, they might be pa8sing up
very vital dep osits . "?9
Construction and operati on of the Utah plant
In April 1942, it was announced that the Defense
Plant Corporati on had advanced $35U ,UOO for the
tion of a tungsten mill in Salt Lake City .

c ~ nstruc 

The United

Stateti Vanadium Corporati on was picked as the operat or
of the plant, which was located at 5th West between 7th
and 8th So uth in Salt Lake City .

The plant was designed

t u utilize a process 11hich had been developed by the
United States Vanadium Corporat i on in 1938 .

Before the

company developed itti chemical process, c onsiderable
tungtiten was l ost in middlingti ( the milled material
between the high - grade concentrated and th e tailings ) .
The usual selective fl otation cur.centrati on proces

pro-

duced a c oncentrate running around bG percent tungsten ,
while the chemical pro cess of the

U~! t ed

States Vanadium

Corporati on produced an equally - nigh tungsten content fr om
low- grade millings .

2)1

The Salt Lake refinery treated

Salt Lake Tribune, May 23

1942, p . 29 .
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i nt e r·mediate fl otatio n C••ncentrates which were t oo
1

-

1aje

Le mar keted ot hrrwi~e .

t

The plant did

r .t recPi v e c rude ore direct fr• m mine ,

but tr eatod

c· nc o ntr ate~ only.3U
In order to induce
t~

b (_,in

Def e n~c

~mall

Plan

~ nn , unce

Cor pvrati on initiate

that ore

mall

Salt Lake plant .

mine;; wer e abl

t~o

prvrram;:,,

It

1 t o 3 percent tun,

~'a"'

tho first time tung · ten

t ·:> .:;ct: l low-grade

re in sma ll l otJ.

wa:.~

pro[ ram

c o ncentrates

h urt ton, but only f ._r those

pr ducers '1-•11'"' pr duced les
th ough th

In

that same year the ;uvernmcn t

rai;;ed the price u f lo\.er t;rade tungsten an
3U per dry

~ten

uantiti es and sto ckpiled

iti<.n , Juring t1 v ember ,

f r m $ 24 to

In

States Vana ium Co rporati on

c o n• ainin ~

•,, uld be purchased in

a

re

" increase the prl..ducti on of the ore;:;., the

AuruJt c.f 1942, t he Uni t e

at th

pro ducers o f tungsten

than luU tons in 1942.

f price JUpp rrtJ t o

Al -

maller pru ducers

ori{ innlly intended t o run f or one y ear, it.

.a.; c on -

t inued until December 1944? 1
In A ri l 1943, the Salt Lake plant began operati ons .
Th

sto ckpile of ore at th

plant was sent

t~

the

3
ll~. ~ pri l 1 7, 1~42, p . 17; ~y 7, 1942, p . l3i
p ril 21 , 1~43, p . 2, ; V~y 7 , 1942, p . 13; May 24 , 1941 ,
r . 12B.

3ll ibi ., August?, 1942, p . llB ; November 25, 1 942 ,
p . 22 ;:Mate r ials urv ey : Tung~ten , p . I - 6.
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Segerstrom mill near t-tilford for concentration .
~.. ;

Most

the ore which >.as ultimately used at the treatment

plant cat:le fr um the Desert Mine in Juau County; Star
.ilu::~t

and Traction Lode mines in Toc· ele County; Scheelite

~.tuee n

in Millard County; Lone Pine 1-tine in Box Elder

County; an

the Garret

~ine

in Beaver County.

From

April 1943 to the end of the year, the plant processed

13, J'tC short t olld of C·Jncentrates.

The Bureau of Mines

reported that :
Chiefly as a result of bringing into operation
the re- treatment plant of Metal Reserve Co. at
Salt Lake City , Utah , and greatly increased output at the Yellow Pine Mine in Idaho, production
of primary tungst.t>n con'Oant:rated in the U. S,
gained 28 percen~ over 1942 to reas~ an all time
high of' 12,045 short t ns in 1943.
In April of 1944,

o peration~ ~rere

plant in Salt Lake City .

suspended at the

During the four months that it

had uperated ir, 1944, the plant treated b , 870 tono of concentrates .
its

One year later, the plant reopened and during

o p~ration

in 1945 handled 8,658 t ons of concentrates .

The plant finally clo u~d down during thethird quarter of

1946.

During its 1946 operation

it t .eated 5,805 tons

1,

,3:::

Salt Lake Tribune, April l b , 1943, p . 17; May 23,
~lineral::~ Yearbook 1943, p . 678 .

1943, p . 12B;
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of con centrates.

During the periods of oper&ion be-

twe en the yea r s 1943 t o 1946, 34,703 tons of concentrates were JWOCessed at the plant. 33
Pos t war use of the plant
In April 1947, the plant was advertised for sale by
t he go ver nment, and three cone erns bid fo r the structure.
They we e :

The Structural Steel and Forge Company of

3alt La ke City , $81,40 ; Morse

Brother~

Machinery Company

of Denver, Colorado, $74,743 ; and the Pamil Corporation
of New York City , $75,137 .

In May , the War Assets

dminis-

trati on approved the bid of theStructural Steel anu Forgo
·._

I

Company .

I

The c ompany later dismantled the plant andre-

bui lt a utructural oteel plant on the site .
the government-built plant wa

Thu~,

di mant l ed, the

although

ite was

uded for the con truction of a plant which used primary
stool fr orn Geneva Steel Company to produce structural
furms .34
Utah '

Industry Behind the Industry

Introduction
One of the a f fects of Geneva Steel was the construet i on by th

33

government vf a refractories plant at Lehi.

I-tineral3 Yearbook , 1944, p , t-61;
p . 3B; 1946, p. 1198 .

pril 15, 1945,

34
Salf L eke Tr1bupe, April 29, 1947, p . 16; May 29,
1947, p. J.
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It wa.s evident at the time that a large steel plant
~uch

as Geneva would require refractories f or its con-

dtruction and maintenance.

The Lehi refractcries plant

\las built specifically for supplyin• refractorie

to the

steel and iron plants in Utah County .
Refractories during

ar II

vlhen the United States entered World War II, refractorie
emer1ed from a state of semi-hibernation to meet requirement

of a newly- awakened indUGtrial America.

had subsisted fr m 1930 to 194

on a limited

Industry
cale, but

the war greatly heightened the demand for refractories.
In 1940, 1,800,000 in u1ating firebricks were con umed
in the nati on, hhile in 1942, that figure had climbed to
8 I 00 I 000 • J 5
Though the refractorie

industry, as with the machine-

tool industry, was one of the first to feel the pressure
of arming , no ->trict \lar Production Board controls were
ever applied .
~

In 1942, when theinduatry reached its all-

time peak in allowing steel, aluminum , magnesium, and
other war plants to go int o pr oduction, it was opere. ting
at 94 percent of capacity.

In 1944, it was

do~m

percent of capacity , although war production wa

to 70
rolling

35 "Earn a Corner in Every • E•' Flag,• Brick and Clay
~. January 1944, p. 25 .
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at full speed.
·.~hich

In 1939, th re were 211 establishments

were classifie

\<hich 40

~1ere

non- clay and 1&5 were clay refractories

e tablishments.
c la~uif ied

r·

54

in the refractories industry , of

By 1947, there were 265 establishments

in t herefrac t ories industry, or an increase

e<:~tablishment .:>.

During the war, two refractories

planto were built by the Defe nse Plant Corporation .
of these--the Lehi refractories plant--was built t

One
supply

~ilica trick~ t o Utah's newly acquired steel industry.3 6

Development and use of refractories
Ancient Egypt ians are credited with the f irst use
refractories, .Jince the olde3t known pyramid wa3
erected near Cairo of sun- dried clay brick.

Durned clay

bricks were made in Chaldea, and burned silica brick was
used in th

construction

~r

the palace of Darius,

In

America , Spanish c nquidtadoree found natives of Mexic o ,
Peru , ani Arizona quit

profi cient at the art of brick-

maki ng .3 7
In the middle of the l Sth century , common brickmaking metho s and special f ire- clays were joined in a
proces3 that produc ed firebrick .

This joining signalled

the bi rth ...,f the modern refractories industry.

.hat is

36 •·The Industry Back of In ustry, " Fortune, March,
1945, p . 190 U. S. Department of Commerce, Statistical
Ab~tract, 19 4-45 , pp . 81S- Sl7 ; 1947, p . 873.

·
4

3 7aeneral Refractories Company , Refractories ( Philadelphia, Pa. , 1949 ) , p . lu.
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believed to be the fir t exclusively firebrick plant
in America was built in upper New Jersey in 1812 , and
this was f ollowed by another in 1825 .

The first

ilica

brick was made in t he United States in 1866 in Akron,
Ohio , although this brick did not find wide use until
it

introduction in the open hearth furnaces in 1855.

The halti

of the importati on of

ma~nesite

during

orld War I necessitated the disc overy of domestic sources
of refr actories material .

Ne1~

deposits of magnesium were

found in the Far West, and Missouri was

rec~gnized

a

a

ource of diaspore clay u ad in t he production of refrac tories.

tver since World War I, the United State

has

been largely independent from uae of foreign sources fo r
refractories material.38
A refractory is a heat- resistant clay and miner al
product, the prime function of Which is to provide the
tructure of furnaces that heat, melt , or g enerate,

Broadly

speaking, any material that can. be heated slowly to 1500 C
(2732 F )

1~ithout sho~1 ing

obvious signs of fusi on may be

classified as a refractory .

There are as many as six

different types of refract or ies.

These are :

f ireclay

bricks , high alumina brick , silica brick, basic brick,
in ulating brick, and plastic refractories .
./

38~ • • pp. 10- 15 .

In

ad~ion ,
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certain

t yp e~

of cements and mortars are

cla~sified

as

refr acto ries . 39
In 1936 , there were more than ~even industries
which depended upon refract or ies, the most important of
lvhich

~the

steel industry, which c o naumed nea r ly

50 p ercent of all refracto ries produced in that year.
Since nearly all equipment fo r the pr. duction of ferrou
mater ial;:~

requires refract ories, the steel induJtry and

refrac t ories indu try are int erdependent and have been
closely asso ciate

Refract ories are needed t o f o rm th

gigantic ovens in which coal

i~

converted to coke,

a re us ed in blast furnaced and in the hot blast

They

o~toves,

rth i ch are us ed to heat the air dUpplied to the blast
f ur nace .

Refract ories a r e also used in cupola

ver batory f urnaces,

oaking pi t s, r eheati

fo r g ing f urnaces and annealing furnaces .
a lan

or re-

furnaces,
Blast furnaces

co naume 33 percent of all refract criea.40
The re f ractories plant built in Utah during the war

wa s desi g ned to produce silica brick, the raw material of
'"hich is quartzite or ganister .

This mineral is a hard,

39

Ibid,, p . 11 ; "The Industry Back of Indu try , "
Fort une, p . 196 .
4°Ref r ctories, pp . 40- 41; ••Refractories Keep Pace
with Indu.;trial Prog ress, " Brick and Clay Record, January
19 44, p. 39 .

den->e, and c omparatively unifo rm r ·ck compose
entirely

f

silica.

almost

The principal depo its of ganister

ar e scattered throughout the country am include th
state of Utah.41
Operation of the Utah plant
In .fuly 1942, construction started on the refractory
plant at Lehi.

Some of the amaller structures had been

built, but the con.>truction of the larger buildi
gan during the last part of Juzy,

d

be-

The cost of the plant

was t hen estimated t o be $250,0 0, although ultimately it
reached $625,000.

Gladding McBean and Company, fr orn Lo

Angeles, California, was ch o en t o operate the fact ory,
1.hich 1m

expected to employ 75 men.

tructi on of the plant, refractorie
Ironton

Prior t o the conwere

shi~:ed

t o the

plant from California.42

Pr0ducti vn figures of the Lehi plant are not available, but between 1941 and 1942, the suppl y of refractory
stone in the United States increases from 2, 254 , 000 pounds
to 2,718,000, but decreased in 1944 to 2,707,000 pounds .
In 1944, quartzite sold f or th

41

manufacture o f silica brick

Refractories, pp . 24- 2 •

42 Salt Lake Tribune, July 26 , 1942, p . l JA ; War
Industrial Facilitie Authorized, pages not numbered.
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.:iropped 23 percent in
ir .~m the year 194J .
~~i.l1l

uantity and 18 percent in value
In !·larch of 1944 , the Lehi plant

clo1!ed due t o an adequatC' .. upply of brick.J for the

iron and steel plant~ in Utah C0unty . 4J
In .July 1946, the 14- acre plant 11a.J
sale and in Septetlber of tha

large ut
Po.-~1~ar

It

f<)r

year the :ar Assets

Admini.Jtration .Jold Lhe plant t o
C Qpany

adverti<~ed

heGeneral Refract ries

f Philadelphia, Penn3ylvania , one of the five
1

efr ctorie

produ::ers in the nation . 44

tatus of the Lehi p l ant
wa.:~

knmm that the refractol'i es industry would

face probleiJ];;I in the post11ar period , partly due to imrovernen• s made by the indu3try itself .

Fortune stated :

In some industries refractories la::~t tHice
as lonr as they did t\lenty - five years ago .
This prot~edo ha.J created problem.J for the
1nuustry . !!orL'lally about 90 per cent of
refract ories ar"' u.;ed "ot replacement, only
10 per cent for new in.;tallation::~ . As re fractories F.et better replacemE:!nt sales
decline , 45
The refractories industry durine the last year of th

war ,

ho1.ever, b eli evec.l :
4 JMinerals Yearbook , 1942 p . 1222 ; 1943 , p . 12971
1
1944, p . 1206 ; Salt Lake Tribune, ~~rch Jl , 1944 , p . lJ,
44Ibiu ., Jul y lJ , 194~, p . 13 ; Sept ember 28 , 1946 , p . 1) .
45, Industry Back of I ndu::>try , •· Fortun e , p . 196 .
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It can be fairly assumed that re fractory pro duction will be gr ater than 110% of the 192526 level and \'lill be nearer the 150% of that
level even if the l.Jiggest useri steel, uhould
take an extreme drop to 70 mil ion to ns of ingot
steel . Then refractories may remain at about
135 to 14~& of the 1925 - 26 level . 46
With the succes ful operation of Geneva
postwar period, General

Refract ~ries

teal in the

maintained the plant

into the l960 1 s in order to supply refractories to Utah 'o
1artime steel facilitie •

46

"Looking Forward,'' )3riclt arxi Clay Record , January,
1945, p . 61 .
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CH PTER VI
THE UTAH OIL REFit ERY DURING viORLD v.AR II
National Expanuion of Oil Refining Capacity
One u! the mo..Jt vitally needed wa1time pr oducts was
high- octane gasoline.

Defense aircraft required a gas o-

line whi c h possessed a hi gh antiknock quality not then
avai lable in conventional gasoline .
ue~

t

Re earch in techni-

produce a high quality gaJ, line was accelerated

in the latter part of the 1930' s .

In 1937, the first com-

merc ial catalytic cracking plant in the nat ion went •·on
uyream 1' at Harcus Hook , Pennaylvania.

In the fall of

1939, neHer refininr; proces:;es , particularly catalytic
crackinr , alkylat i un ,

~olymerizat i o n ,

and hydrogenation Levan to appear .

c atalyti~

reforming ,

Advertising campaigns

introduced ne w • super" mot or fue ls which po;:;sessed high
antiknock qualities .

Sun Oil anno unced its Nu- Blue

9unoc t. , 11hich v1as heralded a.; a ne1 miracl e of ga soline
chemist r y .

Nu- Bl ue claimed quick atarts , economical

mileage , and hi gh antiknock qualit ies .

Later , Socony-

Vacuum , Standard of New Jersey, Shell , and o ther companies
introduced new •·super" fue ls ~lith high antiknock rat i rlf s , 1
1
Paul H. Gidden , • tandard Oil Compant (Indiana t: 011
Pioneer of the !l.i ddle 1; est (New York : App eton- Cent uryCrofts , 1955 ) , p . 600 ; American Petroleum Institute,
Petnl eum Facts and Fig ure , 19 59, p . 3.
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As the danger of war approached, President Franklin
Roo~ovelt

took

dtep~

to organize the petroleum industry

into n unified dupplying force for the armed furces ,
industr y, and civilians .

In May 1941, he created tho

Office oi Petroleum Co- ordinator for Civilian Defense
anJ appointed Secretary of the Interior Harold L . Ickes
to head the agency,

The Office was later changed to the

Office of Petroleum Co- ordinator for 1•/ar, and even later
to the Petroleum Admini tration for \·lar .

In Uovembcr of

1941, Petroleum Co- ordi nat or Ickes appointed 7S leadars
from all branches of the industry to the Petroleum Industry Counci 1 f c. r National Defen:Je , 2
An unprecedented amount of governmenL control was
placed over the induli>try <hen prices of crude oil and
mo.:Jt of its product
Price Contr, l Act.

were f r ozen under the Elnergency
Control uf production quota,

normally a function of the ~:~everal states,

as brought

under the c ontrol vf the federal government under the
auspices of Secretary Ickes , J
The Utah Oil Refinery in Salt Lake City was one of
numerous refineries in the c ountry which were expanded

2

standard Oil Company (Indiana ) , pp . 606- 607 ; Petroleum
Facts and Figures, p , J ,
J standard Oil Company (Indianal p . 607.
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or built to increase production of vitally needed high)Ctanc

~aso line.

The $15, 00,0 0 expansion of th

Utah

refinery waa one of the moat important wartime facilities
built in tho state .

Its significance is most noticiable

when compared with the Kalunite plant built during the
same period.

..hile the authorization for the cc. nstruc-

tion of the Kalunite plant required a great deal of political
lobbying, the Utah Oil Refinery obt ai ned authorization for
expansion without much "politicking" and with little
publicity or noteriety.

l~oreover,

the Kalunite plant

received a great deal of attention both by the Bureau of
lUnes and the Office of Production Management, in addition to ocveral Congressional committees.
periodicals and newspapers foncerning

th~

Articles in
Kalunite plant

ere frequent both during am fol101dng the war,

The

Utah Oil Refinery , on the other hand, failed to receive
any Jubstantial amount of publicity until the plant was
practically constructed and ready for production, in spite
of the fact that only thrpe other plants authorized in
the state by the gove1·nment during the war cost more
(Geneva Steel plant, Columbia Steel plant, and the
Remington Arm

plant ),

In contrast with the unsuccessful

Kalunite plant, the Utah Oil Rei"inery plant

1~ao

sur.ce l'.ful

and received national recognition for achieving a unique
production record .

Finally , the refinery was sold in the
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podtwar period and continued to produce a product
similar to the one it was designed for during the
v1ar , 4
Wartime Expansion of the Standard Oil Company
of Indiana
The e:x:pan ion of the Utah refinery wa
wa ~time

part c. f the

program of oxpan ion by the Standard Oil Company

f Indiana, of

\~ich

the Utah Oil Refinery Compa ny had

been a subsidiary since 1921,

Standard attempted t o

f ind new and m0re efficient ways t o meet the demand fer
higher quality

ga~ o line .

In 1941 , about 65 percent of

Standard ' .3 r esearch e..cpenditurcs were appli ed t u
Uirectly ur indirectly conn cted with na ti olllll

roj cts
e f eu

I n December ' f 1941, 3tandard a nnounced tha t it had
devel oped a new process for manufacturing aviation gas oline.
The new procmre wa

calle d '' naptha isomerization, " v

better kno\-m all t ho iuomate method ,
ment of thi

Prior t o the develop-

prcces , i t had taken about 65 percent iso-

octane and 35 percent base blending sto ck
lead to make 100- octane gas oline.

pluo tetraethyl

Under thi~ ne'l'l process

it was now po sible t o make 100- octane gasoline by using
only 40 percent iso- octane and 60 percent base.

4
u. S . Civilian Producti on Administration , liar Industrial ~ci1aties Aut horizeq, July 1940 to August 1945 , pages
not nu ere .
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The process not only s aved on synthetics used,
but the amount of 100-octane fuel which could be
produced frgm this new lending was increas ed
50 percent .
Standard's refineries were operating at capacity
during 1941, and all previous records for crude runs were
br ken as 112,562,112 barrels were processed.

Standard

embarked in 1941 upon a $90,0 0 1 0 0 program to convert
old refining units and cons truct new ones for wartioe
production .

Between the month

of June 1940 and July 1945,

Standard Oil Company of Indiana received authorizations
for over $110,000,000 in facilities, of which only
$28,000,000 was financed publicly.

Ey 1944 , . tandard

had a daily capacity for manufacturing approximately
1,150,800 gallons of 100-octane gasoline , which wae

~o re

than was produced daily by the entire petroleum indus try
before Pearl Harbor.
When the war ended, ~tandard ' a refineries were
shipping enough aviation gasoline every day to
fuel oge than one million miles of fli~nt y

B- 29 ' a .

The Utah Oil Refinery Expansion
The Utah Oil Refining Company was incorporated in
June of 1909 in

~ alt

Lake City and had been refinin

5standard Oil Company (Indiana) , pp . 611- 612 .

6
Ibid., pp . 6o9- 620 .

crude
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petrol eum for c:.ver )0 years pri r to
In 1909, a plant

wa::~

orld Wa r II.

cc.• nstr·uct.ed by the company c:.n

a qua1·ter--a cre lease on a railroad r ight - of - Hay.
seven-ba n el - capacity pl ant

wa~;~

The

erected t o manufacture

oil and grease.
Among the ear ly di~app c:. intment::~ and c:.bstacles
that beset the new ent e1prise were thv disatroua f ires which alm at completely destroyed
the plant . But in later yea1s the uffi cials
of the company came t v l ook upon those fires
as bles~ings in disguiJe, f Jr they neces i tated rebuilding the plant , a rebuilding 1hi ch
in both in tances was upon bigger and better
s cale . ?
In 1917, the 1.Udwe st Re f ining Company obtained a
50 pe1·cent interest in the Utah company.

Four year:>

later the Standaz d Oil Company of Indiana acquired owner ship of the Midwest Refining Company and with it a 50
percent interest in th

1931, the plant wa

Utah Oil Refining Company.

In

moved to its pr sent - day l ocatic n

j ust north ' f Salt Lake City .

By the end of 19)'/, the

refinery had a total net production of 139,278 barrels ,
or a daily average of 382 barrels.

Due to the competi -

t i on fro m truck tranJportation and the pronounc ed and
growing tendency of Califo rnia operato1s to extend t heir
7 "Largest Single Industrial Enterprise in Salt Lake
City, • Stanolind Record, September , 19)1, p . 1.
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markets into the Utah a rea , the Utah company
in 1939 with either closing it
crude pipeline f r om \1/yoming.

~.as

faced

refinery or building a
Most of the plant's crude

oil came frum nvrthweJ t ern Colorado and Wyoming by rail.
Rather than close the refinery, the Utah Oil Company de cided tv build a pipeline from Fort Laramie, Wycming, t o
Salt Lake City.S
In November of 1939, th

fir t oil was

Salt Lake City via the pipeline.
moothly even

~. ith

temperature

below zero along the r oute.

eceived in

The line operated
clo..

t o 36 degree

The project, which

co~t

about $4,5UO,OOO, waj the lag st pipeline projoct built
by the indu try in 1939 and had a capacity of 6 ,000 to
8,0 U barrels per day.

The line als o held the distinc-

tion of being the fir t pipeline t o orosa the continental
divide.

Between 12,0 0 and 50,00

men were employed to

build the 438- mile line.9
During the last part of 1941, an attempt \,a

r.lade

to persuade the government t o authorize a high- octane
plant in

alt Lake City.

In December, however , the

Petroleum Council of National Defen e turned down the
prc posal .

In the opinion of the Council aviation gasoline

8
Ibid . ; Salt Lake Tribune, Pay 8, 1949, p . 8S i
dard OII!Company (Indiana ) , pp . 561- 589 .

~

9
Ibid ., pp . 588- 590 ; Salt Lake Tribune , January 2 ,
1941 , p:-)9 .
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could beat be produced at a
major

refinerie~

limit~

number of the

and no attempt would be made t o pr oduce

lu - nctane gas vline at

.:~mall

or even medium- sized plants .

In early December of 1941, the Army Air Force , believing
that the st orage of aviation fuel on the Pacific Coast
~a~

vulnerable to bombing

for

st c ra ~ e

attack~,

requested that a tank

be made available in Salt Lake City.

The

Utah Oil Refining Company t ook a tank out of service,
cleaned it , and began unloading the first shipment on
December 27tL . l
Little can be discovered with respect to the government de c isi on to expand the Utah plant.

It is known that

in April of 1942 the Standard Oil Company of Indiana was
cr,nt emplating the construction c f three alkylation plants
an~tllo

installations f or production of toluene, butane ,

and naphtha .

It

Refining Company

v1a.:1

b lieved then that the Utah Oil

ould probably build one of the alkyla-

tion plant.:~ .ll
A labor ohortage during the construction period was
a maj or problem faced by the cumpany,

In November 1943

10 Ibid., October 1, 1941, p . 15· December 12 , 1941,
p . 25 ; Titandard Oil Company (Indiana) , p, 614.
11 11 Standard of Indiana and .,ubsidiaries Planning
' t enaive Refining Addition~:. , " The Oil and Gas Journal,
April 2) , 1942, p . 80 .
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there were appr ximately 1,500
pro ject .

~orkers

employed on the

By December the c •mpany demanded more cun-

structi on workers .

As a result, the \ ar Manpt er Com-

placed al l bui l ding and conatruction tradea on

mis~io n

the critical shortage list in the state .

The ef fect

of this action was t o prohibit the employment of con.. truction Horkers in areas except through the United
Stat e~

Employment Service or by arrangement with that

dervice .

In that same month, the

ar P ducti on Board

halted ;;ork on a struct ur al steel unit of the Geneva
~tea l

plant in order to use th

Horkers on the construe -

tion of the refinery in Salt Lake City .

Director D. M.

Nelson of the Board is reported to have said that it was
important t o the war effort that the high- octane gasoline
pl ant be finished before the struct ural unit at Geneva be
comple t ed .

Later in the month , it wa

not ed that there

were 52S jobJ still available that needed to be filled at
t e

re f ~ery.

At the end of December 1943 , the co nstruc-

tion of the plant was called the
area . 1112

11

No . 1 war job in this

12
lt Lake Tribune , November lS , 1943, p . 15 ·
D~cember 15, 194Jbep. 17; ecember 17, 1943, p . 17 ; December
18, 1943 , p . 12 ;
cember Jl, 1943, p . 11 .
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In April of 1944, the plant waa put into operation
\~hen

the catalytic cracking t ower

wa::~

place

"on

tream. ''

Peak empl oyment during the co nstructi un period had been
ar ound 2, 400

\~orkers,

and a considerable number of these

11ere expected t o become permanent employees of the plant . l3
In .June 0f 1945, t he Utah Oil Refinery achieved a
world'

rec ord in production of 1 0- octane ga3 >line .

The

a chievement, made public before the third j oint technical
meeting of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, wa

the

production of 40 gall ona of 100-cctane gasoline from 100
gall on::~ of crude oil . l4

In March of 1946 , the War
announced Lhat the plant

wa::~

As~;~ets

Administration

t o be sold or leased.

The

refinery consisted then of 26 building s with a total of
59,0 0 square feet of floor area .
wa s 467 ,00

Its st orage capacity

barrels of petroleum or gasoline and it s

refini ng capacity was 5,500 barrela daily .

Later in the

month, t he Utah Oil Refining Company, the only bidder for
the plant , submitted an offer to buy the part of the plant
which was adaptable to producti on of high test gasoline
fo r automobile use .

In May , the War Assets Administration

authorized the sale of the plant to the Utah Oil Refining

l3Ibid ., April 29, 1944, p. 17 .
14

Ibid., June 21, 1945, p . 13 .
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Company, and in August the

ale of the plant, at the

price

~·inal

f

1

148,3Uv, became

••ith the appruval of

the ~ale by the U, S. Ju tice Department,l5
It is ironic that the Utah Oil Refinery , which was
a

~uch

~uccess

receive

and is still in operation today , would

uch little publicit_r and notice when fir t

authorized .

Both the refinery and the Kalunite plant

liere unu ual or unique pl nt •

The Kalunite plant wa

the only concern in the country pruducing alumina from
unite ,

hile the Utah Oil Refinery was one of two

refineries in the nation•pr;,ducing aviation gasoline by
th

•·neohex.ane process . ,.16 Yet the Utah Oi l Refinery 1

which co t throe time
r 1le

what th

Kalunite plant co t

to receive the r cognition accorde

1

the un ucce

ful Kalunite plant .

15

~AY

Ibid . , March J, 1946 , p. 2B; March 14, 1946 , p . ll ;
?1 , 1946, p. 1; Augu t 31 , 1946, p . 17.
16

~ •• June 21, 1945, p. 13 .
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CH PTER VII
EITEL McCULLOuGH ' S RADIO TUBE PLANT AND VARIOUS
OTHER PLANTS
Introduction
One area

f manufacturing which received a

izeable

number of wartime faci lities and became an indudtry of
re pectable proportion durinr the war
indu~try .

National sale

approximately $1,
totaled over

of the indu try in 1941 totaled

,00 , 0 0 .

By 1943, however ,

,000,00 ,00 , •hich wa

ales for the prewar

as the electronic

ales

larger than the

merican automobile industry.

1943, Fortune magazine called the change "sudden,
an

a

In
weeping,

yet barely realized.'l
It waQ reported in 1944 that:
Fe , if any indu tries, have had a war boom
like that ~ r the electrvnic induatry · it
output for direct air use" has multiplied
more r pidl y , according to WPB figures , than
that of any other industry--faoter even than
aviation. And such production report do
not include the costly increased number of
vacuum tubes and electr·omagnets, relays and
switches , wires and motor that electronic
equipment makers have had lv provide for
other industries to speed their war production
job . 2
l ''Electronics :

1943, p . 133 .
2
p. 24.

A Lever On In ustry ,

"Electr ... nics Era ,

Busines

Fortune , July ,

eek, July 29, 1944,
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Some idea of how the war affected this industry can
be obtained from a description of the Navy's demand for
electroni c apparatus during the war.

At the end of

December 1941, the Navy comprised a total of 2,082 vessels
and landing craft, in each of which one transmitter and
twt receivers were installed.

By December 1944, this

figur e had risen to 37,981 as a result of the shipbuilding
program.

Large aircraft carriers installed 101 complete

sets, each consisting of two to fifteen transmitters and
receiver .

A battleship had 78 s uch sets; a small mot or

torpedo boat, seven; and smaller types of landing craft,
13.

It has been estimated that between December 1941 and

March 1945, 300,000 complet e sets, each comprising two to
f ifteen major units of equipment, had been installed in
)8, 00 ve sels and landing crart.3
As for purposes other than communication, it was
believed that so great were the wartime strides in the
application of electronic controls, that the p ostwar
dollar volume of industrial electronic tube s would outrank that of tubes f or radio reception, long distance
telephone, and other c ommunication .4

3J. B. Dow, nsome Navy Electronics Problems and a
Proposal f or a Radar Patent Pool," Electri cal Engineer~. March, 1945, p. 88 .
4 •·An Electronic War,,. Busines ,; Week, March 28, 1942, p . 56.
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Of the plants conetructed by the Defen e Plant
Corporation in the radi o and communications indu try,
mo~t

of them were .;ponsored by the \l;ar Department 1

Signal Corp

The total investment in 57 plants con-

.;tructed by the
$5 5,000,000 .
an

Defen~e

Plant Corporation approximated

The Defense Plant Corp ration disbur ed

dditi onal $33,000,000 for investment in equipment

for lease to man ufacturers operati
rly Development of the

97 other plant . 5
ectronic Tube

Thermionics, the term applied to the study of the
di charg

of electricity from

~hot

in the 17th and 18th centuries.

bodie , " was developed

Uuually experiment

w r

conducted in air at atmo.;pheric pres ure by philosophers
un

~tatic

electricity.

During the l

O•s, Ott o von

Guericke invented a primitive vacuum pump an an electrvstatic friction mach1n •
I

The pump made it possible to

remove air from a gla s vessel and by attaching two
electrod s inside the evacuated glass vessel, a colorful discharged gas could be observed.
investigation was done on th
when th
Crooke

work of

Not much serious

Jubject until the 1870 ' s ,

ilhelm Hittorf in Germany and

illiam

vf Great Britain re ulted in research which led

5
U. S. Secretary of the Treasury, Final Report of
t he Recon truction Finance Corporation, 1959 , p . 287 ,
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to the development of the electron theory and the development of modern electronic tube .

The incandescent

lamp developed by Thoma

the father of

A. Edison wa

the radio tube, whi le a British profes or , J, A.
Fleming , developed t he firet vacuum tube detector for
radio v1ave · • b
Lee de Forest in 1906 invented

device called the

•audion• which he intended to be an improved detector
o. radio sif,nal3 .

The ••audion• for ook the patho; of

gaseous diacbarge and became
vice.

purely electronic de-

This invention increa ed the sensitivity of the

vacuum tube by adding a grid, which controlled the flow
of electrons .
tube caul

It was eventually di covered that de Forest '

not only detect r die

i

ls but coul

amplify

them .?
The entry of the Unit d State

into

orld War I

pJdtponed further American development of the electronic
tube , and directed the accumulated techniques t oward
immediate

mili ~ ary

problem , ouch as radio communi ca-

tion betwaen planes and

ound

tations .

Fol l owi ng the

b

F. J . Tyne, "Saga of the Vacuum Tube, '' Radio liews ,
t'.arch , 1943, p. 44; ''Tho! El ectronic Tube," Science ,
October 13, 1944 , p. 10 .
7 John lilltJ, • Forty Year of Electronics , " Techno1ozy
June, 1944, pp, 486- 487; Science, p . 10 .

~.
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ar, sc re

of companie

f r civilian U.:>e.

be

n producing radio tube

Later the vacuum tub

1-1as

u.:~ed

the motion-picture indu try, in public -addres
and in the phonograph recording industry .

in

yst m ,

During the

1930 1 3, there was considerable work done to improve the
earlier developed applications an to develop n w ones.
The chief difficulty wa

the fact that industrial

electronic applicatior, wa:~ ahead c f indu trial acceptance. 8
As

wa~

true in

orld

ar I,

pr ~ duction

manufacturing was great l y increa ed during

in electronic
orl

War II.

In addition to the need fvr electronic tubes for communication , the vacuum tube became import nt for a ho t of
complex
r

r

n
a

highly developed guidance oJY tem ,
the most important.

ment built

evel'al pl t

electronic tubes .
Radio Tube plant in
~artime

In

~~rch

'<d\ich

s

hich

During the war, the govern~.

re designed to produce

One such plant wa

the Eitel McCullough

lt Lake City.

Operation of the Eitel McCullough Plant
of 1942 , con ·truction began in Salt Lake City

on thf! radio tube manufacturing plant .
plant wa

f

The co t of the

$1,112,000 , of which $353,000 was financed by

John rlill , ~· .£.!!., p . 488; A. C. Montieth,
· Electro~c in Po twar Indu.;~try, '' ~ . November 1,
1943, p . 109 .
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tel McCullough--the wartime
The balance

p

rator~

of the plant.

s paid by the Defense Plant Corporati on.

Both the operating company and the construction contractoro , the Harrison and Doorman Company , were from
Jan Bruno, California .9
Construction as completed and production began i n
Au~ust

of 1942.

ith the opening of the Salt Lake plant,

titel McCull ough , then only ei

t years old, became the

large t exclu ive manufactur r

f electronic tube

the Unit d States.

in

The company reportedl y pi cked Salt

Lake City for the location of the plant due to its inland location,

The company claim d, however, that the

calib r of men and women available for employment in
Utah played an important part in th

deci ion for the

plant ' s location ,l
By July 1943, the Eitel McCullough plant in Salt

Lake City wa receiving

by thi

tate- wide recognition as typified

statement made by Gov rnor H. B. Maw upon com-

pletion of a tour of the plant .

9
Salt Lake Tribune, March 13, 1942, p . 17; U. S.
Civilian Production Administration , Bureau of Demobilization, ar Indu3trial F cilitie
uthorized, July 194
to August 1945, pages not numbered.
10

Salt Lake Tribune, July 28, 1943, p . ll; December
b , 1942 , p . 3B.
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The company is performi
rebl war work by the
production of tube~ an ot her devices that will
~ave many • f our boy~' live, and I feel confi dent that thid will become a permanent indu try,
becau~e radio and oth r f rmJ of communication
will expand and develop b yond our ronde t hope ,
and this plant will be in on the ground floor , ll
A week after the Governor's visit, the Salt Lake plant
received an Army- Navy "E''
uction in war materials.
waJ awarde

ward for excellence in pro9iA month

a "star• to be ad ed to it

later, the plant
Arn.y

The "at r•• ignified six additional month
duction achievementu .

H. V.

avy ''E" .

of high pro-

il on, a sistant manager

of the plant, said of the "E' a war

t

\'ie feel that this award is a credit to th em.
ployees of the plant
inc m at of them prior
to coming here were inexperience and without
pecial training. \';e feel that they eserve a
great deal of credit f( r th v a shcrttim in
which they have won this award . l2
One month after receiving the " tar" officials
announced that work shift
be discontinued,

on Saturday and Sunday would

The company claimed that thi

did not

mean the closing of the plant, but that the employees
~ere

more efficient and were able to

worker

ere laid off .

11

~

12
p . 13.

..

rk fa tar .

No

On March 8, 1944, however, two

July 21, 1943, p. 15.

~- . July 28 , 1943, p. 11; January 26, 1944,
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~hi ft ~

of

at the plant were eliminated due to the lack

A proximately twv- thirds of

uVPrnment contracts.

the employees , 1,100 personJ,

er

laid off .

The v:ar

Department, when announcement of the cancellation of
c •ntracts
emphas i~

wa~

made, blamed the action on a shift in

in the types of t ubes needed .

By August 1945,

the number of employees at the plant had dropped to

2?5 .

Ordero> at that tim

11ere sufficient to keep the

plant open onl y a few more l>'eek •

In October of that

year , the Navy rein tated a limited contract t o the
lant, but only 50 employee" were necessary f or the
program,lJ
Po:.;twar

Use-

of th

In Augu t 1945 , the plant

Radio Tube Plant
wa~

declared surplus property .

The plant wa3 put up for aale in July of 1946, and the
placed on the plant by the government ~1as $735 , 000 , 14

valu

In January 1947, thre
The bidders were :

concerns bid on the plant ,

\estern Salvage and Suppl y of Salt

Lake City ; Morri on- Merri ll and Company of Denver , Col orado ;
and the Utah State Road Commission.

The Commi ssion bid

lJ

Ibid . , February 27 , 1944, p . lB ; l4arch 9, 1944 ,
12, 1944, p. 9B · larch l J 1944, p. lJ ; Augu t
18, 1945 , p . 15 ; Augu t 2S, 1945, p. 16 ; October ?, 1945 ,
p . lJ·

~

p . 1) .

14 Ibid . , August 24 , 1945, p . lJ ; ,Jul y 1) , 1946, p . 1).
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~1 5

,00

fo r the structure.

One month later, the War

A~set s Administr ation turned do~n all bids.l5

In April 1947, the government invited bid
plant once again .

on th

The Utah State Road Commi sion bid

ag in on the plant, and in August the War Assets Adminiatration approved the Commi s ion•~ bid of $155 ,
The Commi s ion planned t o uJe the fac tory a
road

hop.

a central

To reconvert the plant, the Commi

ion planned

the removal of ex1 ting machinery and the installation
vf a nei concrete floor an

over- head cranes.

The esti-

mated cost of the reconversion wao $100 ,0oo.l6
Postv1ar Significance of the Radio Tube Plant
The end of war brought an
duction program

pparent finish t o the pro-

of Eitel McCullough in the

tate of Utah .

It appeared that electronic tube production in the etate
wa

dtrictly a wartime program.

pr ~gram

Government- supported

initiated the building of the radio tub e factory

and the continuance of the plant in Salt Lake City depended upon wartime markets .

Once the government stopped

purchasing radio tubes, production at the pl ant cea ed .
15

p. 2 .

Ibid ., January 8, 1947, p. lJ; February 7, 1947,

16~ •• April 4, 1947, p. 13; August 29 , 1947, p . 17.
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There never
e~ired

\Ia<>

any indication that Eit el McCullough

to operate the plant once the war was over.

Postwar demand for electronic tube ,

a~

far as Utah

was concerned, was apparently insufficient for economical
operation of the plant.

Fortune even claimed that Eitel

l·:cCullough ' s wartime expan.Jion wa.J a product of government
ta~t ics

to induce

pc.:~twar

competition in the electronic

indu~try ,l7

A

with the processing of carnotite in Utah, however,

the production of electronic tubes by &1tel McCullough
continued in the state as a re ult of a shift in type
of tubes produced .

In January 1949, Eitel McCullough

annowwed its intention t o return to Utah .
th t year, the company occupie
R mingt on

part of the f ormer

pl nt and wa p oduei

electronic tubes.

In May of

high frequency

It planned to manufacture 16- inch

televi.Jion tubes in the future .

Later, &1tel McCullough

produced electronic equipment for Utah ' s missile indu try .lg
What appeared to be a

11

dead 11 indu try for Utah in

t he immediate postwar period did ultimately result in
a succe sful postwar enterprise.

17 "Electronics :

18

A Lever on Induatry,'' Fortune, p . 205 .

3alt Lake Tribune, January 30, 1949, p . lOB ; May
2G, 1949, p . 17 .

lo4
Miscellane

u~

Authorizati vns

In addition t v t he plant:; already discubae , there
were

3

veral auth rizati on" madt> and plant::. expande

wit h

pri vate f und::> .,.hich were si nificant and de ·erve attenti on.
One auth.:.rizati on, f r .. hich federal funds "'ere
all o.ate

but no plant ever

... ~ magnesium depo::.t

in the

c o n~t .uc ted,

ta

wa::> fJr drilling

In early 19 1, it wa

thou ht that Utah held vaat magne ium r·esourc e<>
e

utili~ed

by the government for the >ar.

In September

1941, Governor Ma-< sugg sted in a t £>1 gr·am to

Knudsen of the Office

or

hich c ould

• 3.

Production t.'!anagem nt that the

gove1nment c<..nsider Utah au n pOill.liblc :;c u ce for
magn oium.

At the

Corpo1at

announced it.> intenti on to con truct t.,o plant

~h

nd J! 3ept

to pr .. duce mat'.n aium

er , the Utah J-1agneuiurn

t Cr ... cent Ju nction near Moab , for

which the c mpany lat r a k d thp gove nment f or
In Oct be · , t he Office o. Pr

75,000,

oo. 1 9

uction Management aak d

t or an investigation by t he Bureau of Mine.; for the dr·illing
of the deposit s in Utah bofure any authoriza t.ion
made .
~ ard

would be

In Apri 1 1942 , t he Defen:lf' Plant Corporation for d $150,000 to the Bureau of Mine::> for the investigation.

19

Ibia., February 18, 1941, p . 9; September 28 , 1941,
p. lA; October 2, 1941, p . 4
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On

~' ay

2 , 1942 , the drilling began in the area.

The

drilling showed that there were 13 ,740 ,000 pounds of
me tallic wagnesium and 1J ,26o tons of potash per acre
in the area.

The Utah Department of Publicity and Indus-

trial Development claimed:
This greatest of 11 potential Utah industries
cannot be stifled . Sensible, honest, decent
and patriotic business will not permit it nor
will millions ~f A erican whose homes bear
<'ervice tars. 0
Thereafter , efforts to establish a magnesium plant were
stifled

y the government .

The War Production Board

announced in 1942 that the second expansion program in

191,2 , increasing annual magnesium capacity to 725,000,000
pounds , was cut to 610,000,000 and finally 586,000,000
pounds .
gr~

~agnesium

in 1943 exceeded demands of the war pro-

and was so great that early in 1944 nearly 40 percent

of total installed capacity
administrator

wa~

ahut down .

The government

were obviously much more cognizant of the

supply situation for magnesium than were Utahns .

21

In addition to financing by the government , several
privately-financed plants were of some significance .

20

As

Ibid ., October ?1 , 1941, p. 9; April 3 , 1942, p. 19;
Utah Department of Publicity and Industrial Development,
Utah Industrial Development Jews , December 1 , 1942, p . 4 .
2

~1inerals Yearbook, 1942 , p . 767; 1943 , p . 765 .

l6b
could be e· pected , coppe
developed .

faci litie~

were great l y

The Ameri can Smeltin& and Refining Com-

pany eApanded

faci liti e~

by $217 , 000, the Int ernati onal

Smelting and Refining Company expanded f a ciliti es by

$1,124 , 0UO ,

ennecott Copper Company spent more than

$1J,u0 ,UUO, and the Utah Copper Company s pent
$1, 32,000 f or i t

plan t in

~~ na.

In addition, food

proces ing, electric power generati on and tran mis s i on,
rai l tran portation , and even parachute production facili ties were all developed through private f unds .

Private

fi nancing of f acilities in the state during the war
amount ed t o only about 9 perc nt of the total expan i on. 22

22

Industrial Facilities Authorized, p

es not
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CHAPTER

AND CONCLUSIONS

SU~.ARY

In addition to the
are several

conclusion~:~

diucuti~ion

in Chapter II, there

which can be drawn from

industrial development duri
mo ~t

VIII

th

war .

In th

Utah • ~

first place,

of the new in ustrial facilities authorized

the war f ?r the
a

triali~ed

tate

locate

~1ere

tch Front.

ment built plant

in the alreaJy indu -

Second , most of Utah'

dustry •1as financed publicly.

new in-

Third, many of the govern-

were unsuccessful as po

Fourth, es was probably true

uring

el~:~ewhere

t \~ar

uperation •

in the nati on , the

government had to sell the Utah plants below original
co t and accept the lou
other area

at~

a •·co t of war . "

Fifth, although

of groYith were greater than the primary

indu try, the

metal<~

artime indu trial authorization· for the

state revolved around the Geneva Steel plant .

Finally ,

Utah 's industrial growth during the period 1939 to 1947
waa large , but both the n ti vn
ha

nd the mountain Jtates

greater increases .
Just as was done nationally, most of Utah 1

industry

\~a

lated areas.

located in already in ustrialized an
The indu t r ial ize

Front received the major
Since

thi~

~tartime

J.:~ lt

and populated

popu-

a atch

of the wart i me fa cilities .

area had a large labor

uppl y , exi ting plants

which could be expanded , and developed means of trans-
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Utah'~

portation to markets, it received mo t of
v1artime dcfenae authorizati ons .

The combined authori -

zati ons f or Salt Lake, Tooele, Utah, Davis and
counties totals $290,993,000,

Most of tid

eber

figure is

ac counted for by the huge allotment for Geneva Steel in
Utah count y.

EVen if Geneva Steel had not been built in

th e state, r·owever , the Wa atch Front would have rec ived

103,347, 0

orth of n w

Table 4 dhows state- wide distribution o f

f acilities.
facilities b
shows tbe

123,471, 0

out of

counties f or Utah.

Map 2 on page 170

istrlbution by counties also .

Aa was

ointed out in Clartcr II, most of

wartime industrial development
Approximately 91 percent o

48

Utah•::~

financed publicly .

the facilities authorized

for the state were financed by the federal governrn nt.
Again, the Geneva Steel plant accountd for a great deal
of t he pu li e funds .
been built in the

Had the Gencvn Ste el ;, ork

st~te ,

public fund

for approxirnatel)' $96 ,000 , 00

,,u uld have accounted

or 78 percent: of the total.

f4oat of the government fi nancing wa s : or ne
and enterprises in t h

;_:tate , l.hile

centered around establi hcd concern
pe t ed that pr ivate invc t (.r
invest in new

on~erpriJes ,

dq nded on wai'time demand.

nut

1oul

plant u

r i vate finE.ncing
It was to be ex-

be reluct.

t. t u

the succe s of which largely
The Remington Arms Plant,
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Table 4.

Number of f irmb autho1ized

County
Beavor

Distribution of Utah a industri al facilities
authorized by Countie , July 1940 to August
1945
1

""

Carbon

1
2

Am.:>unt authoriz ed

$

20 ,000
2, 120,00
5 ,192 ,

Davi
chesne

2

203,000

Iron

1

300,000

Pi uta

1

28 ,000

a1t Lak

17

63 , 83 ,000

San ,Juan

3

1,475,000

San Pete

1

90 ,000

Tooele

4

Utah

5

217,588,0 0

.eber

7

1, 377 ,ooo

Variou

1c.

15, 75,000

Total

55

311,327,000

Source :

see table 7 in Appendix.

3,

6,000

170

UTAH

-,
TOOELE
• 3,006,000

BEAVER
$200 , 000

IRON
SJOO,OOO
SAN JUAN
$1 , 475,000

Source :

See Table 7 .

Map 2. Utah ' s industrial facilities by
countie&, July 1940 to August 1945.

171
the Kalunite Plant, the Monticello Vanadium Plant,
the t ungsten re- treatment plant and the Eitel
Mc Cullough Radio Tube Plant were all governmentbuilt plants which were
•ar period.

old or dismantled in the post -

None of these plant

resulted in a postwar

industrial facility operated by the wartime operator or
for the purposenr which it was originally constructed.
The Geneva Steel Plant, the Columbia pig iron plant,
the Utah Oil Refinery and the Lehi Refractories plant all
represent

uccessful wartime facilities whose operation

in the postwar period was that for which it was originally
con tructed.

All except the refractories plant were

operated in the postwar period by the wartime operator .
Eitel McCullough did return to Utah after the war, but
di

not oc cupy the plant it operated during the war.
It appear

that

ome of these plant , such as the

Kalunite a ·i Monticello vanadium plants, were actually
"forced" developments of industry, the natural development of

lihi

ch >>ould not have amounted to much .

Once the

wartime demand, whi ch made their operation possible, was
gone those ''marginal '' operations ceased .

The Utah Oil

Refinery and Geneva Steel plants were merely

extension~

of already successful prewar industrial c oncerns.
the war

~1as

over, their l ow c

Once

t and access t o we tern

markets made thei r ope ration economical and guaranteed
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their postwar success.

With the continued operation of

the steel industry in Utah, the Lehi Refractories Plant
was assured its continued operation.
The establishment of these unsuccessful plants in the
state and their wartime effect can be seen further from
the fact that Utah received more than the nation did on a
per capita basis of new facilities, yet, as

~~11

be seen,

Utah's gro\"lth was not as great during the period 1939 to
1947 as the national growth.

In other words, the dollars

spent in the state were not as '' efficient " as those spent
nationally.
The acquisition in the postwar period of the Utah
defense plants was largely done by a small group of bidders,
usually not more than three or four for any one plant .
Although the government rejected bids very often as being
too low , the lack of a large numb r of bidders on any one
plant might possibly mean that the government sold the
plants at lese than real

valu~.

Although the sale prices

are not known for all the government owned plants in Utah,
it is known that the government sold several plants to
private concerns for lees than cost,

Very often the

difference was substantial, as in the case of Geneva Steel.
The government actually sold the plant for $140,000,000
less than original cost.

The Utah Oil Refinery was sold

for $11,000,000 less than original cost.

The presence of

only a handful of bidders (in the case of the refinery,

173
only one) suggests that

uyers did not offer to purchase

the plants for their true value.

~orne

of this could be

accoun ted for by depreciated value of the plant facilities,
but the majori ty represents a "cost of war '' to the go vernre ent.
Fy far the

ost important wartiree f acility built in

the state was Geneva fteel .

Other areas of the economy,

ho\'rever , had a greater percentag-e of new additions than
the

pri~ary ~etals

industry .

The fa ricated

metal ~

industry in Utah had twice the percentage increase in the
number of establishments that the primary metals industry
enjoyed and the percentage increase in the machinery
industry was more than four times primary metals. 1 The
apparel , furniture and fixtures, and chemi cals and related
products indu tries all had greater or compara le increases
to the fabricated metals industr

Table 5 compares the

number of establishments in roth 1 39 and 1947 for the
nation, mountain states and Uta.h .

Geneva Steel , by virtue

of the enormous investment made and the suc ce ss of its
po twar operations , overshadows any single achieve ent in
any industry in the s tate during the war .

1

An establishment differs from a fi rm in that a
firr. rna have many establishrents . Each ~ranch of a
firm is treated as one esta lishnent .
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Finally, Utah's indu try by any meaaure made appreciable gaind during th

war.

During the period 1939 to

1947, there was an increa e of 223 new establi hment
the state.

in

This was a 40 percent increase over the

number of establishments in the
the nation and the mountain

tate in 1939.

~tates

Both

increased the same

item by 38 and 33 percent respectively for the same
period of time .

Table 5 on the fo llowing page shows

the compari on of th

number of establishment

nation, the mountain state

and Utah .

A better measure, however, i
the manufacturer."

for the

the "value a ded by

The Bureau of Census claims:

In that it approximates the value created in
the process of manufacture , value added provides the mo t sati factory mea ure of the
relative economic importance o
ven indu tries
available in the Censu of Manufacturers . 2
If the "value added by the manufacturer" i
comparison to the nation and mountain
that Utah'

used,

tates indicates

percentage increase over 1939 is somewhat

below average.

It is true that Utah increased by 196

percent its ••value added by the manufa cturer•• between
the years 1939 and 1947, but the nation increased by

2

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Cen us ,
Cen us of Manufacturers, 1947, p. 18 . The r.value added
by manufacturer" is calculated by ubtracting the co st
(f materials, supplie , and containers, fuel , puroha ed
electric energy and contract Hork from the t otal of
shipments .
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Table 5.

Comparison of number o~ establishments in
nation, mountain states and leading inuutries in Utah, 1939 and 194 7.

Number of
establishment a
1939
1947

Industry

All industries, U. S. 173,802

Increase

Percent
change
1939- 47

240,881

67 ,079

38

3, 787

5,049

l,2t>2

33

Utah
All industries

549

772

22 3

40

Food and kindred
product<>

257

285

213

10

8

8

8

0

Apparel and related
products

14

33

19

135

Furniture an
indu:>try

fixtures
ll

23

12

109

Printin • and
indu try

publi~hing

91!

1?8

3

3

Chemicals and allied products
15

30

15

1 0

All industries,
,ountain .Jtatesa

Textile mill products

Petroleum and coal products

o

9

3

50

St one, clay and glass
productu
Primary metals in ustry

37
lb

58
24

21
8

56
50

Fa ricated metal
industry

16

32

16

12

17

5

lu

~'.achinery

(except
electrical )

41
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Table 5.

Continued

Num!Jer of
establishments

Indu try

Increa.oe

Percent
change
1939- 47

19)9

1947

1

J

2

200

Instruments and related
2
products

4

2

100

118

62

111

Electrical equipment

Other

56

ainclude Montana , Id ho , wyoming, Colorado , New
Mexi co, Ariz ona, Utah, nd Neva a .
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce , Bureau of
Mines , Censu1:1 of !muufacture , 1947, pp . 21, JO, 60) .
2 J percent while the mountain
percent.

tate

increased by 211

Table 6 on the following page compares the

value added by the manufacturer'' for the nati on, the
mountain states and Utah.
orld \ ar II bro

ht great industrial strides to

the state , although there \ere some set- backs .

The in-

dustrial development during the Sec ond World War
presaged the development which wa s continued in the post vmr er

of t he Cold War .

Both war and the threat of war

have init iat ed great industrial devel opment in the state
of Ut ah.

Table 6. Comparison of value added by manufacturer for nation , mounta in
states and leading indus tri es of ltah (dollar amounts in thousands)

Increase

1 change
1939- 1947

. 71. , 425 , 825
839 , 202

$49 ,938 , 521
569 , 811

203
211

128,298
42 , 91.8
1 , 241
3 , 1.33
1 , 392
9 ,930
5, ll2
12 , 222
5, 627
34 ,099
4 , 212
3 , 215
21
94
5 , 292

l:l4 ,957
26 , 288
618
2, 723
975
5, 171
3 ,072
9 ,126
3 , 697
23 ,948
2, 745
2 , 660

196
157
99
383
233
122
150
285
191
235
187
479
___ b

3 ,919

285

Value added ty manufacturer

Indus try

1939
All industries, u.s.
All industries, Ht n . States
Utah
All industries
Food and kindred products
Textile mill products
Apparel and related product s
Furniture and fixtures industry
Pri ntin and pu lishing industry
Chemicals and all i ed product s
Petroleum and coal products
Stone, clay and glaos products
Primary metals industry
Fabricated metal industry
Ma chinery (except electri cal)
Electrical equipment
Instruments and related products
Other

. 24 ,287, 304
269 , 381
43 , 431
16 , 66o
623
710
J.l7
4 ,219
2 ,040
3 ,196
1 ,930
10 ,151
1 , 467
555 a
___
___ a
1 , 373

1947

aNot shown in order not to show individual records.
bCannot be determined.
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Census of
turers, 1947, pp . 21 , 30 , 6o3 .

anufac-
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APPENDIX A

TaHe 7.

• ar industrial facilities authorized for Utah, July 1940-August 1945
(amounts in thousands of dollars)
AMOunt authorized

Company

Location

Product

Public

Total
Amount
Aluminum Inc.
American Can Co.

arysvale
O""den

Alura.ina, Potassium
sulphate
Fabricated metal
containers

Private

Sponsor
and source8

280

2SO

83

8)

Am rican Rolling Salt Lake
ill o.

Sheet metal

821

821

American Smelting and
Refining

lister copper,
Elemental sulphur
Black arsenic lead

114
121

82

82
114
121

Copper, lead , zinc, 1,124
impure zinc oxide,
lead 1.\rme

1,124

International
Smelting and
Refining Co.

Garfield
f·lurray
Tooele

Beaver City Corp . Beaver

Electric power
generation

200

Blanding Mines

Vanadic oxide

70

Blanding

200

70

WPB-DPCb

1-'

«»
cr.

Table 7.

Continued
A.mount authorized

Co pany

Location

Product

Pu lie

Total
A.mount
ounti.t'ul. City
Corp.

Bounti.t'ul.

Electric power
generation

Calder Brothers
Crea.mery

Various

Butter , skim
milk powder

Carbon Dioxide
and Che.mical
Co.

Various

Carbon dioxide

Carbon City
Railway

Various

Colder Brothers
Inc.

Private

Sponsor
and source

51

51

102

10 2

52

52

Rail transportation

263

263

Roosevelt

Butter, skim milk

124

124

Combined Metals
Production Co.

Bauer

Refined resin

190

190

Draper Eggs Inc.

Draper

Food processing

Eitel

Salt Lake

Radio transmission l,H2
tubes, relays

cCullough

77

77
759

WAR£DPC

353

.....

en

-..J

Ta le 7.

Continued
Amount authorized

Company

Location

Product

Pu lie

Total
Amount

Private

Sponsor
and source

Electric Power
and Light

Various

Electric power
transmission

675

675

Fruehauf' Trailer

Salt Lake

Repair and
maint enance

102

102

Fur Ereeders
Agric . Coop .

''idvale

Animal feed

51

51

Garfield Chemicals and f.f g .

Garfield

Sulphuric dioxide
gas , sulphuric
acid

1,376

1 , 376

Geneva Transportation Co .

Geneva

r•o tor vehicle
transportation

Gladding •c ean
and Co.

Lehi

Kaiser, H. J . Co .

Sunnyside

Coal

Kaluni t e Inc.

Salt Lake

Alumina

ilica tri ck

65

65

ODT- DPCd

625

625

'P - DPC

863
5, 454

863
5, 454

WP - DPC

......

~
~

Table 7.

Continued
Amount authorized

Company

Location

Product

Public

Total
Amount

Private

Sponsor
and source

Kennecott Copper

Various

Copper

Laher Spring and
Tile Co.

Salt Lake

Automotive springs

Lion Coal Co.

Ogden

Coal

f'orrison
and Co.

Salt Lake

Terminal facilities

58

58

Nielson and
Perry Co.

Salt Lake

Food processing

57

57

Ogden Transit

Ogden

Transportation

88

sa

Ohio Copper Co.

LaSal

Copper

~errill

13,568

13,568
50

50
219

219

RFCe

ll5

115

Parachutes

90

90

Ogden

Cold packed .fruits

98

98

Provo

Electric power
generation

872

872

Parachute Co. of
California

~anti

Pringle R and D
Co.
Provo City

t-'

~

..0

Table 7.

Continued
Amount authorized

Company

Location

Product

Public

Total
Amount
Remington Arms
Co .

Salt Lake

Richfield Oil Co . Various

Small arms amcunition
36,212
arehouse and
storage

36,212

Private

Sponsor
and source
ORD-'\>lARf

185

185

79

79

Smith Canning Co . Clearfield Frozen vegetables

n

77

Tellur ide Pm,rer
Co .

Various

Elec tri c transmission

50

50

Union Car ide
Corp .

Salt Lake

Tungst en

United States
far Dept .
Chemical warfare servi ce

Dugway

Granite Peak Proect

Roosevelt Food
Products

Roosevel t

Ogden Ordnance Ogden
Depot

Dehydrated foods

hell loading

WPB-DPC

423

423

1,475

1,475

O'lS- ARg

5,000

5, 000

ORD- •AR

1-'

"'
G

Table 7 .

Continued
Amount aut horized

Company

Location

Product

Public

Total

Private

Amount

Sponsor
and source

Dugway Proving Tooele
Grounds

Or dnance testing

217

217

ORD - ~AR

Quartermaster
Depot

Clo thing renovation

720

720

CWS- \iAR

U. S . Smelting and Various
Refining Co .

Crude arsenical
ore, lead
ullion

5)6

U. S. Steel Co .
Colum ia Steel Ironton

Iron and iron or e 28 , 441J

Geneva Steel
Utah Copper Co.

Ogden

Geneva

Steel products

l~agna

Copper

Utah Fire Clay Co. Salt Lake

Structural clay
products

Utah Fuel Co.

Coking
coke

Sunnyside

COal

and

187,586

5)6

28,237
187 ,586

\'lP

- DPC

203

WPB-DPC

1 ,032

1 ,032

154

154

1,257

1,257

I-'

>C)

I-'

Utah Ice and
torage Co .

Ogden

arehouse

89

89

Table 7.

Continued
Amount authorized

Company

Location

Product

Pu lie

Total

Utah Hagnesi um
Co.

Vanadium Corp .
of America
·: asatch Oil
Refining Co.
ashington Gas
and Electric
Co.

Sponsor
and source

150

150

WPE-DPC

Aviation gasoline 16,454

15,900

PA - DPCh

1 , 29

PB-DPC

Various

Utah 011 Refining Salt Lake
Co .

Private

Amount
ell drilling

.:onticello Vanadium pentoxide 1 , 290
oods Cross

Petroleum refining

645

64

64

Cedar City Electric power
generation

300

300

Dairy products

eo

80

lectric power
transmission

76

76

We er Central
Dairy

Ogden

Western Colorado
Power Co .

Various

.....

-a
N

Ta le 7.

Continued
Amount authorized

Company

Lo cation

Product

Public

Total
Amount
'/estern Laundry
Press Co.

Salt Lake

Oil drain valves

Private

Sponsor
and source

89

89

8sponsor is the overnment agency authorizing the project and amounts noted.
Source is the government a ency from which the necessary funds were made availa le.
P :

ar Production Board; DPC: Defense Plant Corporation.

AR: 'ar Department.
dODT: Office of Defense Transportation.
eRFC: Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
fORD: Army Ordnance Corps.
~ S : Chemical

arfare Service.

hPA~I : PetroleUill Administration for 'ar.
Source : U.S. Civilian Production Administration, ·lar Industrial Facilities
Authorized, July 1940 to August 1945.

